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Abstract 
 
This dissertation theorises the depoliticised conditions of late capitalism 
through what I call a ‘neoliberal and militarised post-politics.’ It argues that 
ours is a neoliberal and militarised post-political society that cannot 
imagine disruptive revolutionary events. The dissertation addresses key 
debates on governmental social regimes of neoliberal post-politics, the 
inseparability of neoliberalism and war/militarism, and the 
historical/geographical unevenness of global capitalism. In so doing, it 
offers an original topological analysis that makes the following critical 
interventions: an exploration of how the much-discussed social regimes of 
sovereignty, discipline and control relate to each other in the production of 
neoliberal governmentality; an analysis of the affective logic each regime 
entails and how they inter-relate; a proposal for a fourth regime, 
‘terrorism’, and a theorisation of its associated affect, ‘spite.’ Finally, 
radical critique as divine violence is set against neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
The possibility of properly political action is an ancient question that has 
been continuously rearticulated through changing conditions. This question 
of the political is still as urgent as ever in these neoliberal times. Often 
dubbed ‘post-political’, current conditions have sparked incisive if 
sometimes despairing analyses of how and why truly political collective 
action seems so difficult in the current historical juncture of ever-spreading 
marketisiation and militarisation (Badiou, 2012; Bauman, 2012; Diken, 
2009; 2012; Harvey, 2005; Graham, 2010; Žižek, 2010; 2011; 2012). Much is 
said of the debilitating and even violent effects of individualisation from 
both Marxist and poststructuralist perspectives (Dean, 2010b; Dikeç, 2007; 
Harvey, 2003; Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 2010; Žižek, 2008a; 2008b). But one 
of the most tantalising but undeveloped aspects of this body of scholarship 
has been the affective aspects of post-politics. In this dissertation I offer a 
systematic theoretical analysis of not only some of the effects of post-
politics on political subjectification, but of how its affective logics are 
integral to its regimes of power, regimes which help condition the field of 
power in which political subjectification takes place. Furthermore, 
discussions of these regimes have largely been confined to the triad of 
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sovereignty-discipline-government familiar from Foucault (2007; 2008) and 
the regime of control suggested by Deleuze (1995). Here I argue that these 
regimes alone are insufficient to account for the peculiar violence of 
neoliberalism. I propose an additional regime, ‘Terrorism’, with its 
associated affect of spite, in order to theorise the special relationship 
between neoliberalism and terrorism. 
 
While this dissertation theorises neoliberal post-politics, many – but not all 
– of neoliberalism’s characteristics are generic to capitalism, and so the 
dissertation often makes use of the past to make sense of the present. As 
Walter Benjamin (1969: 261) pointed out in the advent of fascism, 
revolution “is a tiger’s leap into the past”, which enables human subjects to 
fulfil some historic task by linking the present to the time of the virtual. 
Simply put, in order to understand the present, the whole of the past has 
to converge with the present. In the process, moment of the past and 
moments of the present eventually coalesce meaningfully, disrupting the 
continuum of history and thus providing the subject of history with a 
theoretical and practical framework for altering the present. And so I put 
relevant theoretical and cultural productions from the past century and 
more in conversation with current intellectual and historical developments. 
I say much more about the approach taken in structuring the argument 
below. But first, why appeal to cultural productions? They are key here, 
given the centrality of affect to this project. They are the bridge between 
the theoretical and the empirical, as they give sensible form to the 
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conceptual. Furthermore, while this is not an empirical study, they serve as 
empirical ‘evidence’ of a particular sort to complement the current events 
also discussed, as they are materially symptomatic and exemplary of the 
logics being explored here, including those that are untimely or out of 
place in terms of their original production. 
 
Second, it is worth noting at the outset that many of the theories and 
cultural productions used here specifically address the political within 
urban life. Indeed this project was initially conceived as an exploration of 
the logics of neoliberal urbanism. Yet it quickly became apparent that the 
rationalities of post-politics jump scale, and that theorising neoliberalism 
and its violence at the urban scale would be an additive factor that would 
expand this project beyond manageable bounds. Instead, this study takes 
its cue from a central insight of scholarship on modernity, that urban ways 
of life have colonised multiple scales from the global to the intimate as 
time-space compression has continued (Coaffee et al, 2009; De Cauter, 
2004; Dikeç, 2007; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2004; 2010; 
Harvey, 1990; 2012). Thus many examples are urban, but theorising the 
urban per se alongside affective rationalities and regimes of power will 
have to be a separate project. 
 
And so this dissertation theorises neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
and historical social regimes and their affective structures. It argues that 
ours is a post-political society in which lives inhabit a time all of their own, 
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unrelated and unbothered by disruptive ‘revolutionary’ events. As such, it 
does not give us, “all of us, the space and time to become something else, 
the right and opportunity to experiment, to enable lines of flight, to forge 
solidarities” (Amin et al., 2000: 26). Neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
- the institutionalised reaction, the systematic silence - is the clear logic 
beneath this process. 
 
The ideal of a world without conflict, antagonism and radical political 
change is the problem of neoliberal and militarised post-politics. It is 
precisely for this reason that confronting post-politics must be a political 
question. For politics proper is always an intervention into a particular 
situation, against specific agents. If conflict, antagonism and ‘the event’ are 
invisible in our contemporary post-political condition, the challenge of 
politics today is to make them appear. The task of politics is, in other 
words, to shift conflict and antagonism to their proper place. But in what 
form? At this point, let us focus on agonism as a common good that can 
accommodate conflict, passions and creative destruction. 
 
1.2 Agonism 
 
Agonism is a political theory which, following the ancient Greeks, asserts 
contest and struggle as the proper bases for politics. In doing so, it 
challenges some of the fundamental commitments of liberal theory as 
embodied in procedural/aggregative model (e.g. Schumpeter) and 
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consensualist/deliberative democracy (e.g. John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas). In both models, the primary aim is to achieve a ‘rational’ 
consensus by means of free discussion (Habermas, 1996; Rawls, 1996). 
Theorists of agonism are, however, sceptical of the possibility of a 
consensus-based liberal politics. Hence agonists specifically focus on what 
Chantal Mouffe (1996: 247) calls the “ineradicable character” of “power 
and antagonism.” 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that there are different versions of 
agonism, such as the work of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and William 
Connolly, but I want to exclusively refer to Mouffe’s and Connolly’s work 
when I use the term “agonism.”1 This is because their agonistic politics are 
based on the notion that politics proper cannot be thought of without 
adversaries, that they are both inspired by Nietzsche’s agon, that politics is 
based on affect and difference, and that conflict and antagonism are 
fundamental ingredients of adversarial politics. In short, both of them aim 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 Agonism is, after all, a classical concept used by more than one advocate. It is also 
referred to as “strong democracy” (Barber, 1984); “virtu politics” (Honig, 1994) and 
“deliberative neo-pluralism” (Mansbridge et al, 2010). 
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to target consensual politics, which has a good deal in common with 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Since we cannot and should not 
eliminate conflict, antagonism and difference from the domain of politics, 
both Mouffe and Connolly guide us to construct a politics of adversaries 
rather than enemies, which would entail an ongoing process of conflict, 
antagonism and affect. 
 
In what follows, I refer to Mouffe’s recent work on The Political (2005) and 
Connolly’s work on Identity/Difference (2002) and Pluralism (2005). Heavily 
inspired by Nietzsche, Mouffe’s work on the political is an updated 
extension of her earlier collaboration with Laclau (2001), but it 
differentiates from that work in the sense that it focuses on post-political 
politics, which is embodied in “Third Way politics” (Giddens, 1998). 
Similarly, Connolly’s work on identity/difference guides us to aim toward a 
politics of adversaries rather than enemies, which has also common 
denominators with neoliberal post-politics. To articulate Mouffe and 
Connolly’s work in the context of post-politics, I aim to build up a critical 
approach, returning each to agonism via Nietzsche’s agon, thus showing 
the weak sides of their agonistic politics. Conversely, I assert, radical 
politics based on Nietzsche’s agon should accommodate struggle, as well as 
affects and will. 
 
Let us start with Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe argues that deliberative 
democracy cannot accommodate deep difference; it does not produce 
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difference (in the sense of antagonism, dialectic) but rather a deliberation 
which denies passion in favour of consensus. In this sense Mouffe (1996: 
16; 2005: 14, 20-1) proposes “agonistic pluralism” as a fundamental 
ingredient of public culture and politics that involves “a vibrant clash of 
democratic political positions.” All of this brings us to the distinction 
between ‘politics’ and the ‘political.’ Whereas, according to Mouffe (2005: 
9), ‘politics’ refers to “the set of practices and institutions through which an 
order is created, organising human coexistence in the context of 
conflictuality provided by the political”, the ‘political’ refers to the 
potential emergence of new forms of antagonism, understood as a 
distinctive political experience in which particular identities can be 
constituted and refuted. While the political refers to the distinctive 
experience of antagonism, politics necessarily involves an agonistic struggle 
for hegemony. And, in so far as politics is politicisation, politics without 
agonism is a depoliticised politics. The aim of an adequate democratic 
theory is, in contrast, to defuse antagonism and affirm democracy, that is, 
to provide the possibility for antagonism to be transformed into “agonism”, 
so that conflict takes a form “that does not destroy the political 
association” (ibid. 19-20). While antagonism designates a we/they relation 
“in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any common 
ground”, agonism designates a we/they relation “where the conflicting 
parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their 
conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents” (ibid. 
20). 
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Another significant exponent of agonistic pluralism is William Connolly’s 
work (2002) on identity/difference. Connolly, like Mouffe, follows a 
Nietzschean tradition, suggesting that agonistic democracy is capable of 
mediating the two poles of identity/difference. By both demonstrating the 
centrality of identity and difference with regard to life while being aware of 
the dangers of the identities getting dogmatized, Connolly also folds “care 
for the protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence 
of identity/difference” (2002:  x). Connolly’s thesis can be divided into 
three main propositions. He suggests as a first step that life requires 
identity. Second, he argues that identities create and maintain differences. 
Identities are formed by way of constitutive others; they refer themselves 
to a “constitutive outside”2 against which they define themselves. That is 
to say, identities are structurally incomplete; they are always marked by a 
constitutive outside which both constructs and deconstructs them. Third 
proposition is what Connolly (ibid. ix) calls “the second problem of evil”, 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Laclau and Mouffe (1985) also argue that the political 
field and identities are constructed through the production of a determining outside. In 
other words, the very domain of politics and identities establish themselves through the 
naturalisation of the “pre-” or “non-” political. In Derridean terminology, this is called the 
production of a “constitutive outside.” 
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which “emerges out of solutions to the first one.” The second problem of 
evil, according to Connolly (ibid. x), “flows from diverse political tactics 
through which doubts about self-identity are posed and resolved by the 
constitution of an other against which that identity may define itself.” “To 
explore this territory”, Connolly (ibid. x) writes, “is to struggle against the 
evil done by attempts to secure the surety of self-identity.” 
 
According to Connolly, the two evils of identity/difference must be 
protected. Identity can be the source of “the second problem of evil”, but it 
is also a defining dimension of life. In this respect, contemporary politics 
does not seek to eliminate identity from the domain of life, for “to do so 
would be to work against a public ethos of deep pluralism” (ibid. xxii). It is 
in this respect that Connolly proposes agonistic respect as a constitutive 
element of politics and society, which consolidates identity through the 
constitution of difference. Agonistic democracy is based on agonistic 
respect which “is a civic virtue that allows people to honor different final 
sources, to cultivate reciprocal respect across difference, and to negotiate 
larger assemblages to set general policies” (ibid. xxvi). Agonistic respect is a 
fundamental political virtue in a society “in which partisans find themselves 
in intensive relations of political interdependence” (ibid. xxvi). As such, it 
seeks to combine tolerance with the possibility of “selective conflict” in its 
practice. But how can agonistic respect flourish in contemporary society? 
Agonistic respect “flourishes most when it becomes a reciprocal virtue 
cultivated by interdependent partisans” (ibid. xxviii). However, agonistic 
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respect for the other is not enough to establish an ‘expansive ethos of 
pluralism.’ It also needs to involve the civic virtue of critical 
responsiveness” (Connolly, 2005: 127). Whereas, according to Connolly 
(ibid. xxviii), agonistic respect “speaks to relations between already 
crystallized constituencies”, critical responsiveness “speaks to the relation 
a crystallized constituency pursues to a disqualified minority struggling to 
migrate from an obscure or negated place below the register of legitimate 
identity to a place on that register.” To embrace critical responsiveness as a 
civic virtue “exposes the extent to which a positive ethos of political 
engagement exceeds the reach of any fixed code, austere set of 
procedures, or settled interpretation of moral universals” (ibid. xxx). 
Predicated upon the notion of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, 
agonistic democracy thus opens up political space for agonistic relations of 
adversarial respect (ibid. x, 86). 
 
Connolly’s work is a significant attempt at linking identity and difference. 
His understanding of agonism, however, is not devoid of difficulties. In 
order to clarify this point, we need to take a closer look at Nietzsche’s 
agon. As is well known, God dies in Nietzsche’s world. But Nietzsche is 
indeed far more interested in asking what happens when ‘God is dead.’ 
Nietzsche points out that if God is dead, then so is Man, or “at least the 
conception of humanity favoured by the guardians of social order” 
(Eagleton, 2012: 8). Hence his main concern is to create the Overman 
whose life is full of passion for greatness in a world without Gods. The 
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Overman is one who revolutionises the idea of himself without pretending 
that God is still alive. For this to happen, however, the Overman should 
engage in the art of the struggle because struggle is the essence of life. In 
his early essay “Homer’s Contest”, it becomes obvious that Homer’s 
contest occurs, for Nietzsche (1954: 34), in an “uninterrupted spectacle of 
a world of struggle and cruelty.” Hence Nietzsche values the Greeks for 
their embrace of cruelty, violence and destruction, the very affects that 
made the Greeks’ accomplishments achievable. Nietzsche’s agon, too, is a 
channel for our destructive affective capacities. In short, the Overman is 
the agonal spirit incarnate (see Thiele, 1990: 12). As such, he bears a 
“spiritualized enmity” that does not “stretch out languidly and long for 
peace desire peace” (Nietzsche, 2005: 173). In his world, strife is not the 
great-vote winner, but it is actually the best policy because from strife, 
from struggle “man emerges … stronger for good and evil” (Nietzsche, 
1986: 163). For life is a struggle, a conflict between two necessary aesthetic 
elements: Dionysus and Apollo. As Apollo creates boundaries, Dionysus 
transcends them; Apollo is life-preserving, Dionysus life-creating. 
 
Dionysus never finishes his labours. And the agon provides the opportunity 
for Dionysus to enjoy cruelty and transcend boundaries. In this sense the 
formulations such as the “full release of …hatred as a serious necessity”, 
“the tiger charged out”, or “the cruelty of the victory” (Nietzsche, 1954: 34-
39) refer to will to power, the supreme immanent principle of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy: “[a will to power] – when you speak of good and evil too, and 
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of valuations. You still want to create the world before which you can 
kneel: that is your ultimate hope and intoxication” (Nietzsche, 1961: 136). 
Seen in this perspective, life for Nietzsche is will to power, which expresses 
and seeks to expand itself. Life as will to power forces us to destroy old 
values and set new ones. Values are, however, not there in nature, waiting 
to be discovered, but instead are created, or willed. And it is through 
interpretation that values can be authentically created. To engage in 
competition requires us to view values from the perspective of a will to 
power as an immanent principle. Significantly, will to power should not be 
understood as success, for success can undermine the benefits derived 
from the contest. How is victory, therefore, measured? Victory is 
meaningful only when it “heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, 
power itself in man” (Nietzsche, 1990: 127). Nietzsche asks: “What is 
happiness?” He answers: “the feeling that power increases – that a 
resistance is overcome” (ibid. 127). In this sense the struggle is permanent. 
 
At this point, I seek to show that Nietzsche’s agon has an aesthetic 
dimension with respect to life. Nietzsche (1967b: 20) tells us that art is “the 
true metaphysical activity of his life.” Thus art and struggle are intimately 
connected. For Nietzsche, intoxication is indispensable for the agonistic 
struggle, and this applies to action as well. These points have been 
remarkably neglected by Connolly. When it comes to politics, Nietzsche’s 
agon should be thought of as an exit point which the will to power may 
take, be it the sublimation of passions, or creativity. As a common outlet 
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for the will to power, a uniquely political agon does not desire power but 
desires itself. That is, the political agon can only be satisfied in so far as the 
subject desires something other than power. Thus, although Connolly and 
Mouffe have made important contributions to the theorisation of 
democratic politics, there is a fundamental difference between their 
agonistic politics and the Nietzschean agonist. The key problem arises 
when they attempt to transfer the ontological agon to a normative status. 
For instance, they agree with Nietzsche that, ontologically speaking, 
absolute truth is an impossible one. In agonists’ hands, however, this can 
become a distinctly liberal-democratic and egalitarian normative claim. 
Thus Connolly (2005: 123-4), for example, places the emphasis of 
Nietzsche’s agon in entirely the wrong place, writing that: 
 
“An ethos of agonistic respect grows out of mutual appreciation for the 
ubiquity of faith to life and the inability of contending parties, to date, to 
demonstrate the truth of one faith over other live candidates. It grows out 
of reciprocal appreciation for the element of contestability in these 
domains. The relation is agonistic in two senses: you absorb the agony of 
having elements of your own faith called into question by others, and you 
fold agonistic contestation of others into the respect that you convey 
toward them.” 
 
What this passage reveals is how Connolly attempts to institutionalise 
Nietzsche’s agon which demands respect for others’ beliefs. My contention 
is that any attempt to institutionalise and formalise agon is doomed to fail. 
This is what Connolly’s agonism is about: the agon without the struggle. 
The Nietzschean agon is an ability to interpret, that is, to construct a 
perspective in which life, along with differences, is felt, experienced, lived. 
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In this sense, the agon is not submission to an already established 
institution; it is sustaining the struggle, the contest, while preparing the 
stage for potential contingencies. Crucially, and contrary to Connolly, the 
agon does not promote a conservative respect for institutions, for existing 
differences; it itself is pure difference. Thus the agon emerges out of a 
desire to think beyond the existing practices. As such, it demands its 
warriors create their values against another’s with the aim of deciding 
whose values are life-affirming and whose life-negating values must be 
ruthlessly destroyed. In this very concrete sense, Connolly’s agonistic 
pluralism predicated on conservative respect is insufficient to produce the 
agony of the perfect struggle, or Dionysian fervour and intoxication. As a 
consequence, Connolly’s agonism, and his emphasis on the opening of 
more political space, becomes a pseudo-agonism which produces no 
genuine political events, and no genuine political space, because it misses 
the necessary ‘affective’ dimension of Nietzsche’s political agonism. 
 
Converting difference into otherness, Connolly’s agonism, in short, seems 
to skip the value of struggle and cruelty. Nietzsche, however, repeatedly 
celebrates confrontation, struggle, cruelty and war. For Nietzsche, life 
simply is will to power and the will to power is a struggle for mastery over 
life. Paradoxically, however, Connolly (2002: 185) does not accept “the 
reading of Nietzsche as the consummate philosopher of world mastery.” As 
can clearly be seen from the following passage, he writes that: 
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“While such a reading is possible, it is not the single or necessary reading to 
be drawn from a thinker as protean as Nietzsche. It tends to be given by 
those who endorse strong transcendental or teleological perspectives. They 
presume that any ethic of care and self-limitation must flow from a 
teleotranscendental perspective, and that since Nietzsche noisily repudiates 
such a perspective, the coiner of the phrase ‘will to power’ must endorse a 
ruthless philosophy in which a few exercise mastery over other humans and 
nature.” (Connolly, 2002: 185) 
 
I agree with Connolly that Nietzsche’s agonism is not about world 
domination. And the same goes for will to power. Will to power as a 
struggle for “mastery over life” does not entail domination over people. 
Instead, it asserts confrontation, struggle and cruelty as fundamental 
features of life. But, in Connolly’s agonistic democracy, they are seen as 
positive, generative sources of potentiality. In contrast to Connolly, in his 
notion of life as will to power, Nietzsche (2005: 213) writes: “The free man 
is a warrior. – How is freedom measured? By the resistance which must be 
overcome…” This crucial point has been repeatedly ignored by Connolly. 
And despite that he is heavily influenced by Nietzsche, the insufficiencies of 
Connolly’s ethics necessarily becomes indexed to a politics of liberal 
tolerance in which antagonisms are reduced to agonism and agonistic 
respect to a general political dialogue. 
 
Let us now return to Mouffe. Though there are clear parallels between 
Connolly’s and Mouffe’s agonistic model of democracy, there is also a 
difference between the two approaches. While Connolly seems to think 
that “the ethos of pluralisation” constitutes a fundamental basis for 
democracy, Mouffe’s democratic politics is based on the idea of 
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democratic community and citizenship. I largely agree with Mouffe’s 
theorisation of post-political politics, which, according to her thesis, 
imposes consensus and excludes the ‘passions’ from politics. In a neoliberal 
post-political vision, as Mouffe suggests, the dimension of antagonism 
based on affect vanishes. For this reason, the post-political vision leaves no 
room for affective or passionate form of politics. Though Mouffe’s agonistic 
democracy goes beyond Connolly by proposing the idea of democratic 
citizenship, she seems to suggest a clean-cut distinction between 
rationality and affect. For instance, Mouffe argues (2005: 28) that 
democratic politics “needs to have a real purchase on people’s desires and 
fantasies and that, instead of opposing interests to sentiments and reason 
to passions, it should offer forms of identifications conducive to democratic 
practices.” Mouffe seems to be saying that values are irrational and there 
is an absolute distinction between reason and emotions, in the context of 
the political. However, I would argue that reason and affect can be only 
thought of together. 
 
As argued in detail above, Mouffe’s (2005: 21) democratic politics aims to 
sublimate antagonism and open up a space in which antagonism is 
transformed into ‘agonism.’ The process of sublimating or ‘taming’ 
antagonism brings to mind Nietzsche’s concept ‘transfiguration’, which is 
also about organising and channelling passions against those who are 
indifferent, which prevents one from going under because of one’s 
passions. In short, then, both antagonisms and passions are inherent to 
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political struggle “because there are passions, there are antagonisms, and 
because there are antagonisms, there are passions in society” (Diken, 
2009: 114). 
 
To clarify this point, Nietzsche’s notion of “joyful wisdom” can be useful. 
For Nietzsche (1960), joyful wisdom is a concept which conjoins the levity 
of affect with the gravity of reason. The real force behind wisdom is an 
immanent principle, the will to power. In other words, joyful wisdom is a 
question of will and passions; it is thus the most powerful affect of all. Like 
Nietzsche’s ‘perfect nihilism’, joyful wisdom refers to a practical activity 
that does not separate reason, affect and will from one another, but to an 
immanent principle which consists of reason and will in the same context. 
Behind the rational context of any politics there is also an affective force, 
an intensive desire. 
 
To put it bluntly, reason is not a barrier to living passionately. Referring to 
science, what Nietzsche wants, in short, is a will to power which is free-
spirited, joyful, and life-affirming. In Nietzsche’s formulation, if there is to 
be any normativity in will to power it will have to be active will rather than 
passive will: the joy felt in courageous wisdom. And, as I argue in a greater 
detail in the last chapter, what we need is a radical politics that aims at 
constructing a will to struggle, which will become the defining 
characteristic and alternate will on the abyss of neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics. The political, then, is created through affects as well as a will 
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to struggle. Hence, and contrary to Mouffe and Connolly, what we need is 
a radical politics that is at the intersection of affect and a will to struggle, a 
perpetual struggle which is constitutive of agonism in a radically political 
framework. 
 
If neoliberal and militarised post-politics is the impossibility of a real 
change regarding the ‘given’ situations, then the challenge of radical 
politics today is to disrupt that givenness. Neoliberal and militarised post-
politics is counterrevolutionary because its main task is to displace dissent, 
rupture and resistance against the system. Its logic, of course, is political. It 
is a determinate formation, a principled reaction with tendencies toward 
the increasing neoliberalisation and militarisation of society. Post-politics 
is, in short, a complex combination of different types of social regimes and 
affective structures. This also explains why a radical politics of event should 
delve into the complex linkages between historical social regimes and their 
affective structures that constitute neoliberal post-politics. Because 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics is a principled reaction against 
revolutionary alternatives, and because radical politics is not simply a 
politics of resistance, any discussion of how to rethink alternate social and 
political imaginaries, cannot proceed without a proper understanding of 
the established social regimes and the affective logics of neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics that it seeks to emancipate itself from. Hence the 
challenge of radical politics: to diagnose the depoliticised conditions of late 
capitalism and better understand the relationships between historical 
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social regimes that constitute it, and the affective logic each regime entails 
and how they inter-relate. So what rationalities of power underlie the post-
political? How can one theorise the affective logics of the established social 
regimes? 
 
1.3 Social Regime 
 
In this dissertation I use social regime to refer to a prevailing social system, 
affects and emotions, pattern or the set of rules, both formal and informal 
that discipline, control, manage, regulate the operation of a specific 
‘governmentality’ and its interactions with society overall. A social regime 
is, in short, constituted to make the existing social order function 
effectively. A social regime assumes society is anarchic and that there is no 
authority above the existing order capable of regulating, managing, 
assaying its interactions and the corresponding characteristics such as 
affects. Since the aim is to create a society without radical conflict and 
antagonism, a social regime assumes that conflict should be shifted, 
regulated and, if possible, eliminated through strategies and affects. In this 
sense, a social regime maintains an intimate relationship between society 
and the local and global insertion of particular norms and rules. 
 
Even though a social regime may at first seem identical to the dispositif, it 
is in fact a more complex concept. To get closer to an understanding of 
social regime, we need to highlight the differences between the concept of 
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dispositif and unpick its political logic in relation to ‘governmentality.’ In 
Deleuze’s reading of the dispositif, we observe remarkable similarities with 
his own reading of assemblage. In “What is a Dispositif?”, Deleuze (2007) 
argues that a dispositif can be analysed in terms of “lines” which enable 
new forms of objects and subjects to appear. Dispositifs are then 
composed of “lines of visibility, utterance, lines of force, lines of 
subjectivation, lines of cracking, breaking and ruptures that all intertwine 
and mix together and where some augment the others or elicit others 
through variations and even mutations of the assemblage” (Deleuze, 2007: 
347). Deleuze (1988), therefore, links dispositif to a complex network of 
power relations in Foucault’s writing which enables human beings to “see 
and speak” with regard to truth.  
 
Thus the key to a dispositif is the valorisation of truth; indeed a dispositif is 
a heterogeneous ensemble of power relations through which truth both 
creates an ontological surety and a ‘grid of intelligibility’ in which truth 
takes shape and functions. As with Deleuze and ‘assemblage’, a dispositif 
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for Foucault is not to be confused with a technical device. Rather, it is a 
heterogeneous system where the truth of any real is produced. Foucault 
thus used the term dispositif to refer to multiple power relations, norms, 
values and discourses that maintain the functioning of power.3 
 
This dissertation discusses social regime as a more specific type of 
dispositif. Rather than making a general claim that a social regime is 
identical to the dispositif, or apparatus and assemblage, I suggest that a 
social regime is a type of dispositif that, in brief, organises society in a 
particular way in a specific time and place, according to a particular 
rationality of power and affective logic. A social regime, by aiming to create 
a society without conflict and antagonism, is self-transcending. From this 
perspective, it is produced through counterrevolutionary principles and the 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 “What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Secondly, what I am 
trying to identify in this apparatus [dispositif] is precisely the nature of the connections 
that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thirdly, I understand by the term 
‘apparatus’ [dispositif] a sort of—shall we say—formation which has as its major function 
at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need.” (Foucault, 1980: 194-
195) 
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corresponding affects that shape human conduct and social and political 
relations, with the aim of preventing and preempting disruptive events. 
 
A social regime, then, is a specific form of dispositif that is enacted always 
in response to an urgent threat: ‘the event.’ By events, I mean revolts, 
uprisings, riots, insurrections, revolutions – in short any relatively 
unorganised individual or collective upheavals that threaten to overthrow 
the existing social order as a whole. Since a social regime is essential to the 
operation of the existing order, it should be seen as a more parallel 
concept to ‘governmentality.’ If governmentality organises ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ - from the individual to the collective - that requires techniques, 
rationalities, affects and above all, a way of countering the event, then the 
social regime is the component that provides the conduct that organises 
the social, and prevent disruptive events through counterrevolutionary 
principles and affective logics. Thus, the power of social regimes has to do 
with the preemptive and regulating strengths they inject into 
governmentality (see Debrix and Barder, 2009: 407). Social regimes are 
indeed machines for governmentality. If the event is the problem, and if 
social regimes are the answer, the existing governmentality must ensure 
that the conduct responsible for disruptive events is done away with 
(before they take actual shape). It is indeed through techniques, 
rationalities, affects and by way of organisational and counterrevolutionary 
social regimes that governmentality takes charge of a population, 
orchestrates the conduct of conducts, and represses all forms of disruptive 
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resistance, ensuring that the event is an impossible one. The event is, 
therefore, managed at the governmental level (through social regimes). 
 
Further, a social regime implies not only principles, rationalities, norms and 
affects that facilitate the functioning of existing governmentality, but a 
form of interaction and cooperation that is more than short-term interests 
or temporary arrangements. It facilitates regulation by organising ‘the 
conduct of conduct’ and establishing standards of norms, rules and 
generating affects in changing circumstances. Techniques, standards of 
behaviour and the interventions that follow are, after all, conducted in 
order to manage and organise society and life so that individuals will 
behave in the desired way. In this way, potential events that threaten the 
existing social order are neutralised and the probability of maintaining the 
existing system is assured.  
 
Indeed, a social regime is established on the presupposition that life is 
characterised by pervasive uncertainty. Thus actions, threats and affects 
that are considered potentially dangerous do not only interrupt the 
present but also have future consequences and that it is therefore in the 
interests of the social order to govern, manage, neutralise and eliminate 
“unknown unknowns”, ensuring that the event does not take place. Since 
the aim is to create a society based on order and certainty, a social regime 
declares pervasive uncertainty to be the problem to be solved. Hobbes 
(1651/2008), for instance, argues that our lives are characterised by 
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pervasive uncertainty as we have conflicting interests. Yet, we are roughly 
equal in strength so we cannot easily dominate others and thereby put an 
end to conflict once and for all. Within this context, the social regime 
facilitates the maintaining of the existing order so that conflict and 
antagonism do not degenerate to disorder. It is in this sense that the social 
regime should be approached in terms of an imposed governmentality. In 
short, social regimes are deliberately established by dominant and 
hegemonic governmentalities with the aim of getting populations to 
conform to the existing norms, rules and requirements through 
normalisation and regulation of human behaviours and their affects, as 
well as a combination of war and violence. A social regime is the pursuit of 
war and violence by corresponding characteristics and associated affects so 
that the existing order remains intact. 
 
Alongside this, social regimes and their associated affects are complex and 
plural (Foucault, 2007; 2008), distinguished by their capacity to counter the 
event. Social regimes are thus as plural and complex as neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics. After all, neoliberal and militarised post-politics is 
concerned to keep its own social regimes of governance under continuous 
control and critical review (Dillon and Reid, 2001: 47; see also Dean, 1999; 
Dillon and Reid, 2009; Rose, 1999). A social regime operates then as a 
complex and heterogeneous network of rationalities, tendencies and 
affects. Structuring the affects and the corresponding characteristics that 
shape the operation of the existing order, of life, social regimes typically 
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develop around a specific problematic: that of the event. In retaining the 
idea that politics is an attempt to manage and control the ‘aleatory’ 
element implied in life, the social regime avoids, at all costs, the 
unexpected ‘eventualities’ that would be the dissolution of the existing 
system, of neoliberal governmentality. 
 
The point of a regime, then, is a study of a particular aim of exercising 
power and intervening upon particular problems: that of potential 
disruptive events. This makes neoliberal and militarised post-politics more 
effective, thus saving the system from the threat of political and moral 
decline. It also makes struggle more difficult, for a social regime aims to 
decrease subjectivities’ subversive affective capacities. In this view, a social 
regime seeks to both manage and control social and political groups in the 
pursuit of harmony; it organises human subjects by preventing individual 
and collective action from occurring. The social regime is, in other words, 
counterrevolutionary in that it aims to achieve certain outcomes in the 
context of an art of governing. It is in this context that the properly 
ideological function of neoliberal and militarised post-politics is directly 
evident. Mobilising concrete social regimes, the cultivation of affects such 
as ressentiment, fear, cynicism and spite are central tropes which the 
integrity of the system is maintained while, at the same time, a 
counterrevolutionary logic that accompanies the established social regimes 
is one which aims to create a society without conflict, struggle and radical 
systemic change. The social regime targets actual practices with the aim of 
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minimising the possibilities for struggle, the event. As I will outline shortly, 
it is as much about actual conduct as it is about virtual conduct. It is as 
much about preventing actual practices as it is about repressing virtual 
events. As I argue in detail in the following chapters, central, then, to social 
regimes is the idea of event, which enables neoliberal and militarised post-
politics to touch the virtual within actual practices. Actual as well as virtual 
conduct of (disruptive) event is all that is important; the actual as well as 
the virtual (disruptive) event is what restructures the established social 
regimes that constitute neoliberal post-politics. 
 
As I elaborate further in the following chapters, proponents of the concept 
of neoliberal and militarised post-politics have taken as their point of 
departure two “rationalities of power” (sovereignty-discipline) discussed by 
Foucault (1977) in Discipline and Punish and the regime of control by 
Deleuze (1995) in his “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” However, the 
links between these rationalities of power have only been hastily suggested 
(see Diken and Laustsen, 2005; see also Collier 2009; Diken, 2009; Graham, 
2010). In this dissertation, I reread sovereignty, discipline, control - along 
with my own proposed regime of terrorism - as ‘social regimes’ in order to 
illuminate the corresponding characteristics and the affective logics that 
are either only implicit or else partially developed in Foucault’s and 
Deleuze’s accounts, yet are essential to their operation. I focus on the 
concept of neoliberal and militarised post-politics further by rigorously 
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theorising the links between the four basic types of social regimes of 
sovereignty, discipline, control and terrorism. 
 
Furthermore, I link these social regimes (sovereignty-discipline-control-
terrorism) within the topology to four distinct affects, which have been 
proposed as characterising neoliberal post-politics: ressentiment, fear, 
cynicism and spite. Since affective modulation becomes an essential 
function of contemporary society, affects such as ressentiment, fear, 
cynicism and spite are necessary to impose neoliberal governmentality on 
population. Thus the population is addressed affectively so that it can be 
rendered governable and manageable for the stable unity of global 
capitalism and the neoliberal order. In the process, therefore, the affective 
logics become a generative principle of neoliberal and militarised post-
politics. A social regime cannot function without affects it brings into play. 
For every social regime of governance generates its own particular affect. 
 
Importantly, the aim is to analyse each affect independently so that their 
effects can be studied within the established regimes. Thus ressentiment, 
fear, cynicism and spite are explored as different affects without one 
determining the others. Alongside this, social regimes open up new fields 
of entry, so that it becomes possible to engage in life with more political 
energy, to directly manipulate life purely at the level of its affective 
relations. Thus, when one says sovereignty, one also says discipline, when 
one says discipline one is also saying biopolitical control - or to be more 
28 
 
specific, when one refers to neoliberal and militarised post-politics one is 
effectively pointing towards an entire political economy of affect (Evans, 
2010). In this sense, social regimes are inseparable from affective relations. 
Nietzsche (1967a: 148) writes: “moral evaluation is an exegesis, a way of 
interpreting. [...] Who interprets? – Our affects.” 
 
1.4 Topologies of Power 
 
Crucially, however, I propose that every social regime is connected with the 
other social regimes in a specific way without one determining the others 
(not even in the final instance). Rather than viewing sovereignty, discipline, 
control and terrorism, for instance, in terms of a dialectical confrontation, 
social regimes can be seen as inextricably connected and interdependent. 
One should, therefore, note that this is not a straightforward linear 
development; it is not, then, intended to argue that a new order is 
emerging - that “sovereignty is replacing discipline” or that biopolitical 
control is replacing terrorism (see Foucault, 2007: 143). Rather than there 
being an implied redundancy or, a logic of temporal developmental 
succession, there comes into being a dynamic interaction that is called 
neoliberal governmentality. 
 
The established social regimes and their associated affects are not pre-
given, lying there waiting to be revealed. The effect of such a perspectival 
analysis is not, then, intended to be solely an ‘intellectual’ one. Rather, 
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what is at stake is the production of a certain kind of experience, a 
refiguring of truth itself. Each social regime “never functions in order to 
represent a persisting world but produces a new kind of reality, a new 
model of truth” (Deleuze, 2007: 30). Each social regime has its own 
procedures for establishing truths and undoing the untruths, and its own 
rhetorical devices for adjudicating and certifying truth claims. And we 
cannot passively wait for the Messiah to come with the ability to recognise 
the existence of such relations. The real problem we must confront, 
therefore, is a political one: how to sustain a critical rationality with 
political intent? How to find the events? The task is to find the events, 
“where they are, at their time, and in their element” (Deleuze, 1983: 110). 
 
Hegemonic social regimes aim at countering disruptive events that 
threaten the dominant hegemony in order to bring about radical structural 
change in the way they function. This strategy is composed of a diversity of 
practices and interventions operating through multiple topologies of 
power. Hence I employ a “topological” analysis of “the patterns of 
correlation”, as Steve Collier (2009: 78) has put it, “in which heterogeneous 
elements – techniques, material forms, institutional structures and 
technologies of power – are configured, as well as the redeployments 
through which these patterns are transformed.” By topology I refer to a 
branch of mathematics that concerns not only “with the geometrical 
properties of objects” but also with how society is organised (ibid. 80). 
However, by topological analysis I am not aiming to pursue mathematical 
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analyses. Instead, the primary aim is to show how the established social 
regimes are configured in assemblies of neoliberal and militarised post-
politics, without implying that they follow a straightforward linear 
development. 
 
The key theoretical reference in this dissertation is Michel Foucault’s 
concept of “governmentality” (Foucault, 1991; 2008). While 
governmentality includes the repressive state apparatus’ of the police, it is 
the way “in which one conducts the conduct of men, is no more than a 
proposed analytical grid for these relations of power” (Foucault, 2008: 
186). Thus, it is Foucauldian governmentality that enables us to name, 
understand and analyse neoliberal and militarised post-politics, 
imaginaries, and the established social regimes and their associated 
affects. To be more precise, governmentality is seen by Foucault as the 
model for social relations, as its “grid of intelligibility” (Foucault, 2007; see 
also Protevi, 2010). The ‘grid of governmentality’ opens up new 
possibilities in which relations of power and affects can be grasped and 
analysed. It is these modern arts of governing that I endeavour to capture 
in the notion of neoliberal governmentality. The present study therefore 
examines neoliberal and militarised post-politics as a form of 
governmentality, as complex combination of different types of knowledge, 
subjectivities, political rationalities, techniques, affects and tendencies 
aimed at governing society and human subjects. This specificity of 
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governmentality, in other words, lies in the complex interweaving of social 
regimes and affects. 
 
The term topology seems preferable to me because it refers to a 
multiplicity among diverse elements without providing a tendency to what 
Rose et al. (2006) call “rigidification.” The combination of sovereign power, 
disciplinary power, neoliberal control and terrorism is this definite principle 
of relationality within which populations are managed and governed. 
Neoliberal and militarised post-politics operates in practices of relationality 
and uncertainty. To maintain its hegemony, it needs to permanently 
mobilise multiple social regimes and affects in order to shape people’s 
identities and the political/cultural terrain. We need new critical tools to 
analyse it. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
It is here that the question of neoliberal and militarised post-politics comes 
up. The idea, then, is not that discipline-biopolitical control-terrorism 
replace sovereignty, but that they develop alongside of it throughout 
neoliberalism: which is why it is difficult to ‘distinguish’ one social regime 
from another. Hence my research questions: If the established social 
regimes operate in conjunction rather than opposition to each other, 
 
32 
 
1) How should/can one theorise the relationship between neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics and the established social regimes of 
sovereignty, discipline and control? 
2) How can one theorise the affective logics of these three social 
regimes? 
3) How can one account for terrorism as a new social regime with its 
affect, spite? 
4) How can one theorise the intimate relationship between radical 
critique and revolution in neoliberal and militarised post-political 
society? 
 
1.6 Deleuze/Foucault 
 
The key methodological question for theoretical interpretation, then, is 
how to conceptualise the relationships between regimes of power and 
their affective logics. In the following chapters, this conceptualisation will 
proceed in conversation with a number of philosophers and theorists, the 
most important being Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Slavoj Žižek, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin. First, as argued above, I take as a 
point of departure a topological analysis that employs 
Deleuzean/Foucauldian concepts. For they provide us with analytical tools 
to grasp the truth of neoliberal post-politics, an immanent target in which 
different social regimes of power, affects, and knowledge take shape and 
function. Utilising Deleuzean/Foucauldian concepts, I explore how 
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sovereignty, discipline, control - along with my own proposed regime of 
terrorism - are combined in “complex edifices”, “systems of correlation”, or 
“topologies of power” (Collier, 2009), thus diminishing neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics’ political and moral fallout. For Deleuze, for 
instance, the topological analysis always acts on the present. What is our 
present situation? What new possibilities of life do we see appearing 
today? What are new forms of political subjectivation? Above all, one 
might say, the topological dimension of Deleuze’s analysis requires an 
‘untimely’ intervention into history and the present. Untimely in the 
Nietzschean sense: the aim is to act “counter to our time” and thereby act 
“on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come” 
(Nietzsche, 1991: 60). 
 
Deleuze always insists on creating new concepts, which enables us to see 
the world in a new way, in a process of becoming. A creation of new 
concepts means that we see the world and time within the perspective of 
becoming or ‘virtuality’ rather than a linear, determinist time. The virtual is 
real itself in the sense of making future potentialities and possibilities real 
in the present. Only on this basis can we able to invent new ways of 
conceiving time and temporality and create new perspectives on life and 
being, leading to revolutionary events. This is what history means for 
Deleuze: everything is historical and contingent, a process of revolutionary 
becoming. In doing so, Deleuze thus stresses the importance of the virtual. 
Philosophy, for Deleuze, is an attempt to grasp the virtual, for it is the 
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virtual that generates the actual. In other words, life, according to Deleuze, 
“is composed of virtualities, events, singularities. What I am calling virtual 
is not something that lacks reality. Rather, the virtual becomes engaged in 
a process of actualisation as it follows the plane which gives it its proper 
reality” (2007: 388). This is why the event should be understood as the 
virtual form of what is to come: “the part that eludes its own actualisation 
in everything that happens” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 156). 
 
For Foucault, on the other hand, history is made up of two principles which 
are matter (that is only potential) and form (that makes the object a 
reality). Foucault’s work in this respect serves as a “grid of intelligibility” 
(Protevi, 2010: 2) that reveals immanencies in historical social regimes and 
events. Furthermore, these immanent regimes in historical events “are 
revealed rather than constituted” (ibid. 2). These historical orders of power 
and knowledge provide analytical tools to examine the configurations in 
which ‘regimes of truth’ are produced. Foucault, like Deleuze, is careful to 
note that regimes of truth do not follow a straightforward linear 
development. Rather, he proposes a reading of history that is against 
historicism, for historical immanent orders are seen as “multiplicities”, that 
is, dynamic effects of “incessant transactions” (Foucault, 2008: 77). 
 
In short, Deleuze and Foucault offer a reading of history that is against the 
entire model of linearity, for immanent social regimes and the 
corresponding characteristics are seen as, to borrow Julian Reid’s term 
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(2010b: 394), “moving targets”, not rigid ideological rationalities. What 
unites them is that they both conceive power to be immanent to the social 
field, not external to it. If we read Deleuze’s and Foucault’s concepts as an 
account of regimes of truth that operate through ‘incessant multiplicities’, 
then the question of power, the truth of neoliberal and militarised post-
politics becomes available for contestation. As such, 
Deleuzean/Foucauldian concepts provide us to construct forms of 
subjectivities and social relations that are immune to neoliberalism as 
counterrevolution. 
 
1.7 Žižek 
 
Within Deleuzean and Foucauldian topological analysis, the dissertation 
also employs a Žižekian approach to understand how post-politics both 
signifies and tends toward the foreclosure of politics. A Žižekian approach 
allows us to understand how post-politics is grounded in the 
depoliticisation of conflict and antagonism within society, ensuring that 
events do not occur. The aim of post-politics is to eliminate conflict and 
antagonism, leading to revolutionary events. Conflict, however, can never 
be truly eliminated, but can be evaded as a possibility. Conflict and 
antagonism are the system, the system is antagonism and conflict. Thus 
the aim of the Žižekian approach is to shift conflict and antagonism to their 
proper places. Neoliberal capitalism is marked by a false hope that struggle 
and alternate political possibilities might be resolved, allowing the system 
36 
 
to go on as far as it can. A Žižekian approach, however, reminds us 
forcefully that there is always an alternative that is never assimilated. This 
unassimilated rest is, in Žižek, antagonism and revolutionary struggle. Even 
though post-politics tries to occlude the very possibility of alternate social 
imaginaries to the existing order, conflict and struggle remain significant 
elements of revolutionary politics. And because there is conflict and 
struggle, revolutionary subjectivities cannot be constituted independently 
from agonism and affects. 
 
1.8 Nietzsche 
 
Hence my conception of political agonism and affect follows Nietzsche and 
his notion of will to power, the supreme immanent principle in life, which 
he juxtaposes to God’s transcendent judgment. Based on cruelty and 
struggle, Nietzsche’s agon takes life as will to power as a guiding principle. 
In Nietzsche, life as will to power expresses and continuously expands 
itself, which leads him to identify will to power with freedom. Thus, for 
Nietzsche, freedom can only emerge in so far as it is understood as a 
necessity, a necessity which enables a passage between affect and a will to 
struggle. Nietzsche’s radical agonism provides and encourages human 
actors to fulfil life’s main purpose: to engage in a ruthless struggle which is 
to become fully the will to power and thus become free. Significantly, 
however, will to power does not refer to actual physical force or political 
dominance. Rather, it is a process of overcoming a struggle. 
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For Nietzsche, life as will to power requires that an organism strives to 
heighten mere-life; it is the fundamental value, a value on the basis of the 
enhancement of life conditions, its self-overcoming. If the primary value is 
life as will to power, then the fundamental point concerning will to power 
is to establish alternative counter-ideals/values to life. Life here, however, 
is to be understood as a struggle between creation and preservation. All 
life is therefore the will to “striving against something that resists” 
(Nietzsche, 1967a: 374). Nietzsche, therefore, enables us to see life as an 
immanent principle, a conflict, which has neither an external cause nor a 
final end. Life as will to power is not to be exhausted in existence; it is a 
permanent struggle. 
 
1.9 Benjamin 
 
Lastly, Deleuzean and Foucauldian topological analysis, a radical Žižekian 
approach and Nietzsche’s conception of agonism and will to power allow 
us to link their concepts with Walter Benjamin’s critical approach to 
historical memory, whose task is to emphasise an intimate relationship 
between past and present events, by which agonistic history opens up the 
path to universal redemption. In this sense, the idea of agonistic histories is 
essential to Benjamin’s Marxist analysis of society. Of course Walter 
Benjamin’s dialectical perspective to historical memory and revolutionary 
events predates Deleuze, Foucault and Žižek. However, we are still haunted 
by the spectre of Benjamin, for he provides a negative dialectical 
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perspective that is opposed to any determinist, evolutionist historicism. 
Seen in this light, the past, for Benjamin, is not simply past, but carries in it 
signs and traces of another temporality, a promise of a future redemption. 
Benjamin did not write specifically about neoliberalism or the post-
political. His main targets were totalitarianism and fascism. However, from 
a Benjaminian perspective, in order to understand a past properly, one 
should not only analyse actual conditions in which neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics is constituted – one has also to take into account 
alternate political possibilities that are available in the “now-time” 
(Benjamin, 1969). 
 
Benjamin’s notion of “now-time” refers to a theologico-political 
temporality that is entirely different from mechanical, linear time. Simply 
put, his messianic Marxism (dialectical perspective) enables us to conceive 
of a different temporality suspending vulgar historicism based upon 
linearity, succession, and homogeneity. As such, his dialectical perspective 
allows us to unearth the hidden potentialities (the utopian emancipatory 
potentials) “which were betrayed in the actuality of revolution” (see Žižek, 
2006: 78) and in its final outcome, which is now embodied in neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics. And “awakening” from this sleep, from this 
counterrevolutionary moment (neoliberal governmentality) is the primary 
purpose of materialist historiography, and “dialectical images” are (in 
Benjamin’s case, industrial capitalism) the moments of historical 
awakening from this hell, the very hell of neoliberal capitalism: 
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“It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is 
present its light on the past; rather, image is that wherein what has been 
comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other 
words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the 
present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of 
what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, 
suddenly emergent.” (Benjamin, 1999b: 463) 
 
Benjamin’s notion of temporality and revolution as redemption-through-
repetition of the past reveal radical-emancipatory potentials that can 
reappear as dialectical images, as historical spectres and haunt historical 
memory. They require an ‘untimely’ intervention that repeats not an 
aspect of the past but a ‘configuration’ that generates a certain 
relationship between history and politics, enabling a passage between the 
present and the past, between the actual and the virtual. Here the aim is to 
construct an ‘interruptive’ theory against historicism, namely a form of 
temporal hegemony (neoliberalism) and the established social regimes and 
the violence that accompanies them. And that is possible only if the past 
critically analyses the present, if the past and the present are united in the 
moment of danger, ‘a moment of danger’ which is neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics. 
 
However, this is not the whole story. Benjamin’s notion of temporality and 
dialectical perspective also opens up the past to the present, the actual to 
the virtual, in which the subject of history is capable of escaping the entire 
model of linearity, the captivity of neoliberal capitalism. If we follow 
Benjaminian perspective, we are left with two conflicting philosophies of 
history: the one, represented by neoliberal and militarised post-politics, 
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that is the modern victor, refers to a worldview as power and hegemony, 
and the other by revolutionary events. What seems for neoliberalism to be 
consensus, for the history of events is conflict and antagonism. On the one 
hand, bare repetition, which is counterrevolutionary; on the other, 
productive repetition, which is revolutionary. On the one hand, the 
‘enlightened’ human being, who is determined by the conditions, on the 
other, the subject of history who is able to determine the conditions that 
determines her. On the one hand, the history of progress, which insists on 
continuity; on the other, the history of events, which insists on 
discontinuity and thus wants to change the course of history. 
 
In this respect, there is a striking similarity between Benjamin’s notion of 
time and history and Deleuze’s conception of becoming, time and the 
event. As I argue in detail in the last chapter, Benjamin’s dialectical image 
reminds of Deleuze’s time-image in which “the actual image must enter 
into relation with its own virtual image as such” (Deleuze, 1989: 273). This 
untimeliness of the dialectical image and the time-image is associated with 
shortcuts, interruptions and discontinuities. Thus they are both concrete 
devices that help us make sense of historical events as well as historical 
sources such as older movies and novellas for the present. Also, Benjamin’s 
dialectical image is a useful theoretical/philosophical supplement to 
Deleuze’s virtual in conceptualising revolutionary time as non-linear and 
contracted historical moment and the intimate link between revolution 
and critique. 
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So this dissertation is a social and political account of neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics that ‘thinks with’ Deleuze, Foucault, Žižek, 
Nietzsche and Benjamin. Through my empirical discussions I put social and 
political theory in conversation with them, all of whom I contextualise as 
crucial to understanding the dominant hegemony, and radical social 
change as an ‘event.’ The dissertation, in short, brings together these 
diverse figures not in a ‘dialogue’ but in a ‘debate’; a debate which allows 
for both collective solidarity and confrontation among the theorists 
mentioned above in its own framework. I am particularly interested in the 
way in which these figures and their radical theories paradoxically 
converge, despite important differences, on some significant common 
aspirations (freedom, struggle), and unite against common enemies (e.g. 
dominant, hegemonic ideologies.) 
 
1.10 Chapter Outline 
 
The substantive chapters of the dissertation start with Chapter Three. It 
aims to explore the concept of sovereignty. The main argument is that 
sovereign political power is a radically contingent power in which the ‘cruel 
manifestations’ of the modern state manifest itself. Taking Deleuze’s 
notion of sovereignty as its point of departure, the chapter reactivates the 
concept of sovereign power by establishing its relevance to life and 
sociality. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that ressentiment is the main 
affect that pertains to sovereignty, which emerges as a kind of passivity or 
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impotence. The social regime of sovereignty cannot be thought of without 
ressentiment as it creates pacified and oppressed subjects who cannot act. 
 
Chapter Three also deals with cinema, focusing on Pier Paolo Pasolini’s final 
film Saló. Saló poses significant questions regarding sadistic torture as a 
form sovereign exceptionalism. Contrary to vulgar liberal democratic 
interpretations that consider torture as a form of insanity, as a juridical 
problem, the chapter discusses torture as the most privileged actualisation 
of state terror, for it reveals the nature of sovereign exceptionalism and its 
rational consciousness. Torture is, in short, a rational necessity that defines 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics in general and sovereignty in 
particular. In this sense, Saló helps us theorise torture as a way of social 
control that acts out of the same fear other techniques act: the fear of 
revolution. At issue here is a kind of torture that is political, a constitutive 
act of state terror, which aims to decrease the body’s revolting capacity. 
 
In Chapter Four, I propose to rethink Foucault’s Discipline and Punish by 
exploring the profound mutation from sovereign power to neoliberal 
governmentality. The organising principle here is the political grasp of 
neoliberal governmentality as a ‘grid of intelligibility.’ First, I discuss the 
birth of neoliberalism that is based on the market, or competition as an 
eidos. I argue that the Benthamite panoptic prison is crucial to the 
development of disciplinary and economic aspects of neoliberalism and the 
capitalist labour market. The crucial point at this juncture is how the rule of 
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law (Rechtsstaat) plays an important role to get rid of various forms of 
socialism. I contend that it is the fear of revolution that establishes the rule 
of law. Here I discuss fear as the main affect of discipline, arguing that fear 
is the essential condition and a positive element of neoliberalism. I also 
deal with modern biopolitics as both katechontic and as figured around the 
eschaton, suggesting that although biopolitics is still about making life live, 
its main aim is to defuse any fears of a repeat of events. 
 
To flesh out these arguments, in Chapter Four discipline and neoliberalism 
are approached through kettling, a police tactic that turns a legitimate 
protest into a ‘violent disorder.’ I argue that kettling has two relational 
results: to discipline the crowd in order to produce secure and docile 
bodies to thrive, and displace resistance, the contingency of the 
event/revolution, which now appears to be the problem of neoliberalism to 
be solved. 
 
Chapter Five discusses the continuing relevance of Deleuze’s framework 
about the ‘society of control’, relating it to neoliberal capitalism. The main 
argument here is that neoliberal control manages and regulates life in its 
productive new capacities that works in conjunction with the disciplinary 
society. Neoliberal control is a simultaneous process of ‘decoding’ and 
‘deterritorialisation’, which is particularly concerned with the maximisation 
of human vitality. What is crucial is the role of the biopolitical production 
of infinity, that is to say a factical finitude of life as an immanent quality, 
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which is another name for the desire to subject the potentialities of life 
itself to the pernicious logics of capitalist accumulation. The chapter also 
dwells on cynicism, a crucial concept for the examination of the affective 
politics of neoliberal capitalism, arguing that ‘the cynical dividual’ 
demonstrates real obedience’, the belief and desire that are necessary for 
the system. Then a new form of contemporary biopolitics is introduced 
through the conception of preemptive indifference, which attempts to 
create a society without antagonism and the event. Taking uncertain future 
as its main point of departure, preemptive indifference signifies a desire to 
oppose the event, both before and after it takes place.  
 
To flesh out these arguments, in Chapter Five I focus on gated 
communities. Threatening the idea of common good, the privatised, 
secessionary gated communities provide a generic response to the 
contingency of the event. As controlled and securitised sites of modern 
wealth and luxury consumption, gated communities are emblematic of the 
society of neoliberal control, protecting the intact territory and security of 
the cynical and threatened ‘good’ circulation. ‘A liberal way of life’, in 
which the urban elite can pay dues and are protected, is central in this 
discussion. 
 
Chapter Six proposes a new affect, spite, which is defined as a willingness 
to cause harm for harm’s sake. Drawing on Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground, it argues that spite offers an invaluable opportunity for 
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diagnostic social and spatial theory to study contemporary society. 
Furthermore, the chapter suggests that spite corresponds to a fourth, 
paradoxical social ‘regime’, terrorism, which uses pain/suffering as a state 
of (self)punishment against neoliberalism. 
 
To exemplify and supplement the main arguments, Chapter Six focuses on 
Gerhard Richter’s cycle October 18, 1977, a series of 15 paintings about the 
Baader-Meinhof group. Comparing the Baader-Meinhof’s strategy of 
sabotage to contemporary terrorism’s suicide acts, I argue that spiteful 
fundamentalist terrorism should not be seen as a political act, for it refers 
to a will to nothingness that cannot create new values. The chapter 
confronts the consequences of the previous discussions and asks whether 
it is possible to theorise a relationship between two concepts, revolution 
and critique. It rethinks potential openings for radical politics rendered by 
the established regimes and the associated affects in a post-political 
setting. In doing so, it summarises the relationship between neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics and the established social regimes and their 
affective structures. 
 
Chapter Seven asks what kind of radical critique is needed to resist 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics. I focus on the intimate relationship 
between revolution and critique, arguing that radical critique within social 
and aesthetic theory is strictly inseparable from the concept of revolution. 
In so far as the contemporary regime of governmentality is neoliberal, 
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neoliberal post-politics constitutes the problematic of critique today. 
Against this background, the chapter argues that critique is the paradoxical 
constitution of politics through the relationship between strategy and 
intoxication without referring to a stable synthesis between them. In this 
context, I suggest that critique is an indeterminacy, which can be 
articulated in the context of divine violence. The main argument here is 
that critique as divine violence is a radically contingent decision that has a 
capacity to connect the virtual with the actual, strategy with intoxication, 
without falling back on either cynicism or spiteful destruction. The chapter 
insists that the relationship between the virtual and the actual, between 
strategy and intoxication is marked by an aporia, not an antinomy. 
 
The final chapter (Conclusion) deals with the actuality of critique as divine 
violence in the context of the Occupy Movement and the Arab revolts. It 
returns, in this context, to the topological space of the event, that is, to 
both sides of kairos – strategy and intoxication, seeing and desire. What is 
crucial in this context is the strategic aporia of divine violence, which must 
be overcome in praxis. 
 
But first, what is the post-political? Chapter Two continues this 
introduction by elaborating the concept of neoliberal and militarised post-
politics. Using Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as a 
model, I argue that Marx’s diagnoses of the French counter-revolution 
allow us to understand the very foundations of neoliberal and militarised 
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post-politics. However, I do not suggest that the lessons of Eighteenth 
Brumaire, or Bonapartism are identical to the current developments in 
contemporary society. Rather I argue that there are analogies between 
Marx’s analyses of the French counter-revolution and neoliberal post-
politics, which is, above all, an inability to think conflict and antagonism in 
politics. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics is the art of foreclosing the 
political. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
Neoliberal and Militarised Post-Politics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In 1848, Louis Bonaparte, nephew of Napoléon Bonaparte, was elected 
president of the new Second Republic of France. Defending the work of the 
revolution of 1848, promoting prosperity for all, he promised glory and 
greatness for a nation which supposedly characterized his uncle’s reign. 
Because the constitution limited the president to a single four-year term, 
and because he failed to secure the three-fourths majority required for 
constitutional revision, he staged a coup d’état on December 2, 1851. The 
coup provides the occasion of Marx’s insightful book The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). 
 
What follows is an analysis of the post-political as a ‘political’ formation, 
juxtaposed against Marx’s account of the 1851 coup d’état by Louis 
Bonaparte. The first part of the chapter introduces the argument of Marx’s 
Eighteenth Brumaire as a model for understanding the foundations of 
contemporary politics. Part two concerns the depoliticised conditions of 
late capitalism through what I call a ‘neoliberal and militarised post-
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politics.’ To better understand the depoliticised conditions of the late 
capitalist society we need an analysis which is both historically inspired and 
more sympathetic to the securitised and neoliberal character of post-
politics. This is precisely a moment of Benjaminianism in the sense that the 
analysis inserts the past into the ‘now-ness’ of a present danger, a danger 
which is embodied as neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Aiming to 
redeem the past generations of the oppressed, a Benjaminian approach 
allows us to grasp the truth of post-politics, a truth which is found in 
present-day-life (Benjamin, 1999a: 297). After Benjamin, then, what do we 
see? It is important to stress that Benjamin’s concept of history does not 
see in history happy promises. Looking at contemporary society through 
the lens of Benjamin, what we see is a moment of danger, or neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics as a counterrevolutionary logic that grows 
incessantly, with its social regimes and their associated affects. In front of 
such danger, Benjamin’s concept of history would like to help; an irruptive 
history which illuminates and actualises new possibilities. From a 
Benjaminian perspective, the possibility of revolution and dialectical 
history is what matters. 
 
In this precise sense, one should not forget the face of the past (the 
spectre). It is true that we see a past that is full of traumatic experiences 
and counterrevolutionary events. Whereas ‘the history of the victors’ sees 
the past as something that we should all leave behind, a Benjaminian 
approach allows us to see history that includes danger and catastrophe, 
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but wants to liberate it from chains. Benjamin sees the past capable of 
interrupting and thus stopping counterrevolutionary logics that produce 
non-events in which misery, injustice and reaction are continuously 
(re)produced. It is the past which reveals a new dimension of history. That 
is the difference. 
 
Hence the importance of Benjamin’s concept of history in which the past 
(19th century France) has a new meaning that can rise in light of the 
present (neoliberal and militarised post-politics). Let me add that I do not 
mean to equate the political lessons from 19th century France with the 
current developments in contemporary society. Rather I use Marx’s 
diagnoses of the French counter-revolution in order to understand the 
tenuous relationship between neoliberal capitalism and the evident 
militarisation of society. In doing so, I aim to show the emergent link 
between an analysis which does not forget the past, and the object of its 
attention, which emerges as a flash in the present, becomes present: 
“knowledge comes only in lightning flashes” (Benjamin, 1999b: 456). 
 
2.2 Model: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
 
“Hegel observes somewhere that all the great events and characters of 
world history occur twice, so to speak. He forgot to add: the first time as 
high tragedy, the second time as low farce.” (Marx, 1852/2002: 19) 
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When Marx writes of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(1852/2002), the main question to which Marx is responding is how the 
revolution of 1848 had led to Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état and the 
subversion of democracy. To explain these events, Marx divides Louis 
Bonaparte’s (farcical) rise and rule into three separate phases, in which 
different alliances of classes and groupings rule. In the first phase, called 
the February Period, King Louis Philippe, whose rule Marx identifies with 
the finance aristocracy, is forced to abdicate by a broad coalition, including 
the republican bourgeoisie. This alliance is modified by the removal of the 
‘proletariat’ from the centre of the revolutionary stage. The second phase 
is brought on by the fall of the republican bourgeoisie, which gives rise to 
the Party of Order as the ruling alliance. The Party of Order is a bourgeois 
formation, representing two antagonistic wings of the two bourgeois 
factions - the landlords (Legitimists) and the industrialists (Orléanists). For 
Marx, their rule is made possible only in the framework of republicanism. 
This is why not royalism, but the parliamentary republic becomes the 
common denominator of the two bourgeois factions. For it is the best 
possible political shell for the common class interest, the interests of the 
capital. Eventually, however, republican institutions are discarded by the 
Party of Order, that is, by ‘capital’, in the name of ‘order.’ This is the key to 
understanding the different role of the bourgeoisie in 1848 as compared to 
1789: in 1789 the bourgeoisie played a heroic role by allying with the 
people against the monarchy, the aristocracy and the established church, 
whereas in 1848 they had become much more conservative by doing 
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everything in its power to prevent the spread of potential disruptive 
revolutions.  
 
The third phase ends in a coup d’état which brings Louis Bonaparte to 
power. The alliance behind Bonaparte comprised of the various factions - 
from finance capital, the Legitimist landed aristocracy, to the industrial 
bourgeoisie, the lumpenproletariat, the state officials and the army. As a 
consequence, the victory of ‘order’ succeeds in conquering democracy’s 
‘disturbance of order’ and Louis Bonaparte declares himself emperor of 
France. In the process, Bonaparte profits from the myth of his uncle as the 
symbol of the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and, at the same 
time, order and stability. In exploiting this legend, Bonaparte projects 
himself as a man who would rule above class interests, the divisions of 
French politics, for the reconciliation of all classes. 
 
Significantly, as Marx argues, there is something special about France 
where the head of the executive - with a bureaucracy of more than half a 
million civil servants, a complement of a half million officials alongside an 
army of another half million - controls a state apparatus which “restricts, 
controls, regulates, oversees and supervises civil life from its most all-
encompassing expressions to its most insignificant stirrings…where through 
the most extraordinary centralisation this parasite acquires an all-knowing 
pervasiveness” (Marx, 1852/2002: 53). In other words, this is a process in 
which the “material interests of the French bourgeoisie are intertwined in 
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the most intimate way” with the maintenance of the machinery of state 
(ibid. 54). With the support of the bourgeoisie, Louis Bonaparte needs the 
widespread and ingenious machinery of state, “the fearsome parasitic 
body”, in order to repress other classes. For this reason, the bourgeoisie is 
“compelled by its class position both to negate the conditions of existence 
for any parliamentary power, including its own, and to make the power of 
the executive, its adversary, irresistible” (ibid.). It thus finds the everyday 
business of democracy useless, and stigmatises any popular agitation as 
“socialistic.” Thus by now decrying as “socialistic what it had previously 
extolled as ‘liberal’”, the bourgeoisie confesses that “its own interests 
require it to dispense with the dangers of self-government”; that in order 
to “retain its power in society intact its political power would have to be 
broken” (ibid. 57). 
 
In the name of saving society ‘from being destroyed’, from ‘anarchy’, the 
bourgeoisie betrays its ‘progressive’ past to try to safeguard capitalist class 
interests by invoking, in Bonaparte, a leader who contradicts them. Hence 
they cry out: “only theft can still save property; only perjury, religion; 
bastardy, the family; only disorder, order!” (ibid. 107). Put differently, the 
bourgeoisie – so much afraid of the revolutionary working-class and 
socialist ideals - is willing to sacrifice democracy in order to maintain a 
state of ‘order.’ However, while the main protagonist of Eighteenth 
Brumaire is the French bourgeoisie, Marx points out that Louis Bonaparte is 
able to garner the support not only from the small-holding peasants, but 
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from the petty bourgeoisie, and the lumpenproletariat as well. Bonaparte’s 
strength lay in his ability to be able to depict himself as ‘all things to all 
men.’ 
 
It is precisely when he becomes aware of himself as a man ‘superior’ to his 
bourgeois rivals, as an ‘authority’ over them, that Louis Bonaparte attains a 
position which enables him to become the master of the society, an 
‘original author’, in his own right (ibid. 64). And, as Marx (ibid. 101) argues 
in another passage, it is this “abject dependence” which enables Louis 
Bonaparte to represent each class against all the others in turn. Since they 
are unable to enforce their class interest, they must be represented by a 
master, Bonaparte. Herein lay the central dilemma of Bonaparte’s rule: he 
wants to be seen as the “patriarchal benefactor of all classes” but, in this, 
he is spectacularly unsuccessful because he could not “give to one class 
without taking from another” (ibid. 108). Thus, in the final analysis, 
Bonaparte is a ‘floating signifier’, whose true loyalty lies with himself, his 
clique, the clandestine police force and standby army who keep him in 
power. And the rest is a total failure: 
 
“The constitution, the national assembly, the dynastic parties, the blue 
[right-wing] and the red [left-wing] republicans, the heroes of [the Algerian 
wars in] Africa, the thunder from the grandstand, the sheet-lightning of the 
daily press, all the literature, political names and intellectual reputations, 
the civil law and the penal code, liberté, egalité, fraternité, and the ninth of 
May 1852 [when Bonaparte’s presidency was supposed to expire, but 
didn’t] – all that has magically vanished under the spell of a man whom 
even his enemies would deny was a sorcerer.” (ibid. 23) 
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Bonaparte’s coup is undoubtedly illegal and brutal. The revolution of 1848 
becomes an empty gesture, embodying a dialectic of ‘purification’ and 
‘destruction.’ The authoritarian regime the coup establishes is a short and 
exceptional period of ‘dictatorship’ where the rule of law is suspended. The 
state power, therefore, unconditionally authorises itself to exercise an 
absolute power in order to suppress other classes. Anticipating states of 
emergency in modern times, thus restoring state power by manifesting it 
at its most spectacular, the ‘obscene’ message of the ‘unlimited 
governmental power’ imposed by Louis Bonaparte is thus: “laws do not 
really bind me, I can do to you whatever I want, I can treat you as guilty if I 
decide to do so, I can destroy you if I want to” (Žižek, 2006: 337). 
Consequently, the process of promising peace and national honour 
culminates in a brutal and decidedly unbourgeois regime of banditry that 
seizes the reins of power. It is the army, “personified by its own dynasty”, 
which must “represent the State in antagonism to the society” (Marx, 
1858). In fact, the bourgeoisie renounces power in favour of a gangster 
regime (Carver, 2002: 152). For Bonapartism is about enforcing and 
preserving capitalist exploitation. 
 
The aim of Bonapartism is to recognise popular sovereignty whilst placing it 
under a specific disciplinary control in the best interests of the bourgeoisie. 
At the heart of the regime’s policy is technocratic and administrative 
romanticism, which is seen as crucial in building a competitive economy. 
Thus the entire bureaucratic-military machine would be deployed to 
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safeguard the managerial-technocratic ‘bourgeois order’, to support the 
government’s candidates and to counter opposition. In the process, 
therefore, urgent efforts are made to increase the effectiveness of civilian 
policing (Carver, 2002: 153). Salvation seems to be offered by the security 
state. The oft-proclaimed desire for liberty is compounded always by social 
fear. ‘Liberty’ depends both on the curbing of the personal power of the 
Emperor and on the preservation of order (ibid. 156-7). 
 
The French as a whole nation sees not the emergence of proletarian 
power, but the return of a demoralising defeat at the hands of a popular 
“reaction under the leadership of Louis Bonaparte” (Thoburn, 2003: 54). 
Under the repetition of Napoleon in Louis Bonaparte, the revolution leaves 
no room for rightful actors on the scene, bourgeois and proletarian, 
“making way for a troupe of substitute comedians whose burlesque 
performance reaches its climax in the triumph of the clown Louis 
Napoleon” (Rancière, 2004: 93). What we have here is a repetition with 
difference that is “enriched by the notion of a decline from heroism to 
foolishness”: “…the London constable [Louis Bonaparte], with a dozen of 
the best debt-ridden lieutenants, after the little corporal [Napoleon 
Bonaparte], with his roundtable of military marshals! The eighteenth 
Brumaire of the fool after the eighteenth Brumaire of the genius!” 
(1852/Marx, 2002: 19; see also Carver, 2002: 120). The result is a deeply 
retrogressive situation, wherein, “it seems that the state has merely 
reverted to its oldest form, to the shameless, bare-faced rule of sword and 
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cross” (Marx, 1852/2002: 22). The ‘threat’ of the socialist revolution leads 
the bourgeoisie to the conclusion: “better an end to terror than terror 
without end!” (ibid. 89). Its logic, of course, is political. This is a history 
which produces a period of “crying contradictions.” In the end, nothing 
changes and everybody occupies exactly the same position as in the 
beginning. Hence Marx (ibid. 34) writes on the Second Republic: 
 
“Passion without truth, truth without passion; history without events; 
development driven solely by the calendar and wearisome through 
constant repetition of the same tension and release; antagonisms which 
seem periodically to reach a peak only to go dull and diminish without 
resolution.” 
 
In this sense the Bonapartist politics is based on a “lack of belief”, on 
“realism” (Badiou, 2009a: 328-9). As a result, the class struggle is 
foreclosed, the antagonism and conflict are merely weakened and 
transformed into harmony, and the entire political structure is delimited to 
the actual reality by preventing potential ‘revolutionary’ events, from 
occurring. 
 
To better understand and reveal the illegitimacy of Louis Bonaparte, one 
need not look further than Napoleon Bonaparte. The Napoleonic idea, as 
Napoleon (1859: 154) himself insists, “is not one of war, but a social, 
industrial, commercial idea which concerns all mankind.” The want of order 
out of chaos and “stability and perseverance which is the great defect of 
democratic republics” are portrayed as especially important, whereas 
passions and excess are seen as potentially dangerous, for France seems to 
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be ‘unready’ for democracy (ibid. 32, 36). The Napoleonic idea in this 
respect “cleared up the chaos of nothingness and glory, separated truths 
from passions”, which provided the foundation “to secure the liberty of the 
citizen and the prosperity of the country” (ibid. 23, 144). In a similar 
process of repeating and inverting Napoleon Bonaparte, Louis Bonaparte 
tried to establish the link between stability and prosperity, while, at the 
same time, eliminate the ‘party’ divisions. Louis Bonaparte’s ideal would 
have been a society without antagonisms. 
 
Since the lessons of the French counter-revolution are past, they can never 
be experienced again in unmediated form. But The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte can be experienced now and in the future. It is here that 
one should return to Benjamin’s concept of history, for it allows us to 
generate an interrelationship between past and present events. Here the 
implicit issue is the construction of a critical analysis that interweaves 
Marx’s arguments of Eighteenth Brumaire (past) with neoliberal post-
politics, how “history is referred to its ‘making’ – political praxis” 
(Tiedemann, 1983: 84, 91). To put it another way, by juxtaposing Marx’s 
analysis of the 1851 coup d’état and neoliberal and militarised post-
politics, I argue that there is a direct relationship between past and present 
events, a certain relationship which enables us to see the future as a new 
radical possibility, which goes beyond just the temporality of the present. 
For Benjamin, then, an ‘interruptive’ philosophy of history makes sense 
only in so far as the past critically examines the present conditions. This 
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analysis is of course “dialectical”: “for while the relation of the present to 
the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-
been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly 
emergent” (Benjamin, 1999b: 462). Following Benjamin, the dialectical 
image is the moment of waking from hell, the very hell of neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics as a counterrevolutionary system. In this sense, the 
time of the dialectical image is Messianic time, the time of revolution as 
redemption. 
 
Benjamin’s main concern is to seek the future in the past that journeys in 
the present. In this respect The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’s 
temporal status in a continuous present is “still journeying” (Marx, 
1852/2002: 98). Rereading Marx’s cutting descriptions of Bonaparte and of 
French politics with an eye focused on contemporary society, the late post-
political politics comes to mind again and again. But, to reiterate, by 
juxtaposing these two historical realities, I do not mean to suggest that the 
political lessons from 19th century France can be equated with the current 
developments in contemporary society. The point of comparison is 
confined to the lessons of the relationship between neoliberal capitalism 
and the increasing militarisation of contemporary society. What really 
counts, therefore, is the history of events not as a linear, homogeneous 
and continuous process but as a temporality capable of interruption and 
self-fulfilment, as “dialectics as a standstill” (Benjamin, 1999b: 463). 
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Past makes its present appearance as an interruption of the present. And 
“articulating past historically means appropriating a memory as it flashes 
up in a moment of danger.” This danger for Benjamin (2003: 391) is what 
“threatens both the content of the tradition and those who inherit it.” By 
“those who inherit it” Benjamin means the tradition of the oppressed, 
those who are aware – through a dialectical perspective- of this very 
danger and the meaning of liberation. Hence the importance of The 
Eighteenth Brumaire which enables us to see history as both a moment of 
danger and hope in which “time takes a stand and has become to a 
standstill” (ibid. 396). Through an analysis of the The Eighteenth Brumaire 
as the clash between the past as a moment of danger and hope arises, 
then, a new mode of critical thought, where the present remembers the 
past and liberates the oppressed. This means that The Eighteenth Brumaire 
allows us to introduce an ‘untimely’ intervention into the 
counterrevolutionary aspects of the present conditions, which is neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics. 
 
The Eighteenth Brumaire has relevance today on its 159th anniversary for 
many reasons. First, if Napoleon Bonaparte is a floating signifier who can 
be classified as a tragic hero, then the emptiness of the imitative acts of 
Louis Bonaparte can be qualified as “low farce” (Martin, 2002). In this way 
Marx tries to “demonstrate how the class struggle in France created 
circumstances and relations that made it possible for a grotesque 
mediocrity to play a hero’s part” (Marx, 1852/2002: 77). Crucially, 
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however, Marx declares that the tragedy of Napoleon Bonaparte is that of 
society, not of the man. Likewise, the farce of Louis Bonaparte is tragic, not 
for the man but for society, for it is the society that is both the victim of 
Bonaparte’s rumblings and a cause contributing to them (Riquelme, 1980: 
69). As Marx (1850: 81) rightly observes, although Louis Bonaparte was 
“the most simple-minded man in France”, he had “acquired the most 
multiplex significance. Just because he was nothing, he could signify 
everything to save himself.” 
 
Cutting to the chase, Marx’s argument is that the reign of Napoléon le petit 
is not ‘real’ history but merely a parody of non-events, a farce (Riquelme, 
1980; see also Diken, 2012; Žižek, 2006). There are two kinds of repetition, 
which helps us understand history as a ‘paradox.’ On the one hand, there is 
a ‘productive’ repetition that creates something new. On the other hand, 
there is bare repetition that parodies “the old” (Marx, 1852/2002: 12). In 
other words, repetition can dramatise the “spirit” by awakening the dead, 
as part of a new struggle, or make the ghost of revolution “walk about 
again” (ibid. 12). Productive repetition resurrects past events, while bare 
repetition takes an empty form of history, the consequence of which is 
‘farce’ (Diken, 2012: 84). 
 
Thus ‘revolution’ occurs twice: first as tragedy, as a productive repetition, 
which can create something new, then as ‘farce’, as counterrevolution 
(Marx, 1852/2002; Žižek, 2009). Counterrevolution is bare repetition which 
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is built on harmony and consensus, whereas revolution is productive 
repetition which seeks to disrupt harmony and consensus (Diken, 2012: 84-
86). Simply put, counterrevolution as bare repetition produces non-events 
within the given, while revolution disrupts that givenness. When the spirit 
of revolution is forgotten, what remains after is bare repetition, a society 
characterised by the absence of revolutionary events. Neoliberal capitalism 
was conceived at the creation of a new world order. It legitimatised 
sovereign states who were supposed to defend liberal values both home 
and abroad: freedom of speech, all being equal access to prosperity, the 
ability to challenge governments, the elimination of torture and other cruel 
sovereign acts. Neoliberalism, in short, asserted values that would improve 
lives of human beings, and generate prosperity for people living through it 
(Friedman, 2002; Krugman, 2007; Stiglitz, 1998). Soon after the collapse of 
the Berlin Fall, it became institutionalised, declaring “the end of history” 
(Fukuyama, 1992; see also Jameson, 2003). It started to exercise its 
hegemony, especially in economic and military matters, a power which is 
constituted by a complex and open ended social regimes. The first Gulf 
War and the war against terror consolidated the hegemony of neoliberal 
power, in the hands of dominant sovereign states. Today, however, the 
hegemony of that power seems to have broken down (Harvey, 2005; see 
also Crouch, 2011; Žižek, 2009; 2011). The neoliberal world order, in short, 
is now under siege and being pushed back. As the threat of political and 
moral decline continues, however, it becomes increasingly authoritarian 
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and thus violent (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008; Diken, 2009; Dillon and Reid, 
2009; Duffield, 2011; Evans, 2011; Hardt and Negri, 2004; Toscano, 2010). 
 
After the broken promises of neoliberal capitalism (‘more democracy’, ‘less 
war’ and ‘state’, and ‘equality for all’), what sets is an authoritarian liberal 
society in which radical conflict and ‘true events’ are foreclosed (Bauman, 
2002; 2012; Badiou, 2005; 2009c; Diken, 2009, 2012: Swyngedouw, 2009a; 
2009b; Žižek, 2008b; 2010). What we have here is nothing else than an 
‘authoritarian liberal populism’ that “identifies singular actors as the 
immediate causes” of non-events (see Lavin, 2005: 443). After all, we, as 
‘good liberal subjects’, have grown used to the individual acts of heroism. 
The ideology of authoritarian liberal populism allows and even compels 
heroes to emerge in the popular consciousness, which produces a moment 
of historical possibility on which the subjects are able to capitalise (ibid. 
443). It compels us to identify individual heroes to appear as the authors of 
non-events, the consequence of which is farce. It should, therefore, come 
as no surprise to those of us that McCarthyism, Thatcherism, Reaganism, 
Bushism, Mulroneyism, Harperism, Putinism, Erdoganism, and now 
Obamaism have become the rule, not the exception. Although these ‘isms’ 
have different objects, the common denominator that exists between 
them all is the fact that they have presented themselves as the ‘kinder 
gentler’ face of neoliberal capitalism. What a scene! What a farce! 
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Second, the Bonapartist coup of 1851, while ‘not an exact parallel’ to what 
happened post 9/11, also shows the drive for total domination by the 
neoliberal security state. Precisely in this sense the text exposes the 
shallow structure behind the fragile façade of liberal (bourgeois) 
democracy and its political allies that supposedly protect democratic 
liberties. In this age of ID cards, biometric passports, poster bans, military-
style borders, fences and checkpoints around ‘security zones’, armed 
predator drones, Guantánamo, Border Agencies, Home Office, Patriot and 
Terrorism Acts etc. (Agamben, 1998; 2005; Elden, 2007; Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2004; 2010; Gregory, 2006; Lyon, 2001; 2003), 
Marx’s critique of bourgeois democracy still rings true. Despite its rhetoric, 
the bourgeois understanding of liberal values can all too easily sink into 
authoritarianism at the first opportunity. Thus, citizenship rights may be 
suspended in the name of ‘democracy’, innocent civilians can be killed by 
unjust, illegal and immoral drone strikes to save democracy, and torture 
can ‘reasonably’ be legalised to preserve human dignity. Instead of legal 
rights and legal systems based on universal citizenship, neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics is based on ‘states of exception’, pervasive 
surveillance, tracking and DNA database technologies, which give 
governments virtually unchecked powers to preemptively profile entire 
population, thus determining how the situation might be understood 
(Agamben, 2001; 2005; Aradau et al, 2008; Bell and Evans, 2010; Diken, 
2009; Dillon, 2007; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Ericson, 2008; Evans and Hardt, 
2010; Graham, 2010; Rose, 2007; Žižek, 2008b, 2010). In other words, the 
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neoliberal security state is an exceptional state, so are its characteristics. 
This has been accompanied by the revival of sovereignty and a vast 
expansion of the social regime of discipline, the very characteristics which 
pave the way for managing and expanding the mechanisms of control. For 
that reason, Marx’s text reveals the thin line between democracy and 
authoritarian populism, demonstrating how they mirror each other too 
closely (Carver, 2002; Cowling and Martin, 2002; Jessop, 2002). Those who 
are supposed to safeguard our essential democratic values threaten to 
destabilise democracies or perhaps even usher in a new era of global 
authoritarian rule, so as to retain its social power. Today, that is a danger 
that lurks more than ever under the surface of militarised post-politics, 
which operates within multiple rationalities and affects, and above all, 
within the overall socio-economic context of neoliberal capitalism. 
 
Third, under Bonaparte’s rule politics was reduced to an instrumentalist or 
technocratic rule. Similarly, in post-politics everyday life has been 
subjected to increased technocratic control, ensuring that social 
movements cannot be seen to take root and thrive, and that those who 
challenge the system politically and ethically can never, under any 
circumstances, be perceived to win (Graeber, 2011) Politics is, therefore, 
reduced to a technical-pragmatic exercise “in implementing and managing 
developments that are regarded as inevitable, performed by an elite 
coalition of diverse experts” (Bavo, 2007: 7; see also Stavrakakis, 2007). 
With the normalisation of the ‘state of exception’, suspension of basic 
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rights, ideological cultivation of a culture of fear and cynicism, and 
fundamental separation of bad and good circulation, or the included and 
the excluded, the aim is to prevent the event, an event which threatens to 
overthrow the system as a whole (Agamben, 2005: Badiou, 2008: Diken, 
2012; Dillon, 2011; Evans, 2010; Swyngedouw, 2009a; Žižek, 2008b; 2012) 
The dimensions of the neoliberal security complex now beggar the 
imagination. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics, in order to defuse the 
fear of potential revolutions, demands a constant auditing of biopolitical 
control over life to determine which lives are desired and productive and 
which lives are dangerous and need regulation (Aradau et. all 2008; Aradau 
& Van Munster, 2008; Dean, 2010; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Reid, 2012). With 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics, in other words, life becomes the 
enemy of life itself because it is where the event takes place. Worried 
about the possibility of the event, revolution, post-politics is a politics in 
which neoliberal capitalism seems to have become a second nature, and 
where security and militarisation have become formative, productive and 
generative principles of social life (Dillon, 1996; see also Agamben, 2001). 
In other words, a neoliberal consensus has been built around the 
indispensability for capitalism, and the politics of security that posits order 
as an absolute value. 
 
Marx’s analysis of the The Eighteenth Brumaire is sharp and vivid. While 
‘not drawing an exact parallel’ to Bonapartism, present-day readers will 
find some resonances in contemporary politics. My own is to think of the 
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increasing militarisation and neoliberalisation of society and then to grasp 
the truth of post-politics. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics expresses 
itself as an inability to think conflict and struggle in politics. As a principled 
counterrevolutionary formation, like Bonaparte’s rule, it aims at defusing 
the idea of revolution. If happiness, as Benjamin illustrates (2003: 390), is 
liberation from pseudo-events, that is, ‘farce’, which occurs as 
counterrevolution, the task is to remember the chains of the past in order 
to liberate the present. Only on this basis can it be possible to break the 
misery and counterrevolutionary aspects of the present and create 
something different from what already is. The past that I am interested in 
is the farcical character of The Eighteenth Brumaire that, as principled, 
reactionary logic, now reappears in a different guise, as one of the 
dominant mode of thinking in contemporary society: neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics. According to Benjamin, the historical 
consciousness of what-has-been starts with a ‘political awakening’, which 
offers an interpretation of past and present events. Hence I suggest that 
The Eighteenth Brumaire is a text that comes to the present from the past 
and awakes the oppressed in the very core of the present, a remembrance. 
What precisely does neoliberal and militarised post-politics stand for in the 
current historical conjuncture between the present and the past? This will 
be the central question addressed in the second part of the chapter. 
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2.3 Neoliberal and Militarised Post-Politics 
 
As noted in Chapter One, for Nietzsche, what made ancient Greek culture 
alive and thriving was its understanding of the polis as a site of public 
political encounter and radical dissent. For him, the Greek agora asserted 
disagreement as the base for politics proper. Hence Nietzsche praises the 
Greeks as there is no a priori separation between man and nature in them, 
a praise that acknowledges that ‘“natural’ qualities and those called truly 
‘human’ are inseparably grown together” (Nietzsche, 1954: 32). For this 
reason, the Greeks, according to Nietzsche, serve as a corrective to “the 
flabby concept of modern humanity” because this was a clear 
manifestation of the Greek’s “earnest necessity to let their hatred flow 
forth fully” (ibid. 33). The insistence on the inhumane aspects of humanity 
(cruelty, the will to destroy and create) is what makes the Greek agora as a 
site of performative contradictions, and the Greeks so terrifyingly human. 
As such, Nietzsche views the Greek polis as the agonal spirit incarnate, for 
it offers a political culture in which agonism was the common good and 
antagonism was constitutive of the activity of politics. The Greek polis was 
a place where political subjectivation literally took place, and in which 
conflict, antagonism and struggle were accepted as ontological givens, as 
parts of life. 
 
Society in the late capitalist order, however, cannot even imagine radical 
structural change. It is a ‘neoliberal and militarised post-political society’ in 
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which any questioning of reality becomes unacceptable, where radical 
change as an ‘event’ has no place and thus seems impossible or crazy. A 
common complaint about the late capitalist society is that it has been 
profoundly depoliticised in this way, and a number of scholars have begun 
to describe this process as ‘post-political.’ For example, Slavoj Žižek (1999: 
35; 2006), Chantal Mouffe (2005) and Eric Swyngedouw (2009a; 2009b) 
among others, argue that the post-political is a principled ‘political’ 
formation that “forecloses” the political, preventing the “politicization” of 
particular conflicts and identities. According to Žižek (1999: 29), for 
instance, post-politics is the attempt “to depoliticise the conflict by 
bringing it to its extreme, via the direct militarization of politics.” In this 
way, as political geographer Eric Swyngedouw (2009a: 608) suggests, not 
only is the public arena evacuated from antagonism and radical conflict, 
but “the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, 
announcing new forms of governmentality in which traditional sovereign or 
disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through 
disembedded networks of governance.” The aim of the post-political is, in 
short, “pre-emptive risk management, ensuring that nothing disturbing 
really happens, that ‘politics’ does not take place” (Diken and Laustsen, 
2002: 303). 
 
Moving away from ‘old fashioned’ ideology based politics, a new politics 
has to deal with knowledge and information rather than (traditional or 
simple-modern) beliefs. In reality, however, this shift in attitudes means 
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that politics itself should go “beyond left and right” (Giddens, 1994), since 
“partisan conflicts are a thing of the past and consensus can be achieved 
through dialogue” (Mouffe, 2005: 1). As Agamben (2006) argues, “there is 
a shift from the model of the polis founded on a centre, that is, a public 
centre or agora”, to a new order “that is certainly invested in a process of 
de-politicisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to 
decide what is private and what is public.” All of these developments 
suggest that the political itself is foreclosed, relying instead on compromise 
and trade-offs between particular interests and a depoliticised expert 
administration. This “retreat of the political” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 
1997; Lefort, 1988; see also Swyngedouw, 2009a) has enormous 
implications in contemporary society and thus requires urgent attention. 
 
At this point, Rancière’s interpretation of postdemocracy I find especially 
telling because it helps us better understand how post-politics is 
characterised by a propensity towards harmony, towards a consensual 
arrangement in which radical structural change, the event, seems to be 
ignored. Rancière (1999: 93) defines post-politics as “a political idyll of 
achieving the common good by an enlightened government of elites 
buoyed by the confidence of the masses.” It is a consensual arrangement 
that operates within a given socio-spatial distribution of things and people. 
This givenness, this existing order of things, is nothing other than the police 
order, or what Rancière (2001) calls “partition of the sensible.” 
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Rancière argues that ‘conflict’ is tightly controlled by the police order with 
the object of replacing a democratic configuration of politics with a post-
political consensus that eliminates real dispute, the very possibility of 
demonstrating ‘acts of subjectivation’ and ‘contestation’ that might 
interrupt the existing order. In this sense “consensus is the reduction of 
politics to the police” (Rancière, 2001). The post-democratic police order 
insists on circulation: “Move along! There is nothing to see here!” (ibid). 
Assembling around a consensus, the ‘police’ is a process of counting, of 
managing who and what counts, and the manner in which they count. The 
police in this respect refers to “all the activities which create order by 
distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière, 1994: 173). It “refers to an 
established order of governance with everyone in their ‘proper place’, 
whose essence “is not repression but distribution – distribution of places, 
people, names, functions, authorities, activities, and so on – and the 
normalization of this distribution” (Dikeç, 2007: 174). In other words, 
politics “acts on the police” (Rancière, 1999: 33). Based on a particular 
regime of representation, the consensual police order is organised as a 
partition of the sensible which “discloses the existence of something in 
common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and 
positions within it” (ibid. 12). The partition of the sensible “arranges the 
perceptive givens of a situation”; it sets the division between “what is in or 
out, central or peripheral, audible or inaudible, visible or invisible” (Dikeç, 
2007: 3-4). 
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The real, question, therefore, is: if ‘the police’ is based on a particular 
regime of representation, what would constitute a genuine democracy, a 
proper political democratic sequence? Politics proper can only be 
expressed in adversarial terms, and a coming together which can only 
occur in conflict (Rancière, 2007: 49). It asserts yelping dissent and rupture 
as the proper bases for politics. A proper political act, for Rancière, 
perturbs the existing legal order, the police, and gives word to the Wrong, 
to those who are not included, whose statements are not comprehensible 
in the ruling political/police space. Hence, a proper political act claims, in 
the name of equality, a place in the order of things, demanding “the part 
for those who have no-part” (Rancière, 2001). Politics proper, according to 
Rancière, only occurs when the existing order is questioned and 
interrupted. 
 
I find Rancière’s notion of politics proper instructive in this regard. 
However, I would like to go beyond Rancière’s understanding of politics not 
by negating him but by showing to what extent a proper political act is “not 
just a strategic intervention into a situation, bound by its conditions – it 
retroactively creates its conditions” (Žižek, 2010: 33). As will be argued in 
the last chapter, a proper political act is an essential coincidence of 
strategy and intoxication without referring to a stable synthesis between 
them. Combining in the right measure both revolutionary intoxication and 
strategic predicament, politics proper aims at distorting the situation as a 
whole. 
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As noted before, productive repetition redeems past events, while bare 
repetition simply parodies the past, the consequence of which is ‘farce.’ 
Productive repetition (tragedy) is revolutionary, for it is a resurrection of 
past events, bare repetition (farce) is counterrevolutionary, for it is a 
repetition without difference or consequence that produces non-events. 
The farcical character of post-politics derives from the fact that it builds 
upon harmony and consensus; what it produces is nothing other than 
pseudo-events within the confines of the given. Its aim is to repress all 
forms of disruptive resistance, ensuring that revolutionary subversion is an 
impossible one. In this sense the post-political security state is an old trick 
repackaged, but with some flimsy social democratic window dressing 
(Mouffe, 2000: 93): in mid-nineteenth century France, it was socialism for 
the Party of Order; in McCarthy’s day, it was anti-communism coupled with 
the national security state; and today, it is neoliberal and militarised post-
politics, which is not a positive politics, actively pursuing a new social 
project, but a politics of fear, “a reactive politics, whose motivating force is 
defence against a perceived threat” (Žižek, 2008b: 41). 
 
It is its counterrevolutionary aspects that make neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics farcical. Hence it endlessly promises to bring democracy and 
prosperity, and advocates harmony and consensus within the bounds of a 
given hegemonic discourse in order to maintain a state of ‘order’ to 
‘disorder.’ The only subject position this farce allows is that of individual 
types whose have the ability to capitalise historical moments in which they 
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live. Put differently, the only subject position this comedy allows is that of 
heroes who are incapable of disrupting harmony and consensus. Harassing 
the many but catching the few, neoliberal post-politics is the art of 
foreclosing the politicisation of subjectivities. 
 
The fact that we live in a post-political society, that politics has been 
suppressed and foreclosed, has also received severe criticism. One might 
think of Jodi Dean’s work (2009) on Rancière, where she argues the 
shortcomings of his post-political politics. Dean’s article entitled “Politics 
without Politics” is a significant attempt to demonstrate the weaknesses 
and the inadequacies of the sign of ‘democracy’ as it is currently 
constituted for left political aspiration. Dean examines the end of ideology 
thesis which Rancière associates with the triumph of democracy. Referring 
to Rancière’s idea of post-politics “as the art of suppressing the political”, 
Dean (2009: 22) claims that this argument is incapable of handling the 
current conjuncture. While it is worth noting that he speaks of the cause of 
depoliticisation, Rancière, Dean goes on to suggest, can’t explain the 
specificity of neoliberalism (ibid. 22). Thus the arguments for post-politics 
and dedemocratisation “are at best unconvincing and at worst misleading” 
(ibid. 23). Because left political theory should undo the damage neoliberal 
ideas and polices have created, Dean suggests that “the claim that we are 
in a post-political time is childishly petulant” (ibid.). In this sense post-
politics might not be a helpful term to grasp contemporary reality. As a 
term, post-politics, Dean argues, obfuscates the political moves and 
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struggles that produce the current conjuncture, and “prevents us from 
understanding them as such.” 
 
Nevertheless, Dean argues that “there are two reasons that post-politics 
might be a useful descriptor. “ First, it refers to a specific problem in left 
political theory: “the fantasy of a politics without politics” (ibid. 24). 
Thought in this way, post-politics becomes a term that refers neither to 
governance, nor to consensus, but rather to an identity politics that the left 
tends to embrace. For Dean, the left embraces identity politics based on 
inclusion and recognition results in naturalisation rather than the 
politicisation of identity. Second, post-politics is also a useful descriptor “as 
an accentuation of the depoliticization of democracy” (ibid.). Dean seems 
keen to argue that in contemporary society, to demand democracy is to 
demand what already exists, that is, givenness of the partition of the 
sensible. To this extent, as Dean seems to hint, democracy sustains, rather 
than challenges, the hegemonic relations in a given political constellation. 
Basically, this means that democracy is not the solution; it becomes a 
common denominator on which both left and right agree. Democracy, in 
short, takes the form of a fantasy that leads to a politics without politics. 
 
Dean (ibid. 23) also contends that the right has been engaged in the 
political, reframing the constitution, reversing the steps that had been 
taken towards greater race equality, redistributing the wealth to the 
wealthy, undermining habeas corpus and enforcement of the Geneva 
76 
 
Conventions, expanding unwarranted state surveillance, lobbying 
aggressively to make evangelical Christian beliefs a part of schools’ 
curricula so that creationism and climate change denial will be taught in 
the classrooms and so on. Given that these are all political achievements, 
the claim that we live in a post-political society, according to Dean, does 
not have political grounds. As such, post-politics is inapplicable to the 
United States post 9/11 as it fails to acknowledge the collapse of regulation 
in the financial sector, the public/private partnership, “the rise of private 
security forces, and contemporary practices of surveillance wherein state 
agencies rely on private databases” (ibid. 24). 
 
While I find Dean’s argument elegant and persuasive, it results, however, in 
an analysis that fails to grasp the governmental rationalities and the 
affective logics of neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Let us start with 
the right’s engagement in the political. To be sure, the right in the USA 
managed to transform politics; they set the pace for ‘political change.’ How 
did we get here? Contra Dean, I argue that the right’s engagement in the 
political is a result of post-political politics, an emergency politics in which 
fear/security becomes a way of life (Badiou, 2008). We live in emergency 
times, a new era in which the exercise of state power refers to a 
depoliticised expert administration. In such a situation, the only way to 
introduce passion into politics, the only way to energise people and 
increase their self-awareness is through fear (Žižek, 2008b). The right seeks 
to mobilise fear and ressentiment on the part of relatively privileged 
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groups in relation to ‘threatening others.’ Reducing politics to affects, it 
boils down all political issues to the fear of external threats: immigration, 
crime and terrorism, economic downturn, foreign trade, as well as 
socialism and Islamism (Obama is a Muslim and a socialist). “Increasingly 
reckless, anarchic and strident”, the American right, as columnist Gary 
Younge (2010: 31) observes, “is living in a parallel world where fear and 
rage drive out the facts.” The right, in short, articulates its lack of political 
conviction by trying to mobilise the ‘fear of the fear’ ended up naturalising 
rather than questioning the capitalist order and the market. 
 
In this sense the right, like neoliberal and militarised post-politics, relies on 
the denial of a radical, utopian dimension to politics and depicts the given 
reality as the only reality. Having a general suspicion of social change, the 
American right plays a given game that relies on the manipulation of fears 
in a populist fashion, which sustains rather than challenges the consensual 
neoliberal order. Radical social change, it believes, should be cautious and 
pragmatic. Thus the American right seeks to sustain the existing values 
(neoliberal capitalism, the market, conservatism), with no ambition of 
overcoming their positivity; it seeks to preserve particular relations of 
power. Committed to capitalist power relations, it defends privilege from 
those who threaten it (e.g. the power of employers and managers over 
workers). The American right, in other words, pivots on an essential 
commitment – defence of privilege and inequality. In this sense it is 
spectacularly successful in ‘politicising’ the notion of the public good and 
78 
 
replacing it with a free-market ideology precisely through naturalising and 
establishing a consensus around neoliberal capitalism. 
 
In this way consensus becomes an invariant of politics, and most significant 
issues inherent to the system cease to create scissions, taking neoliberal 
capitalism and the market merely as an unquestionable, naturalised 
background. In the final analysis, nothing really political happens; the 
outcome of the mobilisation of the American right does not change 
anything, and, in contrast to productive repetition, no perspective takes 
place. Contrary to productive repetition, which necessarily causes 
disruption by changing the coordinates of the existing system, of neoliberal 
capitalism, the politics of American right builds upon harmony and 
consensus. Precisely in this sense, and contrary to Dean, the ‘political 
success’ of the American right should not be seen as ‘politics proper.’ 
Politics proper aims at disrupting the situation as a whole. What we see in 
the American right, however, is bare repetition, that is, farce, which 
produces non-events within the confines of the capitalist order and the 
market. In the end, therefore, the right does not provide an all together 
different perspective on social change and everybody returns to the same 
position as in the beginning. 
 
As for the private security forces and the contemporary practices of 
surveillance, one of the central characteristics of post-politics is that it is 
primarily security oriented. Contrary to Dean’s claim that post-politics fails 
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to grasp the rise of military-industrial complex, that it fails to acknowledge 
the rise of the contemporary practises of surveillance, neoliberal post-
politics focuses on depoliticised expert management and designates 
security as the overriding responsibility of the modern state. By making 
security one of the central features to modern governance (Agamben, 
2001), neoliberal post-politics redefines populations as vulnerable and 
resilient that must be protected (Reid, 2012). In the process, therefore, the 
affective logic becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The 
post-political is a determinate political formation with distinctive social 
regimes and affects toward ever increasing ‘militarisation’, or the 
‘privatisation’ and ‘capitalisation’ of society. The key question then is how 
to conceptualise the relationships between regimes of power and their 
affective logics. As I propose in this dissertation, the discursive framing of 
neoliberal post-politics and the established social regimes has enormous 
implications for society and politics. Yet, in Dean’s analysis, this remains 
under-researched. Installing “communicative capitalism” (Dean, 2010b) as 
the determinate formation, the power of agency, and ‘drive’ the only 
affect, does not seem relevant precisely because it fails to acknowledge the 
complex linkages between neoliberal capitalism, and historical social 
regimes and their affective structures. 
 
For instance, in order to explain liberalism’s “constitutive inability”, Dean 
refers to Lacan’s discussion of drive as a “constant thrust”, which “forbids 
any assimilation of the drive to a biological function, which always has a 
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rhythm” (Lacan, quoted in Dean, 2010a: 4). Dean (2010b: 30) goes on to 
suggest that the Lacanian conception of drive “expresses the reflexive 
structure of complex networks.” In this context, Dean argues (ibid. 30) that 
beyond the law “are the reflexive circuits of drive.” Communicative 
capitalism, according to Dean, “thrives not because of unceasing or 
insatiable desires but in and as the repetitive intensity of drive.” By making 
communicative capitalism operative, drive therefore disengages subjects 
from a political act of resistance and transformation. For this reason, Dean 
(ibid. 31) argues that, “under conditions of the decline of symbolic 
efficiency, drive is not an act.” Politically speaking, the challenge is, 
according to Dean, to produce “the conditions of possibility for breaking 
out of or redirecting the loop of drive.” 
 
Dean (2010a: 4) asserts that “the structure of biopolitics, biopolitics’ 
underlying dynamic and shape, is drive.” For it can still help us clarify “how 
it is that biopolitics is a politics of reversal, repetition, and return”, an 
activity wherein action and reaction merge together (ibid. 4). Emphasising 
three features of the Lacanian notion of drive, that is to say, drive as failure 
“which does not reach the goal to enjoy”, drive as a “compulsion to repeat” 
and drive as “creative destruction” (ibid. 4-5), Dean seems to be saying that 
drive has a force of loss and capture, which strengthens the specificities of 
both liberalism and neoliberalism. Drive allows us to understand how 
people are “captured in the population”, a biopolitical capture that 
neoliberalism uses and extends its hegemony. 
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This understanding of drive as a force, as an affect that sustains 
neoliberalism is also prone to problems. Drive may be an important affect 
that enables us to see biopolitics as byproduct of fundamental change in 
terms of ‘governmentality’, but it is insufficient to understand how human 
beings are captured in the population, a biopolitical capture that neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics amplifies and extends. Neoliberalism, as 
Foucault (2008: 22) states, is “the general framework of biopolitics.” Only 
on this basis will be able to understand the true meaning of neoliberalism 
and biopolitics. Its objective is to neutralise anything that can threaten the 
hegemony of neoliberalism. In the process, neoliberalism relies not only on 
a circuit of fear and danger but an entire political economy of affect. Just as 
neoliberal post-politics produces and organises different social regimes, its 
functioning also requires multiple differentiated affects in which subjects 
are managed and governed through a biopolitical capture. The established 
social regimes are a kind of sustaining the hegemonic power of the system, 
a mechanism which consists of affects and emotions. Neoliberalism relies 
on this interplay between different social regimes and the affective circuit 
they generate, intervening in its management. In other words, neoliberal 
post-politics is as much about mobilising concrete social regimes, as it is 
about managing multiple affects. 
 
Precisely in this sense, it cannot be reduced either to drive, or the 
stimulation of fear and threat. Neoliberalism is not stable; it is continually 
transforming itself. In short, it is a dynamic ideology, a heterogeneous 
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multiple. And it is necessary that our analysis targets this nexus of relations 
between different regimes of power relations, a multiple political economy 
of affect, life and security/militarisation/war that is its heart. The affective 
logics are tendencies or incitements inherent to regimes of power, but they 
cannot determine in any final way the concrete experiences of those logics, 
such as perceived emotions. In other words, just as each social regime is 
connected with the other social regimes in a specific way without one 
determining the others (not even in the final instance), each affect is 
connected with other affects without one determining the others. Closing 
down possibilities rather than opening them, Dean, however, seems to 
offer ‘drive’ as the only stable category of political economy of affect, 
subordinating all affective politics to it. The biopolitical attempt to manage 
life in its productive new capacities, to maintain completely a population, 
requires a force that exceeds the capacity of drive as a sustaining force. 
Interventions are, after all, conducted in order to affect life so that the 
individual will behave in the desired way. Neoliberal biopolitics’ dynamic 
oscillation between the established social regimes, its compulsive 
circulation from one affect to the other, indicates that we reground the 
affective logics differently, that an analysis of extra dimension of affect is 
necessary for any social and spatial analysis of neoliberal capitalism. What 
truly matters is an analysis that explains the dynamics of neoliberal post-
politics and the established social regimes, which directly manipulate and 
intervene in life purely at the level of its ‘affective relations.’ 
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Dean also argues that the claim that we are in a post-political time is “like 
the left is saying, if we don’t get to play what we want, we’re not going to 
play” (2009: 23). But do the regimes and affects characterising neoliberal 
and militarised post-political completely foreclose the possibility of 
politics? No, of course not! The reign of neoliberal post-politics does not 
mean the end of politics; it does suggest, however, that the traditional 
models of politics are no longer valid, and that new models are called for. 
What gives rise to neoliberal post-politics is also what gives rise to 
possibilities for radical political change. In Dean’s analysis, this element is 
not properly addressed, and she fails even to treat post-politics as a 
complex and historical regime of power relations, instead asserting it as 
crude and stable ‘fact.’ Neoliberal and militarised post-politics is a moving 
target. And “moving targets are, nevertheless, targets of a kind. Harder to 
hit, but more rewarding for it” (Reid, 2010b: 394). As argued above, 
multiple governmental rationalities and their associated affects are means 
to, and methods of, neoliberal post-politics. As I discussed in Chapter One, 
what is then needed is a dynamic ‘topological’ analysis that allows us to 
make sense of particular governmental forms. Topology refers to 
virtualities as well as conditions of possibility that are actualised in 
concrete situations; the topological approach is a theoretical strategy 
through which I propose to characterise, link together and analyse 
different social regimes. What is then needed is a dynamic topological 
perspective that aims to explore the complex interplay between 
sovereignty, discipline, control and terrorism at a theoretical level, and 
84 
 
conceptualise the relationships between complex and historical regimes of 
power relations and their affective logics. Today, neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics, the established social regimes and related affects such as 
ressentiment, fear, cynicism and spite continue to play a major role in 
relation to the social. We need a dynamic topological approach to analyse 
them. 
 
One is tempted to say that, along the same lines, neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics oscillates in between present and future, to make sure that 
‘disruptive events’ do not take place. Post-politics in this respect actually 
precludes the gesture of politicisation proper; it is the art of foreclosing the 
possibility of politicisation. More importantly, and contrary to Dean, the 
post-political consensual order takes as foundational the inevitability of the 
capitalist economic system and the idea that radical dissent and 
antagonism can only exist within the bounds of neoliberal consensus (as 
long as they do not attempt to radically challenge the very foundations of 
neoliberal capitalism). In the process, politics is boxed into a technocratic 
managerialism; a “post-democratic’ process, which leads to the effective 
silencing of genuinely political questions” (Marchart, 2007: 66). Concerned 
more with the electoral mechanisms which are themselves conceived of 
purchasing power, politics is reduced to a depoliticised expert 
administration, and the space of legitimate political debate is compromised 
by the coordination of interests, whereby all problems are left to experts, 
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social workers and technocrats, that is, to an elite coalition of diverse 
experts. 
 
2.3.1 The Euro Crisis 
 
The euro crisis is a high point of doing politics without any ostensible 
politics. Talking quite a lot of the peculiarities of US situation, Dean also 
fails to analyse the peculiarities of European politics, which is again 
depoliticised technocratic post-politics. In Europe, in particular, the rise of 
the managerial-technocratic bourgeois order is what we are witnessing. As 
we have seen in Greece and in Italy, elected if flawed prime ministers were 
forced to resign in favour of unelected economic experts, of technocrats, 
for they could not push through all of the necessary draconian austerity 
measures. In the Italian case, Berlusconi was toppled neither for 
corruption, nor for rising unemployment, xenophobia, or for having sex 
with underage girls; but because the markets think he had to go, whereas 
in the Greek case, former Prime Minister George Papandreou threatened 
to give the people a say on austerity plan, through a referendum. This 
means that, in a crisis, so-called democratic principles and institutions may 
be entirely scrapped in favour of technocracy, of ‘safe pair of hands’, 
backed by the full force of the state, for the sole purpose of implementing 
policies. More troubling, though, is that the suspension of parliamentary 
democracy in favour of ‘unity governments’, of the rule by the ideologically 
neutral technicians, “is viewed not as a problem but as an affirmation that 
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these nations mean business” (Editorial, 2011: 26). What we have here is a 
modern debased version of the political that relies on expert knowledge 
and administration and “legitimizes itself by means of a direct reference to 
the scientific status of its knowledge” (Žižek, 2006: 188). In the process, 
doing politics is reduced to “a professional spirit of an engineer fixing an 
aeroplane” (Editorial, 2011: 26). 
 
Recall Tony Blair’s advice to young people in one of his ‘goodbye tours’ 
before he stepped down as prime minister: “an idealistic young person 
[who] wanted to change the world [should] become a scientist” (quoted in 
Rawnsley, 2006). What this means is that the political no longer represents 
itself in terms of purely political aims, dissent and rupture, but emerges, 
“both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that 
only knowledge has access to” (Swyngedouw, 2009a: 604). Thus science 
becomes politicised and, more importantly, the place of the ‘agent’ and 
belief is occupied by knowledge. Today science becomes a new religious 
authority that can provide the ‘ultimate truth’, the best way to understand 
life. In post-politics, therefore, political problems are given apolitical 
solutions in which human beings are reduced to “a pure disembodied gaze” 
observing their own “absence”: 
 
As Lacan pointed out, this is the fundamental subjective position of fantasy: 
to be reduced to a gaze observing the world in the condition of the 
subject’s non-existence – like the fantasy of witnessing the act of one’s own 
conception, parental copulation, or the act of witnessing one’s own burial, 
like Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn.” (Žižek, 2010: 80) 
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The aim of Bonapartism was to place popular sovereignty under specific 
security regimes in the name of order, of bourgeoisie. At the heart of 
regime’s policy was technocratic management, which was supposed to be 
a catalyst for the development of a competitive economy. As such, the 
political debate was reduced to a farcical exchange without taking on an 
antagonistic form. Similarly, the aim of neoliberal post-politics is to protect 
liberal state power whilst placing it under a disciplinary control. The farcical 
character of post-politics derives from the fact that it is based on a 
technocratic management, which is viewed as the only viable alternative 
for the development of a market capitalism based on competition. The 
Bonapartist politics was largely restricted to the wealthy members of the 
regime, and not necessarily across ‘class’ lines, for a share of political and 
economic power. Thus politics was locked into a ‘technocratic 
management’, represented by older and newer elites. In post-politics, in a 
similar way, politics proper is prohibited and restricted to experts, 
scientists and technocrats. In this, there is no proper content of politics; 
the political space is closed down by criminalising or ridiculing dissent. In 
post-politics, like Bonaparte’s era, politics has been reduced to a 
managerial-technocratic rule without a possibility of a radical structural 
change regarding the ‘given.’ Post-politics is farcical in the sense that it is 
deployed to safeguard the managerial-technocratic ‘bourgeois order’, for it 
is the best ideological shell behind which neoliberal capitalism continues 
on its brutal, militarised, unjust and destructive way. 
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2.3.2 Militarisation of Society 
 
While post-politics sacralises the liberal democratic order, it also mobilises 
all sorts of military/security complex, a process in which the state of 
exception has become the rule (Agamben, 1998; 2005). The militarisation 
belies the seemingly pacific façade of ‘consensual’ post-politics; indeed, 
contemporary society now seems to be formed in the image of 
militarisation. What we are witnessing is the loss of distinctive notions such 
as progress, order and modernisation and the emergence of “the new 
military urbanism” (Graham, 2010) as the organising principle of 
contemporary society. In a sense, therefore, the exception has become the 
rule: military urbanism and the wave of fear have permeated “the sphere 
of the everyday, the private realm of the house” (Misselwitz & Weizman, 
2003: 272). 
 
Indeed, militarisation of society is central to depoliticised consensual post-
politics that has characterised the past few years. Especially since 9/11, this 
process has been accelerated. This is not to say that the militarisation of 
society did commence on 12 September 2001. Processes of urban 
militarisation and securitisation are nothing new; they predate the War on 
Terror. Thus, like others (Coaffee et al, 2009; Graham, 2004; 2010), one 
could argue that the “war on terror has been used as a prism being used to 
conflate and further legitimize dynamics that already were militarizing 
urban space” (Warren, 2002: 614). In effect, there is a particular 
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relationship between the histories of the city and political violence. For 
instance, war, for Virilio (2002), is at the origins of the foundation of cities. 
War, according to Virilio, is not only to be understood as ‘warfare’, but as a 
means for thinking about the way in which society itself is constituted. 
War, in this sense, is an ‘absolute immanence’ that political sovereign 
power “ceaselessly fails to capture in performing the kinds of biopolitical 
manoeuvres upon which forms of civil pacificity are built” (Reid, 2005). As 
an absolute immanence, “pure war” enables the state to establish 
homogeneous cities under the auspices of purity and safety. Indeed, 
methods of discipline and control – coupled with processes of urban 
militarisation - served to normalise war and preparations for war as central 
elements of the material, political-economic and cultural constitution of 
cities and urban life (see Graham, 2012: 137). 
 
To understand the importance of militarisation and war as the organising 
principles of societies, it might be useful to read Clausewitz from a 
Foucauldian perspective. Such a Foucauldian perspective suggests that in 
On War (1993), Clausewitz did not simply define the conjunctive relation of 
war to society and politics as the art of strategy. He provided a theory of 
strategy upon which complex power relations operate within 
contemporary societies (Foucault, 2003; see also Reid, 2003). The primary 
significance of Clausewitz’s strategic thought, according to Foucault, was its 
basic principle upon which a new form of political power had emerged, 
that which Foucault described as “governmentality” (Foucault, 2007; 2008; 
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see also Reid, 2003: 2). Clausewitz’s theory is valuable as it outlines the 
modern role of warfare in what Foucault (1998) called the strategy of 
power. As Foucault provides an analytics of power that permeates the 
morphological networks of contemporary society, so Clausewitz helps us 
better understand the networking of “the liberal way of war” (Dillon and 
Reid, 2009). In this sense militarisation and war take on positive 
characteristics of neoliberal post-politics that takes on the task of the 
management of life in the name of the entire population (Foucault, 1977). 
 
Post-politics, then, is as much about neoliberalisation as it is about 
militarisation of society. It is as much about expanding the processes of 
capital as it is about war and violence. These two registers are intimately 
connected. Neoliberal post-politics increasingly centres on securitising and 
militarising the architectures and circulations of society (Dillon and Reid, 
2009; Graham, 2012). The struggle for contemporary society now coincides 
more and more with the struggle for the liberal way of war. For the ability 
to provide security is especially useful in maintaining a liberal way of life. 
However, as Agamben (2002) shows, security consists not in the 
prevention of crises and catastrophes, but rather in their continual 
production, regulation and management. Therefore, by making security 
central to modern governance, there is the danger of producing a situation 
of clandestine complicity between terrorism and counter-terrorism, locked 
in a deathly embrace of mutual incitement. In this sense, the post-political 
war on terror, coupled with increased militarisation and preemptive 
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techniques, suggests a normalisation of the state of exception, which has 
become the dominant paradigm of contemporary politics today (Agamben, 
2005: 1-31). Or, to say this differently, the state of exception is an instance 
of neoliberal and militarised post-politics. When security becomes the 
organising principle of politics and society and law is replaced by the state 
of exception, a state “can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself 
terroristic” (see Agamben, 2001). 
 
Importantly, the state of exception is always reactionary. We know very 
well from Schmitt (1996: 21) that the political involves a permanent 
struggle between order (counterrevolution) and chaos (revolution). This is 
why the state of exception is declared to save the condition of normality 
(order), that is to say, to avoid a true exception (Žižek, 2002: 108). The 
state of exception is always counterrevolutionary because its main task is 
to displace dissent and resistance against the existing order. It holds 
together as a response to an ‘urgent threat’: how to protect order against 
the fear of disorder. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics is nothing else 
than the materialisation of the state of exception as a reactionary political 
principle. 
 
We seem doomed to repeat history. In its desire to protect a liberal way of 
life through militarisation, war and violence, post-politics takes the empty 
form of farce, bare repetition. Post-politics in this respect is 
counterrevolutionary because it is a compulsion to repeat. For Marx, 
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tragedy refers to disharmony and interruption, whereas farce is built upon 
harmony and consensus. In this sense farce is a constellation of non-events 
which produce no difference within the bounds of a given hegemonic 
discourse. The farce of Louis Bonaparte was tragic, not for the man but for 
the society. Likewise, the farce of neoliberal and militarised post-politics is 
tragic, not for the man but for the society. It is its counterrevolutionary 
tendencies that make neoliberal and militarised post-politics farcical. 
Hence it insists on bringing democracy and so on and advocates harmony 
and consensus within the existing social order. Just as Louis Bonaparte 
subverted democracy and disavowed class antagonisms in order to bring 
‘freedom’ in a mode of futurity, in the interest of the capitalist class, 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics (the war against terror) recognises 
freedom and democracy only in a conservative way, specifically as market 
freedom. Both are authoritarian populist regimes that allow individual 
heroes to emerge in the popular consciousness (Bonaparte-Bush Senior 
and Bush Junior). Both depict their societies as the end of history (the ‘end’ 
being Bonapartism in one case and neoliberal capitalism in the other). Both 
mobilise the repressive state apparatus in order to subvert democracy and 
disavow class antagonisms. In both, political debate is reduced to the 
managerial-technocratic ‘bourgeois order’ without taking the form of 
antagonism. And in both the politics of security/fear appears as the 
ultimate mobilising figure (Žižek, 2008a: 34); two militarised societies, two 
preemptive strategies, two counterrevolutionary regimes, one Bonapartist, 
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one neoliberal post-politics, which depict the given reality as the only 
reality, pushing the idea of revolution to the background. 
 
Just as Bonapartism signified the ‘depoliticisation’ of the political, and 
transformed it into apolitical administration, post-politics signifies a 
naturalisation that rejects the political nature of given questions. However, 
neither engineering nor militarisation, politics remains as much an art as a 
science, and it always involves antagonisms which require us to make a 
choice between conflicting alternatives. It represents reclaiming the terms 
of debate in wider society. As Diken and Laustsen (2004: 9) put it: 
“[p]olitics…is the ability to debate, question and renew the fundament on 
which political struggle unfolds, the ability to radically criticise a given 
order and to fight for a new and better one. In a nutshell, then, politics 
necessitates accepting conflict.” Neoliberal and militarised post-politics, by 
contrast, has eliminated a genuine political space of radical conflict and 
disagreement. It should be clear how in such a climate there is hardly room 
for a genuine political gesture: that is, the positioning of those groups who 
have no space in the current or future police order. At this point, a naïve, 
but nevertheless crucial, question is quite appropriate: is consensual 
neoliberal order a peaceful order? Absolutely not. Quite the contrary: 
because post-politics is a lack of contestation, because it enforces a 
particularly violent way of securitisation and neoliberalisation in society, it 
creates more problems than it solves. This includes the large wage gap 
between the highest and lowest paid people; sweeping cuts in health care, 
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education and pensions; ‘dispensable populations’ excluded from social 
services and political participation (i.e. the poor, the homeless, the 
undocumented); increasing privatisation, unemployment and poverty, and 
the extreme concentration of wealth and consumption in the hands of the 
top %1; corruption among the parties and the political class embroiled in 
media ownership; banking and the phone-hacking scandals and the 
transgression of international law, disrespect of nationals’ opinions; the 
inability to control the ‘free market’ and the rapacious corporations; the 
inter-ethnic wars and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of 
people; drug cartels, the mafia, bribes and organised crime; the 
manipulation of goods and services, for power purposes; and so forth. 
 
Because neoliberal and militarised post-politics is based on a consensual 
order by excluding those who understand themselves as increasingly 
alienated and abandoned by neoliberal forms of power and rationality, this 
provokes greater violent insurgent activism. Because the system is unable 
to handle political and mass civic participation, it operates culturally and 
ideologically through the demonisation of dissent, or the moral castigation 
of all radicalism as ‘bad’, as ‘terrorism.’ Are we not witnessing the same 
ideological operation in the ongoing protests against the system around 
the world? If you build a system on the assumption that there will be no 
radical dissent, critique and fundamental conflict, what happens when 
antagonism and dissent do appear, and begin to articulate themselves as 
political alternatives? In this sense the violence, the naked force we have 
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seen against protesters (Occupy Movement, the Arab revolts, the 
Indignados, the Québec student strike etc.) exposes the brittleness of 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics and its refusal to accommodate 
radical socio-political conflict and antagonism in politics. What such 
hypocrisy shows is that the ‘intimate’ partnership between democracy and 
neoliberal capitalism has come to an end. 
 
All of which leads to a problem: when the political, and the real democratic 
subject, is foreclosed, the blind violence tends to be seen as the only 
‘political’ (re)action for the affective staging of active discontent. As 
Lefebvre (1991: 23) had put it long ago, “this is a new negativity, a tragic 
negativity which manifests itself as incessant violence. These seething 
forces are still capable of rattling the lit of the cauldron of the state and its 
space, for differences can never be totally quieted.” Thus, even though 
post-politics represses the political, such a repression is bound to lead to a 
‘return of the foreclosed’, to violent expressions of discontent and hatred; 
but also to the return of new forms of anti-immigrant and anti-Marxist 
racism, as in the case of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, 
who killed 77 people in Norway in July 2011. The Paris suburb riots (2005) 
and England riots (2011) were also classic violent examples of such violent 
outbursts. Though such violent explosions were not protests with properly 
‘political aims’, they surely must tell us something about the foreclosure of 
the political space. Which points to a problem: we live in a society in which 
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“the only available alternative to enforced democratic consensus is a blind 
acting out” (Žižek, 2011). 
 
Consequently, late capitalist consensual governance and debates signal a 
depoliticised politics “where administrative governance defines the zero-
level of politics” (Swyngedouw, 2009b: 225-6). As such, affects such as 
ressentiment, fear, cynicism and spite neoliberal and militarised post-
politics has engendered are difficult to overstate. Mobilising concrete 
social regimes, neoliberal and militarised post-politics also profits from an 
entire economy of affect, whose strategic remit has turned towards 
creating the conditions of the event. Neoliberal post-politics is always in 
the process of conditioning the event and thus determining future 
reactions so that struggle and resistance become futile. It attempts to 
securitise, privatise and defuse the fear of potential revolutions. It does so 
through historical social regimes and the corresponding affects. 
 
It is at this point that one should return to the historical lessons of The 
Eighteenth Brumaire. The most astonishingly original analysis of Marx in 
the text is not the idea that human subjects make history, albeit in well-
determined conditions. The novelty is rather quite different: “traditions 
from all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living” (Marx, 1852/2002: 19). That is to say, we agents in the present “are 
compelled by the imagery and symbols of the past when they come to fulfil 
some historic task” (Cowling and Martin, 2002: 4-5). In this sense the 
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nightmare world of tradition that Marx refers to is nothing else than 
‘farce.’ The ‘new’ that comes to be actualised in the present always gives a 
comforting ‘familiarity’ in which the spectres of the past are continuously 
summoned up. Marx’s theory, in other words, is that history is a parody of 
events which have to be thrown away in the dustbin. Similarly, in 
contemporary society, we have neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
which is not ‘real’ history but merely a ‘farce’, a dusting off of long-dead 
historical form. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics is a ‘political’ 
formation, a principled counterrevolutionary logic that aims to defuse, 
disperse and suppress revolution. History, then, is revealed to be a tissue of 
farcical non-events, which are not identical in nature but inextricably 
merged with their effects. Failure to be conscious about the past events 
results in a pseudo-history that is static rather than dynamic. The greatest 
danger for our understanding of history thus resides in the entire model of 
linearity, and the violence that accompanies it. No doubt this is a form of 
temporal hegemony to which we are subjected and by which we 
unwittingly become a silent accomplice to the dominant. As it appears in 
Marx and Benjamin, the ruthless critique of linear progression provides an 
opportunity not only for correction to historicism, but also to homogeneity 
of history and vulgar progressivism. Seen in this way, one cannot address 
the present independently of the past; the present is always in relation to 
the past. For both Marx and Benjamin, this insight is vital, for it allows us to 
think of the relation between time and politics in non-linear terms. This 
conception of history is marked by the notion of remembrance as not the 
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past-made-present, but the past that “flashes up” to the present and 
arrives in the future “in a moment of danger” (Benjamin, 2003: 391). 
 
Thus, juxtaposing the Eighteenth Brumaire and neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics, I aim to reinforce the act of remembrance and farce as 
dynamic principles of history and politics; dynamic principles in which the 
past (Bonaparte’s rule, the French counter-revolution) and the present 
(post-politics) converge and unearth the real dialectics of history 
(Benjamin, 2003: 396). Thus I propose a ‘critical’ reflection in which a 
moment in the past (Eighteenth Brumaire) and a moment in the present 
(neoliberal post-politics) coalesce, subverting the non-linearity of history 
and thus providing with a theoretical and practical model for interrupting 
the present. And this is where Marx’s text discloses its close ‘political’ 
relationship to Benjamin’s philosophical revitalisation of material history.  
 
The reign of Bonaparte was based on a ‘depoliticised politics’ where 
socialist ideals, revolutionary events were equated with terrorism. As such, 
the official plebiscite campaign was accompanied by affects (e.g. fear) 
created by carefully established social regimes. Its logic, of course, was 
political because it was a reactionary counterrevolutionary logic that aimed 
at suppressing revolution. In short, the Bonapartist regime was a principled 
‘political’ formation with different social regimes and affects toward 
militarisation and technocratic romanticism in the interest of the capitalist 
class. Similarly, the post-political is not simply an absence of politics. It is a 
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determinate formation with tendencies, rationalities and affects, toward 
ever increasing securitisation and managerial consensual governing in the 
interests of the market. But what rationalities of power and affects 
underlie the post-political? This will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Sovereignty 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter gave a general overview of the debates concerning 
the functioning of securitised and neoliberal post-politics in contemporary 
society. Taking as its point of departure Marx’s analysis of not only history 
as farce, but politics as farce in The Eighteenth Brumaire, it showed that 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics is the current art of foreclosing the 
political. However, the crucial question raised by the last chapter was: 
what rationalities of power underlie the post-political; how do we 
understand the relationships between sovereignty, discipline and control, 
and their corresponding affects? Research has yet to fully delve into the 
complex linkages between post-politics and historical social regimes and 
their affective structures. In addition, radical politics must diagnose and 
confront these modalities of post-politics and the affective logic each 
regime entails and how they inter-relate. 
 
In this chapter I examine the concept of sovereignty, arguing that sovereign 
political power is one of the vital regimes to the development of neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics. Here, I take as my point of departure 
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Deleuze’s notion of sovereignty. This is for two reasons. First, because 
sovereignty always involves the effort to reduce multiplicity to unity, 
difference to sameness, the concept of sovereign power requires itself an 
updated understanding on which to resist that capture operation globally. 
Nevertheless, sovereignty is a vengeful regime that generates what 
Nietzsche (1996) calls ressentiment. The immediate exercise of 
vengefulness is the privilege of sovereign political power whilst victims 
(slaves) are burdened with ressentiment. Following this, the problem, for 
Deleuze, is not simply that of how to criticise sovereignty as a concept, as a 
social fact, for “those who criticize without creating, those who are content 
to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it 
needs to return to life…are inspired by ressentiment” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994: 28–9). Thus, the central purpose of this chapter is to reactivate the 
concept of sovereignty by mapping its relation to contemporary society. 
 
Control over a territory has long been one of the fundamental organising 
principles of sovereignty as exemplified by the signing of the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. According to the Westphalian vision of sovereignty, 
political power should not be separated from territorially defined state 
sovereigns. However, the conjunction between sovereignty and the 
exclusive control over a territory has changed in contemporary societies. 
Today the control over a territory should not be viewed as a sufficient 
condition for sovereign political power. Although sovereignty is often 
associated with territory, developments such as globalisation (Appadurai, 
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1996) and war on terror (Amoore, 2006; Bigo, 2006; Elden, 2009; Gaddes, 
2004; Harvey, 2003) suggest that the emphasis on territories as spaces as a 
normative precondition for sovereignty is a “stubborn delusion, part of the 
mistaken notion that sovereignty is absolute and always territorially 
defined” (Chamberlin, 1988: 15). Or, to say this differently, the equivalence 
of territory and state sovereignty is highly questionable (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1995; Brenner, 2004; Cox, 1991). As Saskia Sassen (1996: xii) 
argues, global financial markets centred on “cross-border flows and global 
telecommunications has affected two distinctive features of the modern 
state: sovereignty and exclusive territoriality.” Thus the Westphalian 
sovereign state model in political geography and international relations 
theory, which have generally linked sovereignty with the notion of 
territory, which views territory as an area of land claimed by a country, is 
insufficient to analyse the realities of contemporary society “because of its 
mistaken emphasis on the geographical expression of authority 
(particularly under the ambiguous sign of ‘sovereignty’) as invariably and 
inevitably territorial” (Agnew, 2005: 437). 
 
In this chapter I argue that we can think sovereignty as a contingent 
concept without dependence on traditional notions of territory (Elden, 
2011). By territory, I do not only mean national borders, lines on a map, or 
the physical manifestation of place. Rather I argue that territory is to be 
understood as the product of a set of governmental practices than a pre-
given object or physical space. Territory is not defined by a ‘physical space’; 
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rather it defines physical spaces “through patterns of various relations.” 
After all, “every type of social relation can be imagined and constructed as 
territorial” (Brighenti, 2010: 57). Territory, in other words, is both a social 
and political process. The notion of territory is not absolute. Rather, it is 
always in relation to governmental practices by which things can be 
ordered and controlled. As Valerie November (quoted in Elden, 2010: 811) 
notes, “the notion of territory is at the same time juridical, political, 
economic, social and cultural, and even affective.” Thus the mainstream 
view that interprets territory as merely “land” or a static “terrain” must be 
challenged. This, however, in no way means that we should conceive of 
sovereignty without territory or borders (Brenner and Elden, 2009). In fact, 
every social regime requires a territorial endeavour. Once a social regime is 
set up, territory-making becomes the norm. 
 
This, however, tells only part of the story. Territory is a dynamic concept, a 
heterogeneous multiple. It is a vibrant concept, “a juridico-political” power 
that is concerned with resources and the means for their management and 
“circulation” (Foucault, 2007: 176). In other words, territory is to be 
understood as a “political technology”: the “government of populations”. 
For Foucault, therefore, governmentality is about population, along with 
security mechanisms, the discourses, rationalities of power and the 
disciplinary technologies. Thus the population “is not the simple sum of 
individuals inhabiting a territory” (ibid. 70) but dependent on a series of 
variables that includes the “climate”, “the material surroundings”, “the 
104 
 
intensity of commerce and activity” and “the circulation of wealth” (ibid.). 
In this sense, territory is a governmental response to the problem of 
population. From this perspective, sovereignty is inseparable not only from 
territory, but also from various set of practices such as “civil society, 
population and the nation” by which it becomes as “a way of governing, a 
way of doing things, and a way too of relating to government” (Foucault, 
2007: 277; see also Elden, 2007: 574). We should therefore stop using a 
notion of territory as the key element to define contemporary sovereign 
power. Sovereignty is a social regime, a set of governmental practices and 
rationalities that is more than merely land, terrain and territory. 
 
Thus, following Deleuze, we need a better theory of sovereignty, for it 
allows us to avoid falling into the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994), a logic 
which is static and has become unable to grasp changes and transitions 
that occur in contemporary society. One way out of this trap, than, is to 
analyse sovereignty not only as a concept which increasingly became 
associated with exclusive forms of territory, but also as a contingent 
concept that is able to analyse the dynamics of contemporary society. 
Today, with the war on terror and foreign intervention, “boundaries may 
remain fixed, and considerable efforts may be undertaken to preserve 
existing territorial settlements” (Elden, 2010: 759). Yet sovereign political 
power within them is held to be quite contingent in the sense that it does 
not seek to simply acquire the whole territory but also create “zones of 
indistinction.”  According to Agamben (1998), the sovereign, through the 
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use of force and violence, imposes a political order, creating an inside and 
outside. The outside, or zone of indistinction, is a place where the dividing 
line between the legality and illegality, citizen and outlaw, law and violence 
and, ultimately, life and death tends to disappear. The zone of indistinction 
is a place where contemporary sovereign power creates new market 
dynamics and thus increases the impacts of global capital flows. This, 
however, cannot be done without violence and war upon which 
sovereignty was founded (Lefebvre, 1976: 1991; Mbembe, 2001). 
Sovereignty, therefore, needs to be seen in relation to war and violence, an 
intersection which cannot be separated without the ‘cruel contingency’ of 
sovereign political power. 
 
Concomitantly, sovereignty is a social regime which attempts to 
appropriate, or capture war and violence, and utilise them for its own 
purposes (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983). This means that both territory and 
sovereignty have an association with war and violence, an association 
which cannot be thought independently of contingency. The overall 
suggestion here is thus that sovereignty is not best understood through 
“territoriality” (Elden, 2010), but through an examination of the relation 
between cruel contingency and its intimate relation to war and violence. In 
short, sovereignty must be approached as a concept itself rather than 
simply through territoriality, which hinders our ability to understand the 
social, historical, and geographical specificity of sovereignty, both as a 
social regime and a political form. Understanding sovereignty as a 
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contingent social regime, as the political control of power relations, allows 
us to account for a range of modern society. Hence the importance of 
Deleuze. 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 88) provide an 
alternative to thinking of the concept of territory as a geographically 
bounded space. They argue that a territory (geographical, political, and 
conceptual) is associated with a continuously changing configuration of 
multiple social regimes. Thus territory is never fixed, neither by national 
borders, nor by physical manifestations of place. Rather “it exists in a state 
of process whereby it continually passes into something else”. As a mode, 
or act, territory “also maintains an internal organisation” (Message, 2005: 
275). As dynamic configurations, various interrelated assemblages form a 
historically specific territory, where deterritorialisation, and in reaction to 
that, territorialisation take place. State sovereignty cannot deterritorialise 
from some relations without (re)territorialising on some others. On this 
basis then, the focus of sovereignty is not exclusion per se but the creation 
of ordered social and political relations and more secure life cycles which 
refer, above all, to relations of dominance. In other words, state 
sovereignty is a social regime of capture, an instance of 
(re)territorialisation, which always hegemonises and thus stabilises new 
configurations of deterritorialisation. Whenever a state sovereignty, an 
organisation, an institution stop resistance, reterritorialisation takes place. 
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Before proceeding, it is important to show the difference between 
Foucault’s and Deleuze’s analyses of sovereignty. Foucault (1977; 2003) 
argues that political sovereignty emerges as a “realisation” of war and 
power. Foucault’s concept of sovereignty is pluralised, fragmented, 
relational, and closely related to various set of governmental practices 
spread throughout society. In brief, he aims to historicise the concept of 
sovereignty through discursive modalities over time by showing the 
transition from the (classically modern) idea of the state to the 
governmentalized apparatuses and the set of practices. For Foucault, 
therefore, what matters is the complex relationship between territory and 
population at the heart of governmentality, the relationship which sustains 
the triangle of sovereignty–discipline–government. Deleuze’s analysis of 
state sovereignty, on the other hand, is related to both war and resistance. 
Indeed, Deleuze offers an account of sovereignty in which war is a property 
to be appropriated and institutionalised by the state. For Deleuze, 
therefore, it is important to grasp the ‘appropriative’ character of state 
power, for it provides us new analytical weapons to resist the cruel 
contingency of political sovereignty. Referring to the work of 
anthropologist Pierre Clastres, he argues (1987: 357-9) that some primitive 
societies used war as a means of preventing concentrations of power 
which may give rise to forms of state. As a response to this challenge, 
nomadic peoples nevertheless seek new ways to preserve the uniqueness 
of their way of life so that the relation between them and the earth - the 
agent of all social production - does exist. Hence they attempt to create 
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strategic mechanisms to ward off the state apparatus. If the history of 
Western civilisation is the history of ordered and more secure life cycles, 
the foundation of the state is made possible not through the destruction of 
nomadism but of its “appropriation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 194, 225, 
327). In this regard, the Western model of sovereignty derives its strength 
not so much from its denial of nomadic multiplicity, but from the 
integration and regulation of nomadism for the development of a unity 
(see Reid, 2010a: 413). The state, or sovereignty, endlessly attempts to 
‘appropriate’, or ‘capture’, nomadism, and utilise it for its own purposes. 
Thus sovereignty employs a different ‘regime of violence’, a ‘lawful 
violence’, which consists of judicial and penal institutions of capture and 
punishment, and the repressive state apparatus of the armed forces and 
police. 
 
Thus, rather than start from the analysis of the role of radical politics in 
Deleuze’s thought it is necessary to focus directly on sovereignty’s ‘cruel 
contingency’ and contemporary processes of ‘capture’ that create 
ressentiment. In Deleuzean political theory, an admission of certainty is 
seen as problematic. Deleuze’s political theory urges us to recognise 
sovereign power in terms of changing socio-historical circumstances. Once 
this has been achieved, we can move on to the next step of creating for 
ourselves not only the capacity to confront the ‘cruel’ contingency of 
sovereign political power, but also the capacity to counteractualise certain 
kinds of transformative agency for radical politics. If radical politics is a 
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response to the problem of sovereignty, it can become an ‘event’ only 
when it succeeds in creating new concepts that can overcome 
ressentiment and counteractualise identities and affects. In this sense, any 
understanding of post-politics and radical politics is incomplete without an 
understanding of sovereignty and ressentiment. However, we must first 
examine more rigorously how sovereignty comes into being. And it is this 
that I shall turn to next. 
 
3.2 Sovereignty 
 
“[They] come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration, or pretext; 
they appear as lightning appears too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, 
too ‘different’ even to be hated. Their work is an instinctive creation and 
imposition of forms; they are the most involuntary, unconscious artists 
there are wherever they appear something new soon arises, a ruling 
structure that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and 
coordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a place that has not first been 
assigned a ‘meaning’ in relation to the whole. They do not know what guilt, 
responsibility, or consideration are, these born organizers; they exemplify 
that terrible artists’ egoism that has the look of bronze and knows itself 
justified to all eternity in its ‘work’, like a mother in her child. It is not in 
them that the ‘bad conscience’ developed, that goes without saying-but it 
would not have developed without them, this ugly growth, it would be 
lacking if a tremendous quantity of freedom had not been expelled from 
the world, or at least from the visible world, and made as it were latent 
under their hammer blows and artists’ violence.” (Nietzsche, 1989: 86-7) 
 
 
This is how Nietzsche speaks of a new socius, of a new social regime with 
its blond men and its own conquerors, who have the ability to wage war 
and inflict their own institutional cruelty upon its victims, especially upon 
the formless, the crowd. For the crowd aren’t true social formations 
inasmuch as they are ephemeral gatherings of people, living and dying with 
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the moment. This new regime is nothing other than despotism, which 
replaces the old primitive socius with its own distinct character: “a terror 
without precedent, in comparison with which the ancient system of 
cruelty, the forms of primitive regimentation and punishment, are nothing” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 182). Unlike true social formations, the crowd 
refer to a kind of anti-social form that is never far from a mob and 
potentially very close to an overthrowing force. Neither subjects, nor 
objects, they are the anti-organization par excellence. The new socius, 
however, is more enduring than the crowd and it is precisely the ability to 
perform endurance than spontaneous irruptions that makes the state state 
and distinguishes it from the primitive socius. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the first social regime to capture and code the 
flows of desire is the primitive social machine. Invented by the ‘primitive 
peoples’, it is the “machine of primitive inscription, the ‘megamachine’ that 
covers a social field” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 141). The primitive society 
is built on the collective investment of the organs, not directed at whole 
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persons or their privatized organs, which are referred to as the Earth, as 
the original condition of all production. The Earth thus appears to be the 
agent of all social production. It is this deterritorialisation that forms the 
basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the full body, or the body 
without organs.4 
 
As a result, the State comes into being by capturing nomadic space of 
connections and coding the flows of desire. For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
task is therefore to inquire about meaning behind the coding of every 
aspect of life, ranging from the daily practices and the biological life to the 
metaphysical. Anthropologists have of course been engaged in this task for 
a century or more, but mostly with a view to trying to decipher the social 
purpose behind the codes and what they mean to the people whose lives 
are determined by them. Deleuze and Guattari take a different route. They 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 A body without organs (BWO) is a process that is directed toward ‘pure becoming’. In 
this sense it is opposed to the organising principles that structure, appropriate and thus 
hegemonise the collective investment of the organs, experiences and states of becoming. 
A BWO is a non-organismically organised body, a limit of a given process of 
destratification, where matter-energy flows come into play immanently without reference 
to a transcendence. A BWO refers to absolute disorganisation of organs, which is nothing 
else than a process of pure becoming: it is “what remains after you take everything away” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 151). 
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are not concerned with what native people think; rather they are 
interested in the operations of the unconscious. In other words, what is 
important is to discern the machinic processes, that is, the modes of 
organisation that link the differentiation and distribution of material flows, 
desires, affects, and so on, to the human body as a living system (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 435; see also Patton, 2000: 88). To be sure, the 
conception of the machinic, or the territorial machine, overturns the vulgar 
assumptions that have conditioned anthropology for a long time. Contrary 
to the orthodox Marxist anthropology and other Western interpretations 
which claim that, in the primitive society all relations between subjects are 
ultimately exchangist, Deleuze and Guattari argue that society is 
inscriptive, not exchangist.5 In this sense the process of capturing and 
coding the flows of desires is not enough by itself to establish a social 
regime; it is merely the means. Since the nature of the individual relations 
is changed, it requires a social regime to come into being. 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 “We see no reason in fact for accepting the postulate that underlies exchangist notions 
of society; society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be to 
circulate or to cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where the essential 
thing is to mark or to be marked. There is circulation only if inscription requires or permits 
it” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 156). 
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For Deleuze and Guattari, there are two kinds of relationships between 
people in groups: affiliations and alliances. The primitive society mobilises 
both types towards its own purposes. Filiation is by nature intensive, 
inclusive and polyvocal, whereas alliance is extensive, exclusive and 
segregative (Buchanan, 2008: 24-5). Thus filiation and alliance “are like the 
two forms of a primitive capital: fixed capital or filiative stock, and 
circulating capital or mobile blocks of debt” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 
146). That is, a debt which is measured in blood and inscribed on the body. 
Even though processes of circulation produce differences in rank and 
prestige, they are without “net investment”, without forming a system of 
exchange or a hierarchy with groups self-elevated above others. In this 
sense, the primitive society is without a state and an exchange economy. 
 
As argued above, the primitive social machine does not exchange but 
inscribe, mark the bodies with rituals of cruelty, which consists in 
“tattooing, excising, incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling, and 
initiating” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 144). As Mellor and Shilling (1997: 
48) have demonstrated, the primitive habitus is a place where violence is 
normative, if not common, and marks on the body as a result of violence or 
disease have a significant role in communication. The body has this role in 
communicating because knowledge is acquired through figural and carnal 
knowing. That is, in this medieval route to knowledge the body is the 
central organising principle. Thus open, mobile and finite debt emerges 
from the process of savage inscription on the body. However, no 
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ressentiment or revenge arises from the finite blocks of debt. To put it 
bluntly, ressentiment does not exist in primitive societies because pain, as a 
festive occasion, as a fundamental ingredient of active life, is very public 
phenomenon. It is shared and part of the belief system that supports active 
participation in community life. In short, pain itself has meaning: 
 
“The fact that innocent men suffer all the marks on their bodies derives 
from the respective autonomy of the voice and the graphic action, and also 
from the autonomous eye that extracts pleasure from the event. It is not 
because everyone is suspected, in advance, of being a future bad debtor; 
the contrary would be closer to the truth.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 181) 
 
The longing for contact through pain is believed to be not only necessary 
but also the proper order of social relations between the community and 
God. Thus punishment takes the form of compensation, or the repayment 
of a debt. In wars, for instance, the injured party demands satisfaction, 
which involves punishing the offender, the debtor’s body. Yet the logic of 
this kind of “exchange”, according to Nietzsche (1989: 65), is not, cannot 
be a direct compensation for the damage done. Instead, “a kind of 
pleasure the pleasure of being allowed to vent his power freely upon one 
who is powerless, the voluptuous pleasure…the enjoyment of violation.”. 
Punishment, then, is considered as a festive occasion, a transgression in 
which cruelty is gratified, and where the carnivalesque activity takes place. 
Hence Nietzsche (ibid. 67) writes: “without cruelty there is no festival: thus 
the longest and most ancient part of human history teaches and in 
punishment there is so much that is festive! ” 
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As a segmented society, the primitive socius exists as a nomadic space of 
connections. However, as we have seen, “in their preservation of a style of 
life tied to and subordinate to that topography”, nomadic peoples and 
movements “attempt to ward off the social-political processes of 
unification on which political sovereignty relies” (Reid, 2010a: 411). But 
how does sovereignty occur? Rejecting the orthodox Marxist 
anthropology’s and other Western models’ interpretation of primitive 
society which states that societies evolve almost linearly, ultimately 
enabling the state apparatus to come into existence, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that the state does not occur in a linear way (from nomadic to 
agricultural), but is born as an idea, which replaces the old primitive social 
regime and its essential elements: “the State was not formed in 
progressive stages; it appears fully armed, a master stroke executed all at 
once; the primordial Urstaat, the eternal model of everything the State 
wants to be and desires” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 217). 
 
The actual state does not come into being as a result of the internal 
dynamics of the primitive territorial machine but is imposed from without. 
As Deleuze & Guattari insist (ibid. 195), “the death of the primitive system 
always comes from without; history is the history of contingencies and 
encounters.” Thus they propose a history written from a contingent point 
of view, which provides a point of intersection between past and present. 
This is a remarkable achievement, for it leaves no room for historicism that 
posits a determinate mode of thought. In other words, social regimes are 
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not considered as successive stages in the sense that one can occur as a 
result from the effects of another. Rather, Deleuze & Guattari argue that all 
social regimes (territorial, despotism and capitalism) co-exist within the 
perspective of becoming or virtuality: “all history does is to translate a 
coexistence of becomings into a succession” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
430). 
 
In short, the state is a virtual existence that proceeds from the abstract to 
the concrete (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 221), conditioning both what 
comes before and what follows: the primitive system and capitalism. From 
this perspective, the state comes into being not by suppressing but 
subordinating the determinate relations of the primitive system to its own 
system of alliance and filiation, which is based on the despotic will, that is, 
God’s chosen peoples (ibid. 89). The nature of the whole system is 
changed, a new hierarchical structure is installed, and these changes make 
both the despot and the new machine, the State, the new paranoiac: “for 
the first time something has been withdrawn from life and from the earth 
that will make it possible to judge life and to survey the earth from the 
above: a first principle of paranoiac knowledge” (ibid. 194). The despot 
becomes the new body that replaces the Earth as the body without organs 
of the social, possessing all the organs of all the subjects. Everything seems 
to emanate from the despot. As a consequence, life becomes politicised 
and absolutely subject to sovereign power; a power in which “it is 
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permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating 
sacrifice” (Agamben, 1998: 83). 
 
Since a new bureaucracy replaces intertribal alliance and all stock becomes 
the object of accumulation, debt is rendered infinite, and becomes a debt 
of existence on subjects themselves, including their very lives, in the form 
of tribute to the despot (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 197). That is to say, 
there is a transition in sovereignty from marking bodies with rituals of 
cruelty to imposing infinite debt. From now on, all meaning arises from the 
sovereign because all debt is owed to him. Thus, it is debt that rather than 
the sovereign will that holds the despotic regime together. In using terror, 
the despot also acquires the monopoly on violence that is inscribed on the 
bodies of the subjects. In the shadows of sovereign violence is born a new 
city, a city of blood, “where power spoke through blood: the honor of war, 
the fear of famine, the triumph of death, the sovereign with his sword 
executioners, and tortures; blood was a reality with a symbolic function” 
(Foucault, 1998: 147). The system of cruelty as principle and practice now 
becomes an integral part of the state apparatus that renders debt infinite 
to the despot, which assumes a juridical form, the law (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983: 213). Sovereignty demands only obedience and holds only the power 
of death over its members. In this way law and sovereignty are completely 
merged without ‘designation’, which makes it possible to make arbitrary 
decisions, thus creating an empty space around the despot. The despot 
acquires ‘the right to punish’, which then becomes a very aspect of 
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sovereignty to make war on his enemies. The purpose of punishment is 
not, then, to restore justice but to reconstitute sovereign power. This is 
why, quoting Muyart de Vouglans, Foucault (1977: 48) asserts that “the 
right to punish ... belongs to ‘that absolute power of life and death which 
Roman law calls merum imperium, a right by virtue of which the prince 
sees that his law is respected by ordering the punishment of crime.’” 
 
3.3 Ressentiment 
 
How, then, does sovereignty relate to the ‘social’ and its affective 
structure? I shall argue that ressentiment is crucial to understand such an 
evaluation of state sovereignty. Yet, in social theory, this link remains 
surprisingly under-researched. A social regime does not exist without 
affects it brings into play. For every regime of governance invokes its own 
particular affect. In a revision of Deleuze’s and Foucault’s understanding of 
sovereignty, I argue that sovereign political power cannot be thought of 
without ressentiment because it is sovereign vengeance that creates 
ressentiment. Initially, it is therefore not ressentiment that generates 
vengefulness, but vengefulness that generates ressentiment. Any analysis 
that claims to explain sovereignty without paying full heed to the 
momentum of this thoroughly important affect will be fundamentally 
incomplete. This part of the chapter fills that particular gap by 
demonstrating attention to the affective logic of sovereignty. 
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Within the enjoyment and the renunciation of pain, of punishment, which 
is turned into a sovereign law, the subjects are now ruled by the threat of 
death, by terror, which makes punishment the vengeance of the despot: 
“in the execution of the most ordinary penalty, in the most punctilious 
respect of legal forms, reign the active forces of revenge” (Foucault, 1977: 
48). As the limitless vengeance of the despots’ is increased and exercised 
on the pacified subjects, it generates ressentiment, the main affect that 
pertains to despotism. As mentioned before, the finite blocks of debt in the 
primitive society does not cause ressentiment but within the matrix of 
terror, of despotism, ressentiment is born as a kind of passivity or 
impotence: desire becomes reactive. Under the tragic regime of infinite 
debt, as Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 214-5) powerfully demonstrate, “the 
eternal ressentiment of the subjects answers to the eternal vengeance of 
the despots.” The state terror, with its right to punish, with its elevation of 
death to a permanent threat and with its subordination of desire to the 
providence of God sovereignty, thus forms a massive pacification and 
creates subjects who are essentially reactive. Hence the importance of 
Nietzsche and his ideas of master-slave morality, which could help us 
better understand ressentiment. 
 
For Nietzsche (1989: 34), ressentiment is a state of “deeply 
repressed…vengefulness.” Three elements are crucial in this regard. First, 
the ‘man of ressentiment’ desires to live a certain kind of life which he sees 
invaluable: thus the priest, a member of the nobility, values a life that 
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includes political supremacy (see Reginster, 1997: 286). Second, the man of 
ressentiment becomes aware of his complete inability to fulfil this 
aspiration: he is inspired by his ‘weakness’ or ‘impotence.’ Third, he retains 
his arrogant attitude or his ‘lust to rule’ (Nietzsche, 1989: 33). Since his ‘will 
to power’ remains ‘intact’, he retains his certain values or pretensions, and 
refuses to accept his inability to realize them (Reginster, 1997: 287). 
Crucially, therefore, his soul oscillates between a desire to live the life he 
values and his belief that he is unable to satisfy it. He dreams of a future 
revenge, that he “will be better off someday” (Nietzsche, 1989: 47). In this 
sense, the man of ressentiment is one who does not act (Deleuze, 1983: 
111). 
 
If sovereignty is characterised by an eternal vengeance, ressentiment 
refers to a repressed vengefulness. Sovereignty is marked by action, the 
man of ressentiment by reaction; he is rendered an inert subject, and 
subordinate to an absolute sovereign power (vengeance). This coincidence 
of action (vengefulness) and reaction (ressentiment) means that sovereign 
power is per definition the arbitrary and external power, that it does not 
abide rules. Thus in exceptional circumstances such as ‘disorder’, the law 
can be suspended (Agamben, 2005: 42). In this sense sovereignty is 
conditioned by the exception - that is the ability of the sovereign to stand 
inside and outside the law at the same time. In the words of Schmitt (1985: 
5, 13), the sovereign is not only “he who decides on the state of exception’, 
but also he “who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually 
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exists.” Significantly, however, law is not suspended completely. Rather, in 
the state of exception the distinction between order and chaos becomes 
blurred. The hidden secret of sovereignty, then, is this radical indistinction 
between law and lawlessness, between politics and violence. In short, the 
state of the exception has become the rule. 
 
The state of exception is not any power whatever of sovereignty but its 
central aspect. It is conditioned by the assertion that the “legal order must 
be broken to save the social order” (Ericson, 2008: 57). The state of 
exception is “a space devoid of law”; it is “a zone of anomie in which all 
legal determinations—and above all the very distinction between public 
and private—are deactivated” (Agamben, 2005: 50). Thus, what takes place 
in the state of exception is the ‘law of indifference’, an action whose 
content involves a radical undecidability from the law’s point of view. In 
this sense the state of exception is not only bound up in the self-founding 
power of the logos or raw power-as-property, but also subjectivation and 
affection: the sovereign is s/he which is also subjectified as vengeful, while 
victims who are subjectified through ressentiment are marked by reaction. 
In short, sovereignty is not only a rational social regime but also an 
affective one. 
 
How does the state of exception function in contemporary society? And 
how does one make sense of ressentiment in the context of sovereign 
exceptionalism? In what follows, I argue that ‘cruel manifestations’ of the 
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modern state, which are intimately connected to the state of exception, 
have become normalised in contemporary society. In a sense, therefore, 
contemporary sovereign power has transformed the logic of exception into 
a form of sociality. The state of exception is no longer a historical anomaly 
but the normalcy itself. However, this normalcy is not only about states of 
exception. Post/11, we are also witnessing the increasing justification and 
legitimisation of torture as a form sovereign exceptionalism. And this is a 
theme which I shall return next. 
 
3.4 Torture 
 
Pasolini’s controversial final film Saló (1975), based on Marquis de Sade’s 
The 120 Days of Sodom (1785), poses significant questions regarding the 
intersection between sadistic torture and sovereignty. The film is divided in 
four segments, heavily inspired by Dante’s Inferno: Ante-Inferno, Circle of 
Manias, Circle of Shit, and Circle of Blood. Saló focuses on four corrupt 
sovereigns after the fall of Italy’s fascist ruler Benito Mussolini in 1944. 
Four fascist libertines - the Duke, the Bishop, the Magistrate, the President 
- kidnap the most beautiful young people in town and take them to a villa, 
to an enclosed space called The Republic of Saló; a Nazi puppet state that 
became the last stronghold of Benito Mussolini (Pugliese, 2007: 249). From 
now on, the Republic of Saló becomes a fascist enclave from which there is 
no escape. Thus starts extreme abuse, torture, and the murders of young 
men and women for the sake of perverted lust and extreme pleasure. The 
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fascist captors welcome the beautiful young Italians to hell with the 
following words: 
 
“You herded, feeble creatures, destined for our pleasure. Don’t expect to 
find here the freedom granted in the outside world. You are beyond reach 
of any ‘legality’. No one knows you are here. As far as the world goes, you 
are already dead.” (Pasolini, 1975) 
 
The young victims’ bodies become sites of repressive pain and sexual 
pleasure, bearing the scars of sovereign vengeance. The greatest strength 
of the movie lies showing us that the appeal of pleasure is inseparable from 
the appeal of sovereign violence, which is at once served and kept at bay 
by a minor festival of the arts. Reminiscent of the rituals of primitive 
system of cruelty, Pasolini almost succeeds in making the sadistic torture 
part of an entertaining spectacle. This festivity is, however, unlimited and 
protected by an unrestricted law of sovereign power. Thus sadistic violence 
can go “as far as the world goes”, carrying to a point “where it is no longer 
anything but a unique and naked sovereignty: an unlimited right of all-
powerful monstrosity” (Foucault, 1998: 149). What we encounter in Saló is 
what I call the limitless ‘enjoyment of cruelty’, which makes torture the 
vengeance of four corrupt despots. Sovereign cruelty punishes the victims’ 
bodies without any quilt, while sexual pleasure becomes a weapon of total 
domination. Whereas physical beauty becomes a symptom of vulnerability, 
sovereign power becomes a total form of fascism, a repressive 
desublimation of nihilism. 
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Torture is widely considered as a form of madness, as an unethical practice 
that is confined to corrupt administrations or totalitarian systems. In this 
view, torture is conceived as an “illiberal act”; it is “irrational”, “cruel” (see 
Dershowitz, 2002; Luban, 2005, MacIntyre, 2007). It is also viewed as a 
juridical problem, as one of the basic principles of human rights (see Kelly, 
2009; 2011; Langbein, 2006; Pavlischek, 2007; Todorov, 2009). I suggest 
that both approaches misunderstand and simplify the role of torture; they 
fail to grasp the true purpose of torture within sovereign political power. 
Torture, I assert, is one among many manifestations of sovereign as 
domination. Thus, on the eve of the publication of his memoir, Decision 
Points, which is believed to “contain anecdotes seemingly ripped off from 
other books and articles”, George W. Bush was still describing 
waterboarding as “highly effective”, saying it provided “large amounts of 
information” (quoted in McGreal, 2010: 7). Torture, therefore, needs to be 
considered in relation to other cruel manifestations of state sovereignty: 
for example, the destruction of ecological systems; the risk-security 
complex; the state of exception; and the complete animalisation of human 
beings carried out by neoliberal biopolitics. And yet torture is not one 
among these various forms of sovereign power. It is the most privileged 
actualisation of state terror, for it reveals the nature of sovereignty (and its 
rational consciousness). 
 
I contend that torture is the extreme systemic expression of the logos of 
sovereign domination. Torture is a technique of sovereign domination; it is 
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not an extreme expression of lawless vengeance. For vengeance is political. 
It is for this reason that it is widely practiced in secret. Torture is a smaller 
system which is representative of a rational sovereign law; it is a tool of 
governance, with the aim of eliciting information from and humiliating the 
‘enemy.’ As a tool of war and sovereign domination, torture is, therefore, 
intimately bound to a “liberal way of war” (Dillon and Reid, 2009). 
Liberalism consists of various interrelated social regimes, which, although 
said to be committed to ‘peace-making’, is nevertheless also dependent 
upon violence, a permanent state of emergency, and constant 
preparedness for perpetual war (ibid. 7). Seen in this light, war, violence 
and society are mutually constitutive and the liberal way of war is “a war-
making machine whose continuous processes of war preparation prior to 
the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal 
way of life” (ibid. 9). The main object of the liberal way of war is life itself 
because it is what threatens life itself. Thus “everything is permitted” to 
the liberal way of war. 
 
Consider, for instance, war on terror’s torturers at Guantánamo Bay and 
the Abu Ghraib prison where torture is systemic. Lodged between (extra) 
territoriality and contingent sovereignty, Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib 
exist in a grey area, as spaces of exception, where “enemy non-
combatants” are being held without charge or trial (Butler, 2004; Gregory, 
2006; Isin and Rygiel, 2007; Žižek, 2008b). The sort of sovereign political 
power being deployed is not only a sovereign “who decides on the state of 
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exception”, but also a social regime which transcends land, terrain, or 
national borders. Far from being legal “black hole”, Guantánamo Bay, for 
instance, is not only a carefully constructed legal territory, but also the 
product of a set of governmental practices by which things can be ordered 
and controlled. In this sense Guantánamo emerges as a new form of cruel 
and contingent sovereignty that deterritorialises and (re)territorialises, 
expands its capacities to act as beyond its own borders and territories 
(Reid-Henry, 2007; see also Margulies, 2004). 
 
In brief, contemporary sovereign power is not territorially limited; it 
spreads through contingent acts and practices, bringing about a type of 
reterritorialisation as deterritorialisation (Hardt and Negri, 2000). This, 
however, does not mean the end of territories as such. On the contrary, 
deterritorialisation always goes hand in hand with (re)territorialisation, 
creating new markets, identities, and regimes of power, as well as new 
territorial configurations (Brenner, 2004; Sparke, 2005). Sovereignty is as 
much about “selective openings” (deterritorialisations) as it is about 
“closures” (reterritorialisations). While someone, something, or 
somewhere is included, someone else, something else, or somewhere else 
is also excluded (see Brighenti, 2010: 65). In the process, however, 
violence, permanent states of exception and war become a powerful force 
in making and unmaking of territory. Hence contingent sovereignty is 
intimately bound up with the liberal way of war. We should, therefore, 
begin to examine the relation between deterritorialisation and 
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(re)territorialisation, on the one hand, and war, violence and other cruel 
manifestations of sovereign as domination, including torture, on the other 
(Butler, 2004; Comaroff, 2001; Gregory, 2006). 
 
It is in this context that Guantánamo should be viewed as the sort of space 
which makes possible the territorialisation of the war on terror alongside a 
deterritorialisation of domestic jurisdiction (Reid-Henry, 2007: 639). Simply 
put, it reinforces “a deliberate spatial separation” of sovereign law and 
“violence” within spaces of exception. And it is by enforcing this spatial 
separation that the cruel contingency of sovereign political power is 
deployed alongside the law. Thus Guantánamo reminds us that the real 
politics of contemporary sovereignty lies not in putting boundaries and 
territories up, but in blurring them (ibid. 644). The cruel contingency of 
state sovereignty would suggest asking not only “where are the territories 
of sovereignty”, or “where are spaces of exception”, but also “how does 
sovereignty’s cruel contingency operate in contemporary society.” As 
Agamben (1998: 55) writes: “the precise scope and location of sovereignty 
and its jurisdiction is never final, but always fleeting.” The functioning and 
the operation of new forms of sovereign power cannot be understood only 
in terms of its territories, but in terms of its cruel and contingent effects (its 
scope).  
 
How then are we to understand the relationship between torture and the 
detention of enemy combatants in light of sovereign political power as 
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cruel radical contingency? As discussed before, torture is a tool of cruel 
sovereign political power, of the liberal way of war. Hence, it has its own 
set of theological, philosophical, and political values. The physical 
destruction of the ‘enemy’ - from crucifixion employed by the Scythians in 
antiquity, to the sleep deprivation and mutilated arms of the accused with 
a blunt knife put into practice during the time of the English Civil War, from 
public executions during the Middle Ages, to prolonged use of stress 
positions, starvation, beatings, electrical charges and extreme cold 
throughout the Cold War, and “squeezing of the testicles, hanging by the 
arms or legs, blindfolding, stripping the suspect naked, spraying with high-
pressure water” (HRW, 1997) practised by specialized teams in Turkish 
prisons - in short, what we see before us today is not the expression of 
incomprehensible horror. It is the exact opposite: the calculated expression 
and a rational necessity that define sovereign power. It is the same 
expression that led Pasolini to explore the nexus between torture, the 
state of exception and the biopolitics of late-capitalist hegemony. Today’s 
most likely successors of Pasolini’s corrupt sovereigns are to be found in 
the torture chambers of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. 
 
In the Republic of Saló, young captors are given the taste of sovereign 
vengeance at its most radical shape: that of the limitless enjoyment of 
sovereign cruelty and torture. Beyond reach of any ‘legality’, ‘herded 
creatures’ are reduced to bare life, life devoid of any value. In Abu Ghraib 
and Guantánamo, similarly, ‘enemy combatants’ have been given the taste 
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of sovereign cruelty and the ‘liberal way of life’ at its most effective: that of 
the limitless enjoyment of sovereign vengeance, violence and systemic 
torture. Reduced to bare life, they are effectively stripped of all rights. 
Systemic torture starts at the top and trickles all the way down. Behind 
water-boarding is the commander. Behind the commander are the 
policymakers such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and George Bush. 
Torture widens the circle of ressentiment and creates victims who are not 
able to act. Ressentiment is a peculiar reaction in which the subject’s 
immediate responses (anger, spite, revenge) against the oppressor are 
muted and thus take a detour through sublimation, inward suffering. 
Hence the favourite destination is not the courtroom but the camp where 
torture is practised secretly. Creative forms of torture find expression in 
water boarding, sodomy and fucking. This is the paradigm of sovereign 
political power, of reign, that makes neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
and capitalist power operative. That is to say, torture and the state of 
exception are fundamental to the operation of neoliberal capitalism as a 
whole. They are fundamental engagements of the war against everything. 
The bare life of victims has come to define contemporary society in the war 
against terrorism. 
 
Second, the metaphor of the Republic of Saló as a fascist enclave in an 
inaccessible place signifies a state of exception, or the space of exception 
where legal order is suspended. The violence of sovereignty in both the 
Republic of Salò and Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo (as spaces of exception) 
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demonstrate that space is one of the central media of struggle, and is 
therefore to be seen a fundamental political issue. For Lefebvre (1976: 33; 
see also Elden, 2007: 822), for instance, “there is a politics of space 
because space is political.” Lefebvre tells us that space is not only the place 
of conflict, but also an object of struggle itself (Elden, 2007: 822). In short, 
each concrete space, territory and spatiality is an arena of conflict and 
struggle (Soja, 1989). Considering the interrelation of the space as the 
place of conflict and space as an object of power and struggle provides us 
an important dimension for grasping the truth about the war on terror. 
Today modern sovereignty is no longer founded on a distinct territory. 
Since acts of governance are distributed among the established social 
regimes and relations of power, it is now everywhere. Sovereign political 
power “is in no case complete; it is also, openly or surreptitiously, 
everywhere contested and eroded, facing ever new pretenders and 
competitors” (Bauman, 2010: 138). Legitimising torture and creating global 
spaces of exception, the violence of sovereignty undoes territory so that 
the rule of law becomes ineffective. In the eyes of the sovereign power, the 
preservation of the territory necessarily entails the disruption of another 
territory (war on terror). Put differently, the insistence on territorial 
preservation goes hand in hand with the insistence on wholly contingent 
sovereign power: “the stress on territorial preservation is enforced most 
strongly at the very time territorial sovereignty is disrupted” (Elden, 2007: 
827). 
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This means that both territory and sovereignty need to be seen in relation 
to war and violence, an intimate relation which cannot be separated from 
contingency. While sovereign power wants to completely enforce its own 
territory, it wants to assert the cruel contingency of sovereignty over 
territory elsewhere (Elden, 2007). Contingent sovereignty does not seek to 
simply acquire the whole territory but only create ‘grey zones’ or ‘zones of 
indistinction’ (CIA prisons in Eastern European countries), and facilitate 
capital flows and access underground sources (Harvey, 2003; Elden, 2007). 
This also explains the relation between mobility and immobility. While 
some are literally ‘arrested’ and legally abandoned through spaces of 
sovereign exceptionalism, others enjoy limitless mobility. In this, modern 
sovereignty is looking to preserve its own position, while at the same time 
expands capital flows in order to support neoliberal economic order. 
 
Summarising rather crudely, states are inseparable from war and violence, 
and the creation of spaces of exception in which people are treated as if 
they have no value. Consider, for instance, Hobbes’s Leviathan. For 
Hobbes, nobody is eligible for the task of doing politics. Hobbes 
(1651/2008) argues that Leviathan is the main solution to the problem of 
chaos, of civil war: a sovereign state ruled by an undivided and unlimited 
absolute sovereign power through social contract. In a sovereign state, 
what counts, therefore, is the relationship between subjects and the 
sovereign, just as all humans are equally related to God in the same way. 
Thus, for Hobbes, secular powers and religious authorities are completely 
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merged in the sovereign. Because the state of nature is a “dissolute 
condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive 
Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge” (1651/2008: 127), it 
can only be overcome by conferring all powers upon one political 
authority, for “so long a man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a 
condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good and evill” 
(ibid. 109). Hobbes’ Leviathan refers to absolute sovereign power and 
atomised individuals, who are reduced to completely powerless buffeted 
by a sovereign state. 
 
Hobbes’s Leviathan was a reactionary response to the problem of ‘revolt’: 
he was afraid of human beings of roughly equal capacities, trying to 
forcefully pursue their own individual interests against the sovereign state, 
but also against each other. In a similar vein, Schmitt’s definition of 
sovereignty was a reaction to ‘chaos’ in Germany after the First World War. 
The common denominator between them is that, they were both so afraid 
of the emergence of disorder. For them the question of order is the 
question of politics and sovereignty. Thus ‘order’ means that in dangerous 
situations such as ‘chaos’, ‘revolution’, the law can be suspended in favour 
of the existing order. And, in so far as the threat of chaos, of revolution 
continues, the existing order cannot exist without the myth of sovereignty. 
And, since sovereignty establishes social order and protects it from 
potential revolutions, it cannot do without cruel sovereign acts. Just as the 
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state of exception is an instance of sovereignty, torture is an instance of 
the state of exception. 
 
In this sense Salò’s fascist corrupt libertines are successors who have acted 
out of the same fear their ancestors have acted at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo: the fear of revolution. It was the same fear that executed 
Robespierre; it was the same fear that turned the revolution of 1848 into a 
regime of banditry; it is the same fear, in sum, that establishes a neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics in modern times. This fear, and sadistic 
violence that follows, reconfigures post-politics in the same sense that 
Hobbes and Schmitt treated a state of exception as a political kernel of the 
law, as a condition for the establishment of a totalitarian state power. And 
it is in this sense also that today we pay witness to a ‘cruel and indifferent 
sovereign power’ that has culminated in the public torture at Guantánamo 
Bay and Abu Ghraib, and the secret torture at CIA prisons, or the 
extermination of precarious individuals with remote-controlled drone 
missiles, and extrajudicial killing, contracting out the secret transportation 
of ‘enemy combatants’ to third parties and states. 
 
Along the same lines, the portrayal of fascist libertines as legally and 
morally corrupt people explains the “redundant affection” that Sade and 
Pasolini attach to their libertines and vigilance of their criminal acts or 
performances (Subirats, 2007: 176). What is crucial in this context is the 
portrayal of sadistic sovereignty as the “law beyond the law” (Agamben, 
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1998: 59). In this sense Salò also anticipates the totalitarian tendency 
inherent to contemporary military-security complex, which is now 
embodied in neoliberal post-politics. Nevertheless, Salò does more than 
reveal the extreme actualisations of state terror: it juxtaposes it to a 
critique of the biopolitics of late-capitalism. By denunciating acts of 
collective torture, Salò also reveals one of the secret aspects of sovereign 
order that attempts to legally legitimise torture as a way of social control. 
 
3.4.1 Torture is Aesthetic 
 
It is worth noting that Pasolini succeeds in presenting two main definitions 
of torture, two aspects of its institutional practice. One is aesthetic. What 
we see in Salò is the aestheticisation of torture. Torture inflicted upon the 
young Italians is performed in a ritualised manner. The “anthropological 
genocide” of Salò, a term used by Pasolini himself (quoted in Chiesa, 2007: 
209), takes place in a villa, decorated with a magnificent art collection of 
futurism, cubism, art deco etc. The masterpieces of the artistic vanguards 
make you feel bad because they are the key to what he is thinking. Pasolini 
hates modernism, and makes the masterpieces of the artistic vanguards, or 
modern art, look fascist (see Jones, 2005). Thus we get the message loud 
and clear: life itself is continuously being destroyed by the biopolitics of 
late capitalism and sovereign power to which no moral ideal is attached. 
Salò presents torture as one of the supreme expressions of sovereign 
domination. The aestheticisation of torture in Salò thus metaphorically 
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anticipates the state of exception on the basis of which the legal and moral 
order of a sovereign exceptionalism might be constituted. In other words, 
just as the state of exception and institutional regimes of cruelty are the 
basic characteristics of the Republic of Salò, the justification of torture and 
the practice of permanent detention have become the rule in 
contemporary society through mediated mise-en-scènes. Recall the victims 
of Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib in orange boiler-suits, who were urinated 
on, sodomised with chemical light and broomstick, in short, the victims 
who were tortured to death. What is more, Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib 
are spaces where absolute sovereign power operates through absolute 
suspension: suspension of humanity and the Geneva Conventions 
regulating the treatment of prisoners of war. These practices were 
supposed to be stopped in neoliberal societies, but torture is a permanent 
aspect of sovereignty which keeps returning in spaces of exception. In this 
sense the aesthetic (and sadistic) torture of Salò signifies a rationalisation 
of what has hitherto been an exception. 
 
3.4.2 Torture is Political 
 
The second meaning of torture presented by Salò is political. Torture 
appears as a constitutive act of political and military organisation of the 
state. Torturers are normal (not mad and bad) sovereigns because the 
bodies of the victims are inscribed by signs and regimes of sovereign 
violence that is seen as ‘legally legitimate.’ In this way the sadistic pleasure 
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of the torturer meets the total passivity of the tortured body, “an immobile 
obedience of the body that almost seems to offer itself to the torturer, and 
thus approve the latter’s actions” (Chiesa, 2007: 221). In other words, the 
sadistic torture coincides with reactive subjects who are rendered obedient 
and subordinate their desires to sovereign political power. Victorious only 
in perversion, the torturers derive pleasure from inscribing signs and 
regimes of sovereign violence on the bodies. In effect, signs and traces of 
sovereign vengeance become an integral part of oppressive norms that 
give rise to the creation of a legal sovereign state. Pasolini thus shows 
“how torture is the interior dimension of the neutral and autonomous 
machinery of fear and trembling” (Subirats, 2007: 179-80), according to 
which political philosophy, from Hobbes to Schmitt, has defined the 
absolutist idea of state sovereignty. 
 
Nevertheless, Salò does not only denounce torture, it also anticipates the 
crimes of state sovereignty. Torture as aesthetic and torture as political: 
these are the contemporary dimensions of torture as instruments of 
sovereign domination and repression. As mentioned before, Pasolini 
presents two dimensions of torture by means of four segments: Ante-
Inferno, Circle of Manias, Circle of Shit, and Circle of Blood. Circle of Blood 
is particularly illuminating in this regard. At issue here is a kind of torture 
that is political, which is replete with sadistic violence, gore, blood, and 
death: precisely the sort of torture that the fascist regimes in Latin America 
and Turkey put into practice and is being practised in the torture chambers 
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of the ‘liberal way of war.’ Circle of Blood symbolises torture as a paradigm 
for the intended destruction of the integrity of the humanness. 
 
In the final sequence of scenes, an orgy of aesthetic and political torture is 
practised in a courtyard. While the young victims are subjected to most 
brutal and almost unendurable torture and eventual execution, the fascist 
sovereigns derive greater sexual pleasure and enjoyment, from watching 
them suffer. Aroused by the display of suffering, the libertines begin to 
suffer with the victims they’ve once degraded, tortured and exterminated. 
Who’s torturing whom? What goes there? What does it all mean? The 
fascist sovereigns and the victims enter into a zone of indistinction, making 
it impossible to distinguish between obedience to the law and its 
transgression. The entire system would start to break down. But one of the 
libertines and a fully aroused soldier watch this deadly and inverted scene 
from an enclosed balcony and through a set of binoculars. The screams, the 
cries, the pains, and the sufferings of the victims cannot be heard. Orff’s 
Carmina Burana is played in the background. We begin to witness 
eroticism, beauty and the suffering in silence. The camera then shifts from 
the suffering bodies to the fascist libertine, who is being masturbated by 
the soldier. The scene focuses on the voyeuristic and masturbatory 
victimiser, who seats with his back to the camera. All of a sudden, the 
victimiser turns out to be an anonymous viewer. He becomes us, the 
audience. Voyeurs of the voyeurism of others, we are - by this conclusion - 
both distanced from and become part of the film’s aestheticisation of 
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sadistic violence. The sadistic pleasure of Salò is projected onto the 
audience: we are shocked and disgusted at sadistic violence, and are 
shocked and disgusted all the harder when we realize that we all ourselves 
become a silent accomplice to violence committed by the global sovereign 
order in our everyday lives. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
So what are we left after the depiction of torture, and the state of 
exception in Salò? Before proceeding, let me reiterate the point made at 
the beginning of this chapter. The concept of sovereignty implies a process, 
a mode of becoming rather than a state of being. This allows us to 
recognise the further temporal aspect of Deleuze’s notion of sovereignty. 
Torture and the state of exception show that sovereignty is a cruel 
contingency, an act of deforming and depersonalising. Today, more than 
ever, sovereign vengeance is pertinent; it becomes a foreign policy, the 
only game in town. Amnesia and vengeance are the privileges of 
contemporary sovereignty. And this makes the global war on terror a 
permanent war. The more people appear to be the object or victim of 
vengeance, the more they appear to be an object of ressentiment. Thus 
sovereign vengeance is intimately connected to its counter-affect, 
ressentiment; which is why sovereignty is but a particular regime for the 
reproduction of ressentiment. The victims of sovereignty, and the collateral 
destruction of their humanness by abject spaces of exception, unjust drone 
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killings and torture, set off a radicalised ressentiment, lasting for long, 
spiteful generations. 
 
Every victim of sovereignty dreams of a postponed and imaginary revenge, 
which can easily become pure destruction. Hence one of the paradoxes of 
sovereign political power: the more cruel the sovereign becomes, the less 
effective it is. Or, the more vengeful it is, much ressentiment it generates. 
In short, ressentiment that the exercise of sovereign vengeance generates 
is enduring. In the world of victims the story of ressentiment, and the 
shame and humiliation it creates, will be told for years to come. Cruel 
manifestations of contingent sovereignty create more enemies from a 
population that are motivated by a feeling of ressentiment, which provokes 
rationally uncontrollable aggressive or destructive acting-out. They give 
rise to a feeling of ressentiment that can lead to spiteful extremism. 
Ressentiment emerges as a kind of passivity or impotence but when it 
becomes impossible to construct meaning out of ressentiment, this can 
lead to a new desire for revenge. In this sense the vengeance of the 
despots can explain the energy that feeds ressentiment. 
 
There is, in this respect, an intricate relationship between ressentiment 
and the ‘slave.’ As I discussed before, ressentiment “is always a revolt…the 
triumph of the weak as the weak, the revolt of the slaves and their victory 
as slaves’ (Deleuze, 1983: 116-7). Ressentiment is a state of impotence in 
which the weak triumph not by creating new values, but simply reversing, 
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through ressentiment, the existing order, by taking the place of the master. 
In other words, the slave revolt can turn into a victory of ressentiment. The 
‘slave’, however, should not be understood as someone dominated. 
Slavery is a situation in which the ‘dominators’ are influenced by passive, 
reactive forces. Modern states in this respect are “regimes of slaves, not 
merely because of the people that they subjugate, but above all because of 
the type of ‘masters’ they set up” (ibid. x). For this reason, the real 
antagonism is between the sovereign and the oppressed class, between 
the slaves of the sovereign state and those who resist it. The struggle of the 
oppressed class can be ‘valuable’ only in so far as it can describe an 
external factor as ‘evil.’ 
 
The sovereign society is a society of ressentiment, in which slaves triumph 
as slaves and command other slaves. However, sovereign political power 
constitutes only one of the four social regimes embodied in neoliberal 
post-politics. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics is also a social regime 
of discipline, which constitutes a differentiation between an inside and 
outside. Discipline is a “non-sovereign power” (Foucault, 2003: 36) 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Discipline and the Birth of Neoliberal Governmentality 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter, I theorised an updated understanding of 
sovereignty that is no longer founded on a distinct territory. I argued that, 
since technologies of government are distributed among the established 
social regimes and relations of power, sovereignty is now everywhere. 
Furthermore, I suggested that sovereignty cannot be thought of without 
ressentiment as it creates an intricate relationship between the sovereign 
and the victim. Sovereignty, in other words, is a dynamic radical 
contingency because it is in that contingency that the forceful and brutal 
sovereign presence manifests itself. 
 
However, the revival of sovereignty constitutes only one of the four 
principles embodied in neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Post-politics 
is also organised according to discipline, which constitutes a differentiation 
between an inside and outside. Discipline is one of the most central 
elements of Foucault’s analytics of power. This chapter proposes to rethink 
Foucault in order to make sense of discipline that he began to understand 
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but at the same time has evolved very rapidly over time. Foucault proposes 
a fragmented and relational concept of power that allows us to examine a 
non-sovereign centred potential for disciplining subjects. The chapter 
explores this slow but profound transition from sovereign power to 
biopolitical governmentality, which is based on high levels of disciplinary 
normalisation upon life. Drawing on Foucault’s argument in Discipline and 
Punish (1977), I argue that discipline works through situated contingencies 
where individualised bodies are ranked and assayed according to “a 
political anatomy of detail” (Foucault, 1977: 139). Furthermore, I suggest 
that the biopolitics of fear is vital to the development of the disciplinary 
regime and neoliberal governmentality, whose mission is to pacify life in 
order to delay the event. Biopolitics, I assert, should be viewed as an 
eschatological, katechontic response whose objective is to neutralise the 
event. And it is toward these Foucauldian considerations and their 
implications for a discipline and neoliberal biopolitical governmentality that 
I now turn.  
 
4.2 Discipline 
 
“And yet the fact remains that a few decades saw the disappearance of the 
tortured, dismembered, amputated body, symbolically branded on face or 
shoulder, exposed alive or dead to public view. The body as the major 
target of penal repression disappeared.” (Foucault, 1977: 8) 
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Above the punitive city hangs the body of the condemned, bearing the 
ritual marks of sovereign vengeance. The body of the criminal tortured on 
the scaffold signifies the power to punish. Sovereign power, in short, is a 
certain power upon life where “the law can be inscribed, a life capable of 
reading and following the proscriptions and prescriptions of those 
inscriptions” (Dillon, 2002: 78). For a long time, one of the crucial aspects 
of sovereign power is the right to decide life and death - the right of a 
single sovereign to make life ‘live.’ The ceremony of cruelty is an exercise 
of sovereign terror at its most spectacular. 
 
But, as Foucault suggests (1977), this has become only one aspect of 
sovereign power in a range of mechanisms because the power over life is 
transformed in the modern West. From the late eighteenth century, as 
Foucault observes, political power is no longer exercised through the stark 
choice of taking life or letting live. Wars are still bloodier, killing an enemy 
is still the objective, and torture is still frequent. Yet, a major shift occurs in 
the way the right to punish is exercised. Now the wars are no longer waged 
in the name of the sovereign, but in the name of the entire population: 
“the right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of the sovereign 
to the defence of society” (Foucault, 1977: 90). What emerges is a new 
social regime with a new political authority that takes on the task of the 
management of life “in the name of life necessity”, ranging from illness, 
sanitary conditions in the towns, to the problems of security. The 
mechanisms “shift from exclusion to inclusion”, from “sending the victims 
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outside the bounds of the polity, to a mechanism for spatial partition that 
allows them to be contained within” (Elden, 2007: 564). The new regime is 
that of discipline, which aims to manage life through a multitude of 
attempts, turning bodies into information and knowledge. Discipline is an 
immanent historical reality, “a quite different materiality, a quite different 
physics of power, a quite different way of investing men’s bodies” 
(Foucault, 1977: 116). 
 
From this moment on, politics addresses the vital processes of man as a 
self-creature, who speaks, lives and works. Man as a finite being is to 
discipline, it might be said, what the state of exception is for the sovereign 
power of the state. In disciplinary regime, man is conceived as a being that 
is finite, but this finitude turns out to be a source of knowledge, meaning, 
and history. At once a subject and an object, man is the being who 
produces himself. Here Foucault’s argument closely parallels Marx’s 
definition of man as a species-being. Consider the famous lines in The 
Economic and-Philosophical Manuscripts, where Marx (1970: 31) defines 
species-being in the following terms: “Man is a species-being not only in 
that he practically and theoretically makes his own species as well as that 
of other things his object, but also…in that as present and living species he 
considers himself to be a universal and consequently free being.” What 
fundamentally separates Marx from Feuerbach is his insistence on the 
historicity of man, namely that man does not come into being as the object 
of consciousness, but is produced practically by the concrete factors of 
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social life due to labour. Man is a species-being because “the practical 
creation of an objective world, the treatment of inorganic nature” is proof 
that “nature appears as his work and his actuality” (ibid. 32). 
 
For Foucault, similarly, man - who is supposed to be an a priori, 
transcendent figure outside history - turns out to be a historical category, a 
product of power and knowledge. Man as a transcendent category, who is 
supposed to be ahistorical, thereby becomes the historical itself. Thus, with 
the disciplines, man (and his body) appears “as object and target of power” 
(Foucault, 1977: 136). Or, to say this differently, the new body is not a 
“mechanical body”; it is now conceived as man-the-machine “composed of 
solids and assigned movements” (ibid. 155). The new machine body has 
two registers: “the anatomico-metaphysical register, of which Descartes 
wrote the first pages and which the physicians and philosophers 
continued”, and the technico-political register, “which was constituted by a 
whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating 
to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the 
operations of the body” (ibid. 136). Their point of intersection is the docile 
body, “which joins the analysable body to the manipulable body” (ibid.). In 
the process, therefore, man emerges as a ‘theoretical’ object whose body, 
whose decipherable depth and actualities could be formed and corrected 
through mechanisms of normalisation (Foucault, 2003: 38). Utilising 
mechanisms of normalisation, the primary target of discipline is to manage 
the situation and maximise individual efficiency and productivity. Through 
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production of self-regulating individuals, society begins to become, as 
Foucault (1991) would explore in his governmentality writings, a space that 
to a certain extent has to be left to itself in order to achieve maximum 
efficacy. 
 
Inseparable from these issues is the integration of the system of 
observation into a tightly connected circuit. Disciplinary social regime 
belongs to the level of the diagram of power and forces, acting on “the 
potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual and which is 
manifested in his observed everyday conduct” (Foucault, 1977: 126). In 
other words, the very principle of strategic danger is crucial to the 
operation of discipline. Without danger no such discipline, without 
discipline no such danger. Danger becomes a formative, productive aspect 
of disciplinary action. Within the matrix of the potentiality of danger, 
discipline can be viewed as an abstract machine in which power relations 
emerge and operate in different physical spaces such as schools, hospitals, 
military barracks, prisons, and so on. It is in this context that the panoptic 
prison emerges as the form of punishment as an apparatus of knowledge. 
Let us recall Bentham’s vision. 
 
4.3 The Panopticon 
 
“Thou art about my path, and about my bed: and spiest out my ways. If I 
say, peradventure the darkness shall cover me, then shall my night be 
turned into day. Even there also shall thy hand lead me; and thy right hand 
shall hold me.” (Bentham, quoted in Miller, 1987: 5) 
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When Jeremy Bentham first used the above verses of the 139th Psalm, 
what he had in mind was creating a semblance of the ‘image of God.’ 
Bentham was a utilitarian who used an “architecture of choice” (Bentham, 
1995) - by which he meant that the authorities should give an appearance 
of choices so that the prisoners have the illusion of autonomy but end up 
behaving in the desired way. Thus he believed the panoptic architecture 
could be applied to any physical space, including schools, workhouses and 
prisons. The principle was that the inspector sees everyone “without being 
seen” (Bentham, 1995: 101), ensuring everyone in making the right 
choices. 
 
Bentham wanted to achieve a system of utilitarian thought that avoids 
dangerous “concert among minds” (ibid. 48) so that any challenge to the 
system does not take place. The goal was to maximise general utility and to 
minimise harm. With the emergence of the idea of the Benthamite 
panoptic prison the power to punish becomes institutionalised, and death 
is just the reverse side of life. The punishment is no longer seen as a crucial 
aspect of sovereign power, using the ritual marks of the vengeful act. 
Rather, it is now seen “as a procedure for requalifying individuals as 
subjects, as juridical subjects” (Foucault, 1977: 6). Because discipline deals 
here with an attempt to alter man, punishment becomes “as a technique 
for the coercion of individuals” (ibid. 6). Nothing is allowed “just to exist”; 
thus all circumstances, including that of chance, must be controlled, 
weighed, compared, evaluated, calculated, banished, organized (Foucault, 
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1977: 25-6; Miller, 1987: 5). In short, everything must be technically argued 
out. This is no doubt a new discourse, a new knowledge of the body that 
will overlook no single detail. Discipline works through minute controls of 
the body; it is a life problem that must play out. Hence a whole learned 
economy of the ‘strategy’ of the body through the institutions such as 
schools, hospitals, barracks, and workshops. 
 
However, this does not mean that discipline techniques disrupt sovereign 
political power and violence. Rather the new ‘strategy’ of the body now 
finds itself recombined with the internalisation of the sovereign gaze. The 
primary goal of the new strategy is, therefore, not confinement and 
enclosure but the true and faithful obedience of the subject. With the 
emergence of the panoptic prison, therefore, it becomes possible to 
develop a disciplinary regime which produces the individual as a 
governable, and economically productive but politically inert commodity. 
In other words, the panopticon idea also paves the way for the 
development of a global political economy, under a strong interventionist 
state. The development of capitalist economy and the neoliberal state 
introduces systematic surveillance in order to better discipline and control 
the labour process and relationships. Put simply, surveillance is an integral 
feature of the capitalist market (Foucault, 1977; 2007; 2008; see also 
Aradau & Munster, 2007; Barber, 1996; Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008; Dillon 
and Reid, 2009; Ericson, 2008; Gill, 1995; Retort, 2005; Rose, 1999). The 
central concern is to colonise social life by market relations so that all 
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spheres of life can be better managed and ordered. In the emergence of 
Taylorism and scientific management, for instance, similar surveillance 
practices of worker are widely used not only to supervise workers and 
managers, but also constitute and expand labour processes more 
systematically. What is crucial in this context is Taylor’s articulation of the 
raison d’être of global capitalist management: managers are supposed to 
act as “information specialists, as close observers”, disciplinary analysts 
and planners of ‘productive’ labour processes (Webster and Robins, 1993: 
245). Taylor (1947: 40) writes: 
 
“The deliberate gathering in on the part of those on the management’s side 
of all of the great mass of traditional knowledge… The duty of gathering in 
of all this great mass of traditional knowledge and then recording it, 
tabulating it and, in many cases, finally reducing it to laws, rules and even 
to mathematical formulae, is voluntarily assumed by the scientific 
managers. And later, when these laws, rules and formulae are applied to 
the everyday work of all the workmen of the establishment, through the 
intimate and hearty cooperation of those on the management’s side, they 
invariably result…in producing a very much larger output per man, as well 
as an output of a better and higher quality.” 
 
This connection between Taylor and the panopticon is also recognised by 
De Gaudemar when he (quoted in Webster and Robins, 1993: 245) writes 
that “the principles set out by Taylor scarcely go beyond those set out by 
Bentham.” In both Taylorism and the panopticon, we find the same 
mechanisms of surveillance and disciplinary control. The very principles of 
the panopticon become intensified and extended through Taylor’s 
capitalist management and thus extended throughout society. In this sense 
the panopticon is the precursor of global capitalist management. In this 
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way the panopticon (surveillance) and disciplinary regime are incorporated 
more firmly into the labour process.6 That is to say, the Benthamite 
panoptic prison and disciplinary regime are crucial to the development of 
economic aspects of liberalism and the capitalist labour market. 
Disciplinary panoptic power sustains the political economy of capitalism, 
especially the free (competitive) market. It is not just what is done by a 
strong interventionist state but what is allowed by this state in a ‘free 
market’ society. 
 
Indeed, the key to the capitalist political economy is the cooperation of 
free trade and competition, and a strong governmental apparatus. Free 
trade is productive as long as it is protected by an administrative social 
regime. In other words, free trade and competition require a centrally 
organised and disciplined social regime that facilitates and expands free 
market policies, capital and labour. The capitalist political economy (and 
thus state) is required a centrally organised and controlled interventionism 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 Note that Marx and Engels (1970: 122) see Bentham as one of the theoreticians of liberal 
capitalism, along with James Mill. 
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in society to help to promote ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number’. In order to sustain an individualised society with economic 
freedom, Benthamite political economy and disciplinary mechanisms of 
normalisation7 go hand in hand in order to modify human behaviours and 
promote responsible, reliable and rational ‘acts.’ So, on the one hand there 
is an active and strong interventionist apparatus with discipline, 
panopticon and surveillance practices, and on the other a market economy 
(economic freedom), competition, individual pleasures and good acts. 
Consequently, the panopticon is crucial to the development of a neoliberal 
governmentality that aims to intensify surveillance, while at the same time 
produces self-governing ‘harmless’ individuals according to the established 
norms. 
 
Yet the panopticon itself is insufficient to solve the conflicts inherent to 
society. Neoliberalism entails spreading the free-market to all aspects of 
society as the basis for the production of new forms of life: it extends the 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 By disciplinary mechanisms of normalisation I mean social and political processes 
through which ideas and actions become ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ in everyday life. 
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process of making the free-market a general matrix of social and political 
relations by taking as its focus not exchange but competition. As such, it is 
precisely this extension of market relations to all spheres of society that 
compels individuals to internalise the logic of surveillance and control from 
the panopticon, for there is no escape from failure in the neoliberal logic of 
market-based competition. After all, one cannot legislate away inherent 
systemic problems. Because in the eyes of neoliberal governmentality the 
only solution to such conflicts, problems, is competition. Free trade and 
competition work better than an authoritarian governmentality precisely 
because they compel human beings to compete and thus come up with 
‘better’ solutions to conflicts and problems. The Benthamite panoptic 
prison, therefore, gives the way for the materialisation of competition as 
an eidos. The ‘invisible’ panopticon must regulate the society overall by 
perpetuating a culture of competition that promotes capital and labour in 
accordance with free market policies. Thus, in the absence of a ‘visible’ 
authoritarian governmentality the political competition solution is anything 
but clear and convincing. Consequently, the panopticon is adopted by the 
market order and becomes invisible, but its effects are tangible, operating 
through a culture of competition as an ‘eidos’ (instead of a natural given). 
The striking similarity between them is that both rely on individual freedom 
understood as ‘economic freedom’ from a given menu. In the panopticon, 
the confinement is actualised by the cells and physical barriers. In the case 
of the market order, the cells are now socially constructed, given by 
property rights and competition. As a consequence, competition as an 
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invisible ‘watchtower’ spreads across all aspects of life and thus becomes 
an organising force through which human beings engage into a continuous 
activity of capital and labour. That is, life that is conducted in market-
relationships as competition. 
 
But what is competition? “Competition is an essence…an eidos…a principle 
of formalization. Competition has an internal logic; it has its own structure. 
Its effects are only produced if this logic is respected” (Foucault, 2008: 
120). According to Foucault, by competition we must always understand 
the market and inequality, rather than equality of exchange. In short, 
competition is “a formal game between inequalities.” The task of 
neoliberalism is to develop the concrete spaces in which competition as an 
eidos can take shape and function. “So it is a matter of market economy 
without laissez-faire, that is to say an active policy without state control. 
Neo-liberalism therefore should not be identified with laissez-faire, but 
rather with permanent activity, vigilance and intervention” (Foucault, 
2008: 132). Competition regulates conflicts and problems inherent to 
society and the neoliberal market whose logic must be “respected.” 
Significantly, for Foucault, the new - as distinct from the 18th century - 
disciplinary paradigm announces a new phase of liberalism. Contrary to 
classic liberal governmentality, which believed that the economy was 
somehow natural, that things could develop on their own without any 
intervention, the economy is understood by neoliberalism as an effect of a 
legal order. Neoliberalism, in other words, is a market builder. “The 
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juridical gives form to the economic, and the economic would not be what 
it is without the juridical” (ibid. 163). As such, the market, or pure 
competition, “can only appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by 
active governmentality” (ibid. 121). The market thus has to be created and 
maintained. This is the key point that distinguishes classic liberalism from 
contemporary economic liberalism. 
 
4.4 The Rule of Law 
 
But how could competition as an eidos be extended from the realm of the 
market and become the regulative principle of society? At this point, 
Foucault makes reference to the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) as a concept 
which may literally be described as “state under law.”8 The rule of law 
plays a central role in constituting a disciplinary normalisation that is based 
upon economic order. With the constitution of the rule of law, the 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 The rule of law (Rechtsstaat) first appeared in political theory and German jurisprudence, 
at the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th century. It “corresponds to the English ‘Rule 
of Law’ but with a special focus – particularly relevant in the XIX century - on the concepts 
of the State and public administration (see Mannori and Sordi, 2009: 242). 
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sovereign no longer has the power of life and death. The new sovereign is 
different in that it is not based on the juridical power of coercion. The 
function of the state, then, is elevated to a status that guarantees freedom, 
particularly a domain of economic freedom. Economic freedom, in other 
words, is central to the development of the state. The state will exist to 
guarantee and protect freedom, namely economic freedom. 
 
What is the ultimate purpose of the rule of law? The rule of law is a 
response to the needs of the market but market expansion creates more 
opportunities for conflict and political dissent. Conflict and dissent cannot 
be resolved by the market but require a rule of law under which the 
intervention and arbitration are carried out. In establishing the rule of law, 
the liberals see the possibility of getting rid of various forms of socialism. 
Or, to put it even more succinctly: it is the fear of ‘potential revolutions’ 
that creates the rule of law. Neoliberalism views society as a battlefield. 
Revolution is always in the air. Neoliberalism is wary of dangerous 
multitudes, the crowds who shun the unity of the State and create 
disorder. The aim of the constitution of the Leviathan (Hobbes) and the 
state of exception (Schmitt) was to transform the multitude into the 
‘people.’ However, the multitude can always reappear within the state. 
Thus dangerous multitudes should be transformed into ‘ordered 
multiplicities’ so that resistance does not occur, that the event does not 
take place. For the multitude is “anti-state”, “anti-people.” Hence Hobbes 
(quoted in Virno, 2004: 9) writes: “When they rebel against the state, the 
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citizens are the multitude against the people.”9 The fear of the multitude, 
the fear of revolution reconfigures neoliberal economic theory in the same 
sense that Hobbes and Schmitt treated a state of exception that is war 
operationally as a political kernel of the law, as a condition for the 
establishment of an absolutist state. This is also the way how the rule of 
law institutionalises a culture of competition as an eidos. 
 
The realisation that the economic growth is the only general good for 
contemporary neoliberal theory, that this is only possible within the matrix 
of competition, as an eidos, is culminated in the idea that politics should be 
kept away from economy; politics, that is to say, should not act for the 
general good. All that society needs is formal law that paves the way for 
the enterprise society subject to the dynamic of competition, but also 
banishes the state intervention in the economy, and in society overall. 
What is then needed is more market and less politics and the state, for a 
state “under the supervision of the market” is preferable “than a market 
supervised by the state” (Foucault, 2008: 116). The market, in other words, 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 I follow Hobbes’ conception of the multitude, which refers to the very negation of the 
sovereign authority with its entailing techniques of normalisation. 
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governs the state. Crucially, therefore, the rule of law is not only used to do 
away with the threat of socialist ideals. Rather it becomes a general 
strategy to transform the society into an economic battleground. The 
battleground means that the liberals also use the rule of law to ward off 
the other aspect of the savage, “that other natural man or ideal element 
dreamed up by economists: a man without a past or a history, who is 
motivated only by self-interest and who exchanges the product of his labor 
for another product” (Foucault, 2003: 194). The liberals see the possibility 
of warding off both two senses of the savage, “who emerges from his 
forests to enter into a contract and to found society, and the savage Homo 
economicus whose life is devoted to exchange and barter” (ibid. 194). For 
the savage Homo economicus, the rule of law “constitutes a social body, 
which is, at the same time, an economic body” (ibid.). 
 
In this figure of homo economicus as a grid of intelligibility, the noble 
savage who carries an inscriptional subjectivity is now gone. Gone also is 
the classical economy of crime and punishment. Sovereignty rules men as 
subjects of right, while the rule of law supplements disciplinary panoptic 
power with the management of individuals qua homo economicus. 
Summarising rather crudely, neoliberal economic theory manages 
individuals qua homo economicus that is based on the dynamic of 
competition as an eidos. Homo economicus therefore is the key to 
understanding neoliberal economic theory. Homo economicus is a person 
“who is eminently governable” (Foucault, 2003: 270), just as neoliberalism 
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is a modification of “the art of governing” as an exercise of political 
sovereignty. Neoliberalism must manage the social; this is the key turning 
point in the history of the state seen through the grid of intelligibility 
(Protevi, 2010: 22). Nowhere is this personal-social-economic 
transformation more aptly expressed than in how homo economicus 
responds to sovereign power: 
 
“This is what the man right, homo juridicus, says to the sovereign: I have 
rights, I have entrusted some of them to you, the others you must not 
touch… Homo economicus does not say this. He also tells the sovereign: 
You must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. 
And you cannot in the sense that ‘you are powerless’. And why are you 
powerless, why can’t you? You cannot because you do not know, and you 
do not because you cannot know.” (Foucault, 2008: 283) 
 
Homo economicus reveals a reality that transcends all the limitations of 
sovereign power, including the economic domain, because the sovereign is 
incapable of mastering the new emerging society. The new society cannot 
be founded on ruthless, cruel sovereignty as having a power of life and 
death. Neoliberalism declares that what’s important about the market is 
competition, so the state should protect and secure market mechanisms 
that facilitate competition. As a result, permeated by state-phobia, 
competition becomes the organising and regulatory form of state and 
society. What emerges in the process of transformation of the noble 
savage to the savage homo economicus is a ‘free’ subject with its passions, 
and a ‘freedom’ that is deprived of justice and equality. Neoliberalism is 
not satisfied with respecting or guaranteeing any kind of freedom. 
Neoliberalism, in short, “is consumer of freedom” (Foucault, 2008: 63). And 
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it is valuable only insofar as other freedoms exist: “freedom of the market, 
freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of 
discussion…and so on” (ibid. 63). Freedom is consumed as much as it is 
produced. In order to consume freedom, the new neoliberal governance 
should produce and manage freedom. In neoliberalism, freedom is limited, 
controlled, and subject to “forms of coercion, and obligations relying on 
threats etcetera” (ibid. 64). All that matters, in the end, is organising ‘the 
conduct of conducts’ that require techniques, and above all, a way of 
speaking the truth of neoliberalism “about the nature of times through the 
truth of the end of times” (Dillon, 2011: 784). In other words, neoliberalism 
always charges itself with delaying the end of a temporal order of things, of 
life. Neoliberalism is a truth teller. And “if the truth teller is  the truth, then 
the truth is for everyone, and if what the truth teller says is true, then it 
follows that the conduct of conduct, from the individual to the collective, 
should be aligned or align itself with the truth” (ibid. 784). What is now 
played is a new ‘game of truth’: market. The market becomes a ‘site of 
veridiction’, a new reality which connects up “of a regime of truth to 
governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008: 37). What we have here is a 
particular regime of truth, neoliberalism, which finds its theoretical 
expression and formulation in the market.  
 
In the new governmental practice, the neoliberal subject as homo 
economicus is a subject who must be left on its own. In the process, the 
individual is addressed affectively. The universalisation of competition, as 
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an eidos, means that any way of life that does not fit with neoliberal 
economic forms is rendered valueless. What is sought, therefore, is a 
“society subject to the dynamic of production” (Foucault, 2008: 147). To 
facilitate competition, discipline should not naturally restrain human 
beings and their passions. On the contrary, their wants, desires, passions 
and instincts should be duly noted, turned into liberal dialogue. If human 
beings are motivated by passions, which lack the idea of equality for all, 
there should be no control of their actions. After all, how could disciplinary 
regime ever obtain the knowledge that would enable it to produce faithful 
and law-abiding subjects? 
 
Neoliberalism governs with economic freedom, while regulating 
‘ontological freedom.’ Interestingly, but not surprisingly, neoliberalism had 
a model of the state that guarantees economic freedom. In reality, 
however, the state has never disappeared; it has always been a guardian, 
maintainer of order. Thus state-phobia results in the strengthening of the 
state apparatus in which the guiding principle is to create docile, yet free, 
bodies that assume their ‘identity’ and their well-regulated freedom “as 
subjects in the very process of their desubjectification” (Agamben, 2009: 
19-20). Neoliberalism views society as a battlefield, aiming to prevent 
disruptive events by state apparatuses, by dispositifs of power such as the 
panopticon. 
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Sovereignty centralises power as a way of dealing with fears of dangerous 
events. With neoliberal discipline, fear is what must be (re)produced by 
social regimes of power to secure a life to make life live. In other words, 
the process of competition combined with flexible labour markets, 
economic freedom understood as the free choice constrained within a 
competitive jacket, and socially constructed barriers (property rights), 
contributes to the pervasiveness of a threat and the actualisation of fear. 
The next part of the chapter argues that fear is what enables secure and 
docile bodies to thrive in the marketplace. Furthermore, the 
decentralisation of fear and power of disciplinary regime mobilises the 
spectre of danger and threat in order to normalise and organise 
populations. The effects of this (re)productive mobilisation of fear are 
central to disciplinary regime. 
 
4.5 Fear 
 
Since affective modulation of people becomes an essential function of 
discipline, fear is necessary for society to impose discipline on population 
and the multitude. Addressing bodies from the angle of their affectivity, 
the growth of disciplinary society depends on effective means of enforcing 
rules by punishing those who break the rules - by creating, in effect, a 
‘culture of fear’ in which control is achieved by a collective fear of 
punishment, including loss of livelihood, economic status etc. Thus citizens 
begin to experience fear, wrapped in the perpetual anxiety, which glorifies 
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reaction rather than action: “the fear snowballs, as the reaction runs its 
course” (Massumi, 2005: 37). It is here, in that immanence, that discipline 
coincides with its affective potential: “fear becomes a generative principle 
of formation for rule” (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 86). Having fear as a habitual 
posture becomes a way of life. 
 
Fear is the essential condition and a positive element of discipline. Life is 
now lived as a natural ‘fear environment’ in which there is no relief, no day 
of rest. The fear of failure/punishment also dissolves trust, one of the 
binding agents of society togetherness. Thus, with discipline, neoliberal 
governmentality molds itself to suspicion, for self-censorship becomes the 
new normal. At the core of such fear lies “the nonentity of the frightened, 
wan and mortal being compared to the enormity of the everlasting 
universe; the sheer weakness, incapacity to resist, vulnerability of the frail” 
(Bauman, 2004: 47). In other words, disciplinary society addresses fearful 
bodies “at the level of their dispositions” toward (re)action, capturing the 
spontaneity of the individual soul. Capturing spontaneity, however, 
converts the individual soul into something it is not: “a habitual function” 
(Massumi, 2005: 33). The goal is to convert fearful bodies and fearful 
subjects into disciplined and ultimately (re)productive subjects of 
neoliberalism. 
 
Importantly, the fearful subject is not a passive subject but an actively 
driven subject of neoliberalism who is continuously produced through its 
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fears and insecurities. If sovereignty generates a weak subject of 
ressentiment whose collective existence is damaged, who does not re-act, 
discipline addresses a fearful subject whose freedom is (re)produced in 
response to insecure and unsafe situations it encounters within the 
requirements of docile and obedient bodies. What is the political 
importance of the fearful subject? Two points stand out. First, the subject 
is always already recognised or recognises itself under fearful conditions. 
Enslaved by its own fears and anxieties, the subject cannot show a 
collective political response as fear environment becomes a second nature. 
Fear braces people together in the terror of not yet being able to answer 
the question, “what can we do?” Thus collective action is restrained, for 
fear becomes an open field for intervention and arbitrary exercises of 
neoliberal power operating on a continuum with militarisation of society 
(Massumi, 2011a). When a response occurs, “it is on the individual scale of 
the personal actions of ‘everyday heroes’ carrying out small deeds of 
voluntaristic support” (ibid). Second, the object of discipline is the 
management of fear and the insecurities that are its foundations. Fear and 
danger meet the necessities of securitisation, while civil and political rights 
are suspended in the name of the market’s future stability. The association 
between fear and growing state security apparatus - in the interests of the 
market - becomes almost automatic. What remains is a fearful subject 
whose ability to understand and make sense of events is suspended. For 
fear caused by discipline is unresolvable. To paraphrase Engin Isin (2004: 
232), what the fearful subject wants is the impossible. It wants absolute 
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security. It wants absolute certainty. It wants absolute safety. It wants to 
have the perfect body. Yet, since providing absolute security, certainty and 
safety is impossible, it cannot tackle its fears; it cannot act. It cannot live a 
normal life. Since these claims are impossible because they pronounce a 
space that the fearful subject cannot reach, it cannot overcome its fear. 
Consequently, fear becomes a permanent feature of discipline, which 
“circulates through the capillaries of collective life” by not repressing but 
producing and intensifying life (see Collier, 2009: 81). 
 
Accordingly, fear presents society as an ‘exposed community.’ Discipline 
does not model a dominating totalitarian society; it is “not a means of 
producing terrorized slaves without privacy” (Foucault, 1977: 215). Rather 
it addresses fearful and ‘self-managing citizens’ capable of conducting 
themselves in economic freedom, deprived of justice and equality. Thus 
‘economic freedom’ and fear are intimately connected. Fugacity, instability 
and insecurity are elementary ingredients of discipline, in which freedom 
and fear refer to one another. In other words, discipline nurtures fear and 
makes it subject to an economic calculus. In fact, fear and homo 
economicus are of a piece: they are indissociable dimensions of the same 
subjectivity. Homo economicus as rational self-entrepreneur promises 
manifold options and opportunities to consume, but it also creates a risk-
security-aware culture, thus establishing a permanent fear of success, or 
fear of failure. With neoliberal discipline, the incentives are changed, not 
by a coercive sovereign authority, but motivated by self-interest – fear of 
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failure. For fear (economic failure, fear of failure) is the best way to 
transform harmful responses into the beneficial, undesirable into 
desirable; it is an integral part of capital expansion. Fear of failure does not 
only become a positive force, but also a destructive force (the inability to 
even live) in the market economy. In this sense, forms of desire and 
pleasure “are intimately wedded to fear” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 323). 
 
Neoliberal discipline’s key concept is less liberty and more fear. For without 
a persistent sense of fear and danger present in the minds and bodies of 
subjects, productive and ‘inspiring’ powers vested in the disciplinary 
regime may lose its legitimacy. The emphasis on fear and danger is vital to 
the development of a biopolitics of fear. The managing of fear becomes the 
scope of biopolitics: biopolitics needs fear to manage it. This is particularly 
clear when ‘danger’ is involved. In what follows I argue that biopolitics is 
precisely the disciplinary (and neoliberal) strategy of pacification and 
stabilisation of society that takes making live as its objects. For modern 
biopolitics, only a constantly pacified and administered life is a safe 
environment. Furthermore, I contend that the coevolving fear of revolution 
is the basis and motive for the constitution of the responsible, reliable and 
rational self because this paves the way for continually growing security 
apparatus. In between stretches a continuum of ‘the event’, which 
becomes a legitimate tool for preemption. 
 
 
166 
 
4.6 The Political Theology of Biopolitics 
 
“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularised 
theological concepts.” (Schmitt, 1985: 36) 
 
 
As I noted earlier, within the matrix of discipline, politics addresses the vital 
processes that sustain human existence: “the size and quality of the 
population; reproduction and human sexuality; conjugal, parental, and 
familial relations; health and disease; birth and death” (Rose, 2007: 52-3). 
This shift in history is what Foucault (2003) calls “biopolitics”, which refers 
to the political strategisation/technologisation of life for its own productive 
betterment; the modus operandi of power relations that aims to enhance, 
render productive, promote, compose, maximise, and administer life. 
Biopolitics is a privileged form of intervention; it is “the politics of life itself” 
(Rose, 2007). 
 
In volume 1 of The History of Sexuality, Foucault proposes (1998) two 
bipolar diagrams of biopower, or power over life. One pole of biopower 
works by individualisation, that is, on the micro-level of power, which seeks 
to produce individuality, and thus incorporate it into efficient systems. But 
this pole also makes another pole that works on the macro-level, namely 
biopolitics of the population, which focuses on “the species body, the body 
imbued with the mechanisms of life: birth, morbidity, mortality, longevity” 
(Rose, 2007: 53). Foucault (2007: 30) claims that this bipolar technology, 
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emerging in the seventeenth century, seeks “to invest life through and 
through”, which is “a question of constituting something like a milieu of 
life, existence.” As a consequence, the development of life necessarily 
becomes the focus of inquiry. 
 
However, one should bear in mind that the seeming distinction between 
disciplinary normalisation and regulatory mechanisms is sustained by a 
shared underlying feature: they both aim to “maximize and extract forces.” 
Thus, they are intimately connected. The biopolitical control “does not 
exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, 
modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, 
embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques” (Foucault, 2003: 242). 
Within this dual structure, life as a model of governing is displaced by life 
as a site of intervention, the point where new forms of life knowledge, 
discipline and control must be applied. Thus nothing occurs in vain. All life 
forms have to be analysed in terms of their properties, propensities and 
potentialities. Thus the discourse of man must be understood “on the basis 
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of the emergence of the population as the correlative power and the 
object of knowledge. After all, man…is nothing but a figure of population” 
(Foucault, 2007: 79).10 
 
This, however, tells only part of the story. One should, therefore, raise the 
more fundamental question: what is the true purpose of biopolitics? My 
contention is that, since biopolitics is also a regime of truth that is to side 
with the forces of ‘neoliberal order’, its main purpose is to avoid more 
catastrophic and radical change. In other words, the main objective of 
biopolitics is to defuse any fears of a repeat of revolution. Precisely for this 
reason, when we examine modern biopolitics, we should pay attention to 
its theological reason because how to minimise the potentially disruptive 
events is shaped by ‘secularized theological concepts.’ Biopolitics is one of 
them. The always present possibility of an event is what defines modern 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 Note the evolution of ‘man’ in Foucault’s writings. In The Order of Things man emerges 
as an enigmatic mutation within knowledge. In Discipline and Punish man appears as a 
finite being who is formed as the principal subject of history. In Security, Territory, 
Population man becomes the figure of the population, “in the first form of his integration 
within biology” (Foucault, 2007: 75). 
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biopolitics’ legitimacy. This powerful configuration also makes the fear of 
revolution the currency of neoliberalism. 
 
4.6.1 Katechon 
 
In a revision of Foucault’s account of biopolitics, I shall suggest that 
contemporary biopolitics is a measured attempt to combine neoliberal 
order and legitimacy of a neoliberal economic theory in order to decrease 
resistance. In a sense, therefore, contemporary biopolitics is doing here to 
the ‘sacralised neoliberal order’ what Schmitt did to the exception, turning 
its revolutionary potentiality (Benjamin) into a counterrevolutionary 
politics of event. Contemporary biopolitics is therefore katechontic. To 
clarify this point, let us now turn to Schmitt’s katechon (from the Greek for 
‘to hold down’). In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt (2003) contends that 
the legacy of Roman law, and temporal political orders established over the 
centuries, is katechontic: what is the best possible order that prevents 
decay, the victory of ‘evil’, and resists the Anti-Christ, the end of finite 
time? With the katechon, or the ‘restrainer’, Christianity emerges as an 
empire whose centre is Rome, and gains a juridical, cultural and 
prosecutorial imperial power within history. 
 
The katechon is what transforms eschatological time into the time of 
Christian Empire, always prepared to act against catastrophe. Empire, 
according to Schmitt (2003: 60), “meant the historical power to restrain the 
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appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the present eon.” The concept 
of katechon refers to a mysterious Pauline verse, II Thessalonians 2.6-7: 
“And you know what is restraining him now so that he may be revealed in 
his time. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who 
now restrains it will do so until he is out of the way.” The passage is a 
Pauline warning to the primitive community in Thessalonica against the 
revelation of the lawless activity of ‘Satan’, of Anti-Christ, upon whom God 
sends a “strong delusion”, “so that all may be condemned who did not 
believe the truth but had pleasure in unrighteousness” (II.2.11). The 
concept of katechon, according to Schmitt, is a “historical concept”, a 
“lucid Christian faith in potent historical power” because, as a belief, as a 
restrainer, what it “holds back” is nothing other than the eschatological 
“end of the world” (Schmitt, 2003: 60). It holds the end at bay and 
suppresses the power of the Satan, the Anti-Christ. “Who holds the Anti-
Christ at bay?” thus becomes the historical question from which Schmitt’s 
concept of the political derives. The katechon is a theology in the service of 
sovereignty, of power, which seeks a theological legitimation of the 
political. 
 
In Schmitt’s view, the real struggle is between the katechon and 
catastrophe, between counterrevolution and revolution. If the sovereign is 
he who “decides on the state of exception”, his main task is to restore and 
maintain the political order, which is threatened by an event. While 
revolution seeks to establish a new order, the katechon strives to maintain 
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the existing social, economic and political order. Revolution attempts to 
turn over the old order, whereas the katechon tries to appropriate 
revolutionary ideas by sovereign exceptionalism. Sovereignty (katechon) 
and revolution are thus intimately connected. The katechon is haunted by 
the knowledge that existing orders (empire) are always preceded by radical 
social change. Thus, it is not a passive figure but an active one, prepared to 
sacrifice everything to keep catastrophe at bay. Schmitt’s katechon is a 
biopolitical imaginary of an imperial sovereign who insists that “time is 
limited”, thus radicalising modern biopolitics and the politics of security 
even further. 
 
Acting under the sovereign law, the katechon is a radical 
reconseptualisation of a biopolitical imaginary, attempting to prevent its 
own end. It is here that the biopolitical imaginary of the katechon coincides 
with its central aspect: the state of exception. The time of the biopolitical 
imaginary is the time of the exception. Thus, confronted with the coming 
defeat of the existing social, economic and political order, the state of 
exception becomes the central aspect to postpone its own end by 
restraining the powers of revolution. Put simply, the katechontic discourse 
empowers liberal regimes biopolitically; “the analytic of which...furnishes 
its governmental technologies and military strategic operational concepts 
and doctrines, as well as its political rationalities” (Dillon, 2011: 783-4). 
When Foucault theorised biopolitics, he did not explicitly address the 
transformation of theological reasoning. In this sense Foucault’s genealogy 
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should be extended to take note of how theological reasoning is one of the 
central characteristics to the development of biopolitics. Schmitt (1985: 4) 
reminds us forcefully that “in modernity, theology continues to be present 
and active in an eminent way.” As far as the event is concerned, which 
aims at bringing about the end to the existing order, theological and 
political reasoning become increasingly difficult to distinguish. If “the 
transformation of political reasoning often finds its expression through the 
tropes of theological discourse”, so, too, “the transformation of theological 
reasoning often finds its expression through newly addressing questions of 
temporal conduct and rule” (see Dillon, 2011: 785). The task of each 
reasoning is to organise ‘the conduct of conduct’ and establish a regime of 
truth in changing circumstances. In this sense, the katechontic response is 
an imperial biopolitical order of securitisation, a political reality, on which 
the ‘new normal’ runs. It is the spectre of the event that haunts modern 
biopolitics, as well as the established social regimes that constitute 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics. The spectre of the event, revolution 
is intimately bound up with security politics and modern biopolitics: 
without it, they are doomed to fail at their mission to ensure society’s well-
being through enforcing market relations. 
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4.6.2 Eschaton 
 
Every politics of security (and counterrevolutionary strategy) is also a 
politics of the limit; it is concerned with the limit, and end times, of the 
existing rule. The political orders of modern finitude know very well that 
they are finite. This is why the katechontic response becomes an 
imperative to delay that end. However, in legitimising the politics of 
security and the war on terror for which it kills, contemporary biopolitics 
must also be seen as a political eschatology. At this point, Michael Dillon’s 
article (2011) entitled “Specters of Biopolitics: Finitude, Eschaton, and 
Katechon” I find especially significant, for it provides new critical reflections 
on the nature of neoliberalism and biopolitical warfare. Dillon’s analysis of 
the role played by political theology gives a new inflection to security 
politics and contemporary biopolitics. For security politics and neoliberal 
biopolitics, Dillon (2011: 782) has diagnosed a “political eschatology”, a 
“modern eschaton”, in which the transcendental finitude of horizon is 
transposed into a factical finitude and thus becomes an immanent quality. 
As a modern eschaton, contemporary biopolitics and security politics in 
general, explains Dillon, are concerned “with the end of things”, “the very 
end of time itself”, which has to be delayed through social, political and 
economic interventions. As opposed to the transcendental finitude of 
biopolitics, the modern aspects of the eschaton, Dillon (ibid. 781) goes on 
to argue, provide biopolitics with an open horizon of temporal possibility, 
an open historicity, within the infinite becomings of finite beings, 
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happenings, or events (ibid.). That is to say, the temporal imagination that 
informs modern biopolitics changes from time as a derivate of eternity to 
time as continuous emergence in which life is conceived as an immanent 
process, a life of becoming (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 108). There is no relief, 
no day of rest for modern biopolitics because, as a modern eschaton, it is 
defined by continuous processes and patterns of continuous contingent 
emergence. Taking life as the main focus of inquiry, modern biopolitics, like 
liberalism, is therefore diverse and heterogeneous. It is based on the 
regulation of the ‘infinity of finite beings.’ The temporal limit of modern 
biopolitics is marked, in other words, an open horizon of finite possibilities, 
‘an infinity of finite possibilities and becomings.’ 
 
In this precise sense, modern biopolitics as a modern eschaton deals with 
potential events as a matter of managing the infinity of finitudes, without 
allowing these finitudes to universalise themselves, and thus leading to 
radical structural change. Doomed to time, modern biopolitics can thus be 
seen as an extension of Christian eschatology. Securing the liberal order 
from its ongoing struggle against the event is a task that is shaped by 
religious traditions. In this sense, biopolitics derives its warrant to secure 
the neoliberal order from the fear of the event, of revolution, 
‘eschatologically.’ Contemporary biopolitics is motivated by the fear of the 
event, which is intimately bound up with the fear of a breakdown of order 
tout court. As Dillon (2011: 782) rightly observes, 
 
175 
 
“[T]he catastrophic threat-event of the dissolution of the temporal order of 
things is continuously also interrogated to supply the governing 
technologies, by which the political order is regulated in peace to be ‘fit’ for 
war and is regulated so as to resist the same catastrophic threat-event.”  
 
Modern biopolitics is, in short, a political eschatology that is “concerned 
with the end of things” and this gives rise to an updated understanding of 
security politics that “derives from the positive exigencies of government 
and rule that arise in restricting that end” (ibid. 782). 
 
The eschaton remains a source of political as well as ‘religious’ dissent and 
resistance today. And it seems that today there are two responses that 
continuously call the nature of the eschaton into question: the first 
response is katechontic, which legitimises the existing order, the second is 
revolutionary, which seeks a total deligitimisation of that order. The first is 
to side with neoliberalism and the war on terror, the second with ‘divine 
violence’ and revolution. As both katechontic (preventing radical structural 
change and delaying the coming of end times) and as figured around the 
eschaton (the end time), contemporary biopolitics is a preemptive take on 
the event/revolution, which legitimises counterrevolution in general and 
the neoliberal security politics (the war against everything) specifically. As a 
political eschatology that refers to an open horizon of temporal 
possibilities, contemporary biopolitics is also a katechontic response, which 
attempts to foreclose the reservoir of temporal possibilities so that they 
cannot universalise themselves. Where there is an eschaton, the katechon 
grows too. Where there is a fear of revolution, there is always a 
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counterrevolutionary tendency that defuses that threat. While the 
eschaton concerns the open finitudinal horizon of the modern account of 
life, the katechon concerns the preservation of that horizon (ibid. 789). 
 
In Hobbes’ political eschatology, Leviathan was the main solution that acts 
with an eye toward the catastrophic end. Thus Leviathan centralised all 
individual fears to react to such fears of dangerous events. Consequently, 
fear became the currency of the political order and the constitutive rule of 
the sovereign. This eschatology for Hobbes was nonetheless based upon 
the virtuality of threat and danger. In Schmitt’s political eschatology, 
Hobbes’ model of absolute sovereign would be revisited and the sovereign 
decision on the exception became a mechanism that could centralise all 
individual fears so as to ensure control over fear/danger. In Schmitt’s 
political eschatology, the sovereign decision was the katechon that delays 
the empire’s end. Modern biopolitics of security, however, emerges as an 
eschatological, katechontic response, whose mission is to manage life to 
make life live by preventing the event. In the process, therefore, security 
and war become constitutive principles of formation for rule. With modern 
biopolitics, security and war as centralised forces are redesigned, or 
redistributed throughout neoliberal arrangements. It is that katechontic 
gesture which legitimises perpetual security and perpetual war against the 
threat that the event (Satan, the Anti-Christ) mobilises against this move. 
Delaying empire’s end, contemporary biopolitics of security and war thus 
become empire’s katechontic tools. And the same goes for fear. Modern 
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biopolitics’ relation to fear is revisited and becomes a new modality of 
power that is able to preserve or enhance the life-efficiency of a given 
population (see Debrix and Barder, 2009: 406). Contemporary biopolitics 
turns fear into a dispositif, a katechontic response, geared towards 
preempting disruptive events and supplying the governing technologies 
and military apparatuses of security. When we speak of a biopolitical 
production of fear, what we are really describing is a series of scare tactics 
that can only produce ‘good’ social effects by agents/agencies of neoliberal 
governmentality. 
 
If the event, revolution, is the problem, then a new productivity of 
biopolitical fear is the answer. Life, therefore, get fused with fear. As an 
eschatological katechontic response, which takes place in life for life, 
modern biopolitics ‘sacralises’ the liberal democratic market, and 
understands ‘freedom’ only in terms of existing neoliberal values. Modern 
biopolitics only recognises market freedom, that is, the freedom to talk 
endlessly about consumer products. Other freedoms will invariably follow. 
As a political katechontic response, contemporary biopolitics is concerned 
with the virtuality of what already exists. As an eschatological katechontic 
response, the rule of truth spoken by biopolitics, in short, is prepared to 
sacrifice everything to keep ‘the threat of revolution’ at bay. The 
revolutionary event of the dissolution of the neoliberal order is 
continuously also interrogated to renew and modify biopolitics (Dillon, 
2011). In short, there is always a need for modern biopolitics to think in 
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terms of disruptive events, or to mobilise the spectre of fear and absolute 
threat in changing circumstances. It is in this sense that neoliberalism 
should be seen as “the general framework of biopolitics”: “only when we 
know what…liberalism was will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is” 
(Foucault, 2008: 22). What modern biopolitics dreads most is the 
impotence of neoliberal power. Its objective is to neutralise anything that 
can threaten the existing order. In this sense, contemporary biopolitics is a 
preemptive counterrevolutionary tendency that seeks to sustain the 
existing neoliberal order of things. 
 
Modern biopolitics is a finitudinal form of rule, a privileged form of 
intervention, whose mission is to secure life with its vital new capacities. In 
this sense, as Foucault (2008) insists, when one says “biopolitics”, one says, 
“biopolitics of security.” Or, to paraphrase Foucault, when one says 
“biopolitics”, one says, “biopolitics of fear.” With the biopolitics of fear, life 
itself becomes the enemy of life itself because life “threatens life in its 
positive procreativity” (Dillon, 2011: 788). Thus, rather than only a politics 
of sovereign exceptionality, modern biopolitics of fear is enacted by way of 
governmentality that mobilises all sorts of public agents to use the spectre 
of fear, danger and threat (see Debrix and Barder, 2009: 400). And 
crucially, it is the fear/danger/threat of revolution that leads to a 
biopolitics of fear because it is through the event that fear is rendered 
productive in order to establish disciplinary control. When biopolitical 
agents/agencies of fear production become the loci of disciplinary 
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techniques of neoliberal post-politics, the production and the reproduction 
of fear is no longer the exception but the rule. And this means wondering 
how the biopolitics of fear takes place and reproduces itself in special sites 
or exceptional events. In the next section of the chapter, I argue that 
disciplinary techniques, and the biopolitics of fear, also perform an 
important segregatory function. They divide society/city into particular 
groups such as responsible/reliable individuals and dangerous individuals, 
and thus serve as significant lines of demarcation that are materialized and 
spatialised in urban governmental practices. Examples of this are almost 
too numerous but a single one will suffice for a bullet point: kettling. 
 
4.7 Geographies of Kettling 
 
In November 2010, British students staged a series of demonstrations in 
several cities of the UK and Northern Ireland. Organised by the National 
Campaign against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC), thousands marched against 
spending cuts to further education and an increase of the cap on tuition 
fees by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. After the 
2003 anti-Iraq war protest in London, which attracted almost a million 
people, the 2010 protests have marked something of a turning point in 
modern British history: the political protest was back. But if these protests 
made dissensus visible, and posited it at the heart of British politics, they 
also gave police an opportunity to widely use a scare tactic, an extrajudicial 
punishment, ensuring that protest against the status quo is ineffective. The 
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tactic is called ‘kettling’, which so easily turns a legitimate protest into a 
‘violent disorder.’ 
 
Though kettling may at first seem a tactic of ‘total policing’, it is in fact a 
more complex spatial strategy. To get closer to an understanding of 
kettling we need to unpick its political logic in relation to discipline and 
neoliberalism. I shall argue that kettling aims to achieve two seemingly 
relational results: to discipline and incite the crowd in order to produce 
‘good’ social effects by agents of neoliberal governance, and displace 
dissent and resistance in order to defuse the fear of the event. 
 
Firstly, kettling aims to discipline the crowd in a specific site. Police officers 
with batons, sniffer dogs and riot shields block the protesters into a specific 
area for hours. Thus kettling aims to organise what Steve Herbert (2007: 
601) has called the “protest zoning state”; where “the expression of 
dissent…is controlled with a territorial strategy - it is banned from some 
areas and confined to others.” The protesters are held in tightly confined 
spaces without time limit and thus become the subject of police brutality at 
its most devious: anybody can be crushed by horse, or hit with batons to 
the head. Legitimising police violence, kettling is designed to limit the 
disruption in the interests of ‘public safety.’ Punishing protesters without 
charge or trial, kettling is, in short, designed to silence the crowd in the 
interest of ‘public security.’ If the first aim of kettling concerns the specific 
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day where the protest takes place, the long run aim is to dissuade 
protesters from demonstrating in the future. 
 
Aiming to discipline the crowd, kettling also attempts to incite the crowd. 
By seeing and treating the protesters as adversaries, the police aims to 
produce violent reactions from them. By creating difficult and unpleasant 
conditions (sub-zero or warm temperatures without food, water, toilets, or 
freedom of movement) and by preventing people from leaving the 
demonstration, the police aims to provoke the crowd into action. The 
containment process can last until protesters lose their moral energy. It 
makes people feel utterly helpless, hopeless, and ‘discharge’ their anger 
until it overflows into acts of criminal damage. Schoolchildren, or university 
students, for instance, join the protest to defend their right to protest, but 
what they learn from kettling is nothing other than fear: fear of missing 
lessons and lectures, fear of missing their train back to colleges, 
universities, and most importantly, fear of being caught up in a ‘peaceful 
protest.’ Even living in fear of being arrested by the police has all sorts of 
negative effects; it puts the relief of your fear and anger in the hands of the 
‘managers of the event.’ After all, managers of the event know very well 
that fear and political anger can be easily turned into violence, seeking 
action above and beyond words. Thus, what appears to be targeted is the 
possibility of a violent act to the police. The logic which underwrites this is 
rather simple: by provoking the crowd, violence is inflamed by kettling 
itself. The exercise of kettling is therefore incitatory in that it creates the 
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threat in order to deal with the threat. In colonizing the imaginary of the 
protester, kettling strives to make this imaginary real. Thus the crowd is 
addressed affectively as it is rendered controllable and manageable for the 
stable unity of the order. What is at work here is a mutation of 
discipline/neoliberal governance in which the affective subject of ‘action’ is 
rendered governable and manageable. As a classificatory disciplinary 
technology, kettling, therefore, “makes up people” (Hacking, 1995). 
 
A crucial ideological operation of kettling in this respect is its repression or 
the moral castigation of all radicalism as ‘bad’ or ‘violent.’ This strategy is 
based on the assumption that the protesters can be divided into two basic 
categories: ‘peaceful’ legitimate protesters and violent illegitimate 
‘anarchists’, which include radical student groups, left wing groups, and 
initiatives like UK Uncut. At this stage, the media play a central role in 
shaping ‘public opinion.’ ‘Anarchists’ are frequently labelled as ‘violent 
minority’ and ‘anti-capitalists’ by the sympathetic media. Thus they must 
be separated and marginalised from the crowd, for kettling builds upon the 
distinction between an inside and an outside. Inside the kettle, order 
reigns. Outside the kettle, disorder lurks around the corner. Managing 
disorder, the main aim is take robust action against aggressive ‘trouble-
makers’ and deal with them as quickly as possible. What becomes vital, 
therefore, is anticipating the ‘crowd-effect’ to be created in the context of 
the demonstration as a whole. Discipline and the knowledge of the crowd 
must be total so that ‘a becoming of the crowd’ can be controlled. Put 
183 
 
differently, kettling aims to preempt or prevent ‘dangerous multitudes’ 
forming. 
 
This brings us to the main point in the logic of kettling: to normalise ‘social 
struggles’ by disorienting and demoralising the masses. The goal of kettling 
is to care for a ‘liberal life’ by neutralising threats to that life through some 
form of intervention: it is a fight to ‘hit’ the target before it takes actual 
shape. Kettling, therefore, holds together as a response to an ‘urgent 
threat’: how to govern events in a world where neoliberalism is perpetually 
on the verge of collapse. To put it even more succinctly: kettling is 
introduced to protect the neoliberal order against the fear of potentially 
disruptive events. The exercise of kettling is being done in a way that 
makes ‘total policing’ more confrontational or more political. In kettling, 
therefore, the ‘politicisation’ of the police proceeds in parallel with the 
‘militarisation’ of the police. For the police, or total policing, even a 
peaceful protest is treated as a problem to be kettled, predetermining the 
political outcomes. Protest is, in other words, prevented from explaining its 
184 
 
purpose to the public. The TUC march on Wednesday 30 November 2011 in 
London, where more than two million public sector workers staged a 
nationwide strike, is a case in point. The march was subject to 
extraordinary police control and restriction, including the erection of a 
preemptive “ring of steel.”11 In this sense kettling functions as a 
preemptive strategy that aims to empty out the emancipatory core of 
demonstration in advance: anything potentially dangerous must be 
excluded. Since demonstration is seen as an ‘inconsistent’ element within 
the existing neoliberal order, kettling must prevent its massification. Thus 
the crowd must be continuously kettled so that their demands cannot 
reach the public, but rather remain regulated and controlled in its own 
particularity. 
 
In short, kettling is the materialisation of neoliberal security practices of 
the state. If the state of exception is an instance of neoliberalism, kettling is 
an instance of the state of exception. In neoliberalism, certain social 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 Note that this was erected on a trade union strike! Coaffee et al. (2009: 26-7) argue that 
the term ‘ring of steel’ was first used in 1976 “to refer to the amalgamation of the four 
individual security zones around Belfast city centre into one large security sector ringed 
between 10-12 foot high, steel gates.” 
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practices are normalised and legitimised (kettling, police brutality), while 
practices which disrupt the existing order are criminalised. This is why 
kettling protesters, used extensively during the G20 protests in London in 
2009, was upheld as lawful in the Court of Appeal. The European Court of 
Human Rights also ruled on 15 March 2012 that kettling was the ‘least 
intrusive and most effective’ tactic available to the police. These rulings 
show that the exercise of kettling is ideological in that it defends not only 
the legal and juridical, but also the moral and symbolic forms of 
neoliberalism. It is another way of suppressing political differences. It is 
another way of sustaining a liberal way of life. 
 
Neoliberalism is always haunted by the knowledge that it is underwritten 
by the event. After all, it knows that history is replete with events, 
revolutions to come. By targeting the affectivity of the individual, 
neoliberalism is, in short, animated by fear and danger. It aims to be purely 
preemptive. After all, every new tactic of power is simply the outcome of a 
particular power struggle. Its inscription always follows the management of 
the event. When the UK Court of Appeal ruled on 19 January 2012 that 
kettling was lawful, it meant that neoliberal capitalist states would be more 
efficient and effective in response to the contingency of the crisis event 
than they now are. The war on terror, for instance, has made presidents 
and their men, including CIA torturers to remote drone pilots, into ‘political 
actors’ who aren’t interested in law-based governance but instead 
improvise against the event (disorder) and the courts that would severely 
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limit their abilities. After all, laws cannot be politically neutral. Whatever 
the jurisdiction, they are enacted in a highly tactical way in response to the 
fear of potential events. Thus the effective normalisation of a neoliberal 
politics of fear and violence should be seen as a far more sinister attack on 
social movements than an attempt to improve the natural foundation of 
‘civilised’ contemporary society. Liberalism is not to be confused with the 
juridical problem of order. More than that, it is a form of governmentality 
that operates through complex and overlapping historical social regimes. 
But if there is one defining singularity to its global strategy of pacification, 
then it is the biopolitics of fear itself. Today, more than ever before, the 
politics of fear resides in contemporary society and is woven into the 
quotidian spaces and circulations of everyday life. It operates within a 
global imaginary of the event. It establishes the overwhelming fear of 
revolution as the driving force of general culture. 
 
Each regime (and each legal tactic) of neoliberalism responds to the event, 
just as every law (and every decision) responds to revolution. Not only do 
law (the state of exception) and scare disciplinary techniques (kettling) 
permit the reworking of the boundaries of neoliberal existence, but the 
fluctuating shift from sovereignty to disciplinary normalisation and 
biopolitical security/fear governance defines the neoliberal encounter. In 
other words, kettling is intimately bound to the neoliberal politics of fear, 
just as fear is intimately bound to the active production of political 
subjectivities. Both set out who we are as people, what we are fighting 
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against (the event, revolution), and define what we are to become 
(neoliberal subjects as homo economicus). Since what is dangerous today 
(the event) is seen as productive to the very life processes that sustain 
neoliberalism, the biopolitics of fear is directly related to the vitality of 
existence on which the neoliberal order depends. As a consequence, it is 
the event that appears to become the generative source of neoliberalism. 
It declares the contingency of revolution to be the problem to be solved. 
 
As an instance of the state of exception, kettling is a spatial imprint of 
discipline, a neoliberal order which can face ‘terminal decline.’ As the 
threat continues, however, it becomes increasingly violent. When a weak 
system is threatened and thus “legitimized by fear”, it “is virtually fit to 
become terroristic” (Badiou, 2008: 13). Given that neoliberalism’s struggle 
for survival knows no boundaries, it is safe to say that it would fight tooth 
and nail to stop or derail that defeat. In short, this will be a permanent 
struggle to delay catastrophe. But let’s not assume that liberalism’s 
permanent war completely forecloses the possibility of resistance and 
change. As Deleuze (1995: 178) writes: “There’s no need to fear or hope, 
but only to look for new weapons.” 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Understanding Neoliberal Control 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter explored the functioning of disciplinary regime in 
contemporary society. Taking Foucault’s analysis as its point of departure, 
it showed that discipline goes hand in hand with the birth of neoliberal 
governmentality, whose mission is to pacify life to make life live. We found 
also that the (re)productive mobilisation of the biopolitics of fear is central 
to neoliberal governmentality, for it is the fear of the event that defines 
neoliberalism’s legitimacy. 
 
This chapter proposes to rethink Deleuze’s framework about “the society 
of control.” Deleuze proposes a new phase of power that allows us to 
examine how the Foucauldian disciplinary regime has been reorganised 
into our present social state. Within this new system of governance a new 
field of power and domination emerges, which operates through localised 
and decentred points. With Deleuze, therefore, one might speak of a 
generalised form of ‘neoliberal control’ which does not destroy, but rather 
sustains and regulates life in its productive new capacities. It constitutes a 
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governance of free-floating control that works in conjunction with 
disciplinary panopticism. Moreover, neoliberal control is a mode of 
governance which is made possible through the expansion of the market, 
and the shift from industrial to post-industrial modes of production. In this 
sense control is a social regime in which the truth of neoliberal capitalism is 
produced. Furthermore, the chapter discusses cynicism as the main affect 
that pertains to neoliberal capitalism, arguing that cynicism reinforces and 
(re)produces ‘dividuals’ motivated by self-interest. Then a new form of 
contemporary biopolitics is introduced through the conception of 
‘preemptive indifference’, which attempts to prevent potential events from 
occurring. And it is toward these Deleuzean considerations for a 
governmental approach to neoliberal capitalism that I now turn. 
 
5.2 Neoliberal Control 
 
“Ceaseless control in open sites.” (Deleuze, 1995: 175) 
 
 
The axiom underlying the disciplinary regime is that circumstances make 
the subject. Disciplinary panopticism and the formation of ‘docile bodies’ is 
based on the subject as a source of knowledge, where the disciplinary sites 
of enclosure both individualise and normalise identities appropriate to that 
enclosure. “There are two images…of discipline”, Foucault (1977: 209) 
writes. The first one is that of “the enclosed institution, established on the 
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edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions” (ibid. 209). 
The other image is that of Panopticism which improves “the exercise of 
power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective” (ibid.). It is the 
latter image of discipline that enables Deleuze to develop his notion of “the 
society of control.” With the emergence of a neoliberal control society, 
there is a movement from the strictly ordered spaces of enclosure - 
hospital, prison, military barracks, factory, school - to a more general 
dynamic model in which human beings are regulated through digital 
networks that facilitate free-floating surveillance (see Deleuze, 1995: 178). 
This, however, does not mean that we have left behind disciplinary 
panoptic. Rather, it is built more firmly into the “axiomatic” and socialised 
model of activity that operates according to the logics of circulation, “the 
perpetuum mobile of circulation” (Marx, 1976: 71). Neoliberal control is 
digital; it operates through codes and passports. Individuals are thus 
replaced with fluid and endlessly “divisible”, fractal, digital “dividuals”, and 
“masses become samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze, 1995: 180). 
 
While Foucault introduced discipline (and biopolitics) as an analytics of 
power that emerged with, and continues to accompany, liberal modernity, 
Deleuze (1995) argues that the society of control is concerned with the 
transformation of life into value, in the form of commodity and capital, 
which is directly related to digital computing technology. The society of 
control is concentrated on the management of life and production rather 
than confinement, as is the case in disciplinary panoptic. In this sense the 
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transition from the disciplinary to neoliberal control society marks a 
fundamental change in the way the physical production is managed and 
controlled. Deleuze (1995: 180) consistently argues that “this technological 
development is more deeply rooted in a mutation of capitalism.” He 
carefully points out that the transition from discipline to control is 
organised and governed with the major changes in capitalism that some 
others have noted: the transition from classical liberalism to neoliberalism; 
from welfare state to the neoliberal state; from Fordism to post-Fordism 
and “flexible accumulation” (Harvey, 1990); from disciplinary panopticism - 
in which workers are required to obey - to the capitalist free-market - in 
which workers become adaptable, flexible and “entrepreneurial” (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005: 108-121); and from the formal to the real 
subsumption of labour under capital (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 254-256). 
 
Neoliberal capitalism operates through “continuous control and instant 
communication” (Deleuze 1995: 174) through the market. It is about 
modelling all social relations on market relations, even when the particular 
relations in question have not actually been commodified. Neoliberal 
control is thus about modelling all social relations that are still viewed as 
outside the market according to market rationalities. Indeed, neoliberal 
capitalism is based on the continuous process of production; it is a system 
of “production for production’s sake” (Marx, 1976: 742), which makes it 
possible to overcome limits and barriers. It is in this context that one could 
identify two important characteristics of the capitalist socius. First, 
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neoliberal control is a continuous process of deterritorialised flows 
(decoding). Second, and relatedly, the circulation of capital has no 
necessary external limit; its only barrier is capital itself. Since capital has 
the ability to constantly renew itself, it undergoes mutations, adjusting its 
mechanisms to the logic of the neoliberal market in which it is exercised. 
Capital becomes the new “body without organs” of the social from which 
everything else emanates. 
 
Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 261) argue that capitalism “has 
realized immanence” in the “flows on the full body of capital-money.” 
Hence they rejoin Marx in their analysis of capitalism as an immanent 
system that constantly modifies itself. As Marx and Engels (1973: 36-7) 
write in The Communist Manifesto, referring to the ‘immanent barriers’ to 
capitalist development: 
 
“Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with 
their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept 
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All 
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober faces his real conditions of life and his 
relations with his kind.” 
 
What Deleuze and Guattari are particularly concerned with Marx is his 
analysis on the system of credit in capitalism in Capital Volume III. 
Capitalism is for Deleuze an immanent system that continually overcomes 
barriers and limitations. Whenever a new market is opened up, it becomes 
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assimilated into the capitalist system itself. Furthermore, as an immanent 
system neoliberal capitalism values ‘equality’ in so far as all things are 
turned into a commodity. In other words, equality makes sense only if 
everything can be bought and sold on the open market. Capitalism is an 
immanent system because the operation of its monetary system is 
“axiomatic” in the sense that flexible decoded flows make no reference to 
value. Thus they are an additive characteristic of neoliberalism facilitated 
by technology. Deleuze and Guattari present three aspects of capitalism’s 
axiomatic: its operationality, its flexibility and its multiple realisability. First, 
the capitalist axiomatic is purely operational (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 57). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1983: 248) argue that “money as a general 
equivalent” signifies an “abstract quantity” that generates indifference to 
flows. Money, in other words, has no truth value. But the equivalence of 
money itself marks a position of relation that has no necessary external 
limit. Second, capitalism’s axiomatics is always flexible (ibid. 248; see also 
Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 57). Money as an abstract quantity cannot be 
separated from the destruction of all codes that would become concrete. 
Consisting of abstract quantities and entities, neoliberal capitalism does 
not operate according to rules of codes. It differs from previous regimes by 
its capacity to function directly by decoded flows without the insertion of 
fixed points or rules of codes. The capitalist axiomatic is therefore not a 
closed totality. Rather it is independent of the values of buyer and the 
seller, establishing relations and decoded and flexible flows that are 
unrelated. Third, as a result of its operationality and flexibility, the 
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capitalist axiomatic is also multiply realisable that “deals directly with 
purely functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, and 
which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 454). Since the current capitalist model is 
neoliberal, the attempts to privatise all public assets that are seen as 
outside the market (e.g. the university, the healthcare system and so on) 
demonstrate how neoliberalism attempts to restrict the multiple 
realisability of capitalism to a single model (Bonta and Protevi, 2004: 58). 
Simply put, the axiomatic method is the key for legitimizing neoliberal 
control, which is thus identified with the capitalist regime of accumulation. 
Neoliberal capitalism is a hegemonic ideology, presiding over an 
accumulation regime. Human consciousness, leisure, play, and so on, are 
all directly covered by this regime of accumulation. The immanent 
axiomatics of neoliberal capitalism as a regime of accumulation must be 
understood as a system of money and credit, which opens up a new space 
where the entire capitalist production and circulation of commodities is 
regulated by specific financial institutions such as banks, creating a flow of 
credit-debt. Consequently, the flow of credit-debt remains infinite, but it is 
no longer a debt owed to the sovereign. 
 
The result of the capitalist axiomatic is what Deleuze and Guattari call 
“deterritorialisation”; a process in which identities, institutions, bodies and 
labour-power are destabilised and integrated into global circuits of 
neoliberal capitalism. In this new regime, the productive labour power has 
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expanded to cover all spheres of society and life such as human DNA, credit 
card histories, lifestyles etc. - in short - all aspects of life itself that have 
become commodified outside of the old-fashioned labour process under 
neoliberalism. With neoliberalism, capitalist production is no longer limited 
to the factories or offices, and as ‘dividuals’, human beings selling their 
labour power are no longer necessarily how capitalism gets a hold of the 
products of their labour power. Therefore, the entire raison d’être of 
neoliberal capitalism is that it requires a concomitant transformation of 
labour-power and value, enabling the maximisation of the body’s capacity 
of labour-power. For biopolitical control is now inscribed in the habits and 
vital practices of bodies. In the capitalist mode of production, labour-power 
“does not exist apart from” the worker because his “specific productive 
activity…is his vitality itself” (Marx, 1973: 267). If the specific productive 
activity of the worker is the vitality itself, then neoliberal control (and thus 
neoliberal biopolitics) must first of all grasp the importance of labour 
power. 
 
Since, with capitalism, economy no longer depends on slavery but on ‘free’ 
deterritorialised subject, the nature of labour is also transformed. As Marx 
(ibid. 267) put it, labour-power “is the use-value which the worker has to 
offer to the capitalist, which he has to offer to others in general, is not 
materialized in a product, does not exist apart from him at all, thus exists 
not really, but only in potentiality, as his capacity.” In other words, the 
continuous and unstable process of adaptation as labour power, according 
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to Marx, is sheer “potentiality.” However, capitalist biopolitics is not simply 
the management of labour power. Rather, as Virno (2004: 84) 
demonstrates, it “is merely an effect, a reverberation, or, in fact, one 
articulation of that primary fact…which consists of the commerce of 
potential as potential.” That is to say, neoliberal biopolitics is nothing other 
than the commerce of labour power, and it exists wherever that potential 
does appear. This potentiality refers to “all the different faculties” 
(speaking, producing etc.) and potentialities of human beings. And “where 
something which exists only as possibility is sold”, argues Virno (ibid. 82), 
“this something is not separable from the living person of the seller.” In 
contrast, “the living body of the worker is the substratum of that labor-
power which, in itself, has no independent existence.” Life as “pure and 
simple bios”, Virno (ibid.) continues, “acquires a specific importance in as 
much as it is the tabernacle of dynamis, of mere potential.” 
 
Marx had already acknowledged the unique role of ‘species-being’ of 
human labour and the way in which capital was in the process of being 
realised as species being. Similarly, Foucault argued that biopolitics 
configures the population as ‘species-being.’ With neoliberal capitalism, or 
bios, the body becomes the object of biopolitics as mere potentiality, a 
commodity, which obtains an empirical manifestation or mode of labour-
power, which has the capacity of self-actualisation (see Kordela, 2011). The 
object of neoliberal capitalism is, therefore, life as an immanent quality, 
that is, the potentiality of being to actualise itself, which provides 
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neoliberal biopolitics with an open horizon of temporal possibility in the 
form of “labour-power…as a capacity of the living individual” (Marx, 1976: 
274). Life is now widely interpreted by neoliberal biopolitics (and thus 
modern security politics) as a radically contingent force, an open 
historicity, which takes infinite becomings of finite beings, or ‘events’ as its 
focus of inquiry. Put differently, the body’s creative capacity is what makes 
‘the event’ possible because it is where creative potentialities take place, 
especially in relation to every living form’s independence with other 
existing forms. The body produces the event because it is composed of 
infinite possibilities for new emergent forms of actualisations. 
 
To say that with labour power, or bios the body becomes an immanent 
quality, a sheer potentiality of being to actualise itself, is tantamount to 
saying that bodies are now conceived as ‘eternal’ bodies - the species of 
eternity - and thereby secularising the ‘eschaton’ of time as a metaphysical 
category that can be bought and sold from every angle in the market. With 
the secularised eschaton, the subject’s relation to eternity becomes the 
object of neoliberal biopolitics, which aims to provide only secured and 
controlled illusions thereof. In this way infinity enters the historical realm 
of neoliberal capitalism under the name of the market in which “one never 
finishes anything” (Deleuze, 1995: 179). Social control is no longer left to 
ideological state apparatuses such as schools, police forces and the army, 
but is now a branch of marketing, as even “elections themselves are 
conceived along the lines of buying a commodity (power, in this case): they 
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involve a competition between different merchandise-parties, and our 
votes are like money which buys the government we want” (Žižek, 2008b: 
284). Thus contemporary society is a neoliberal control society in which all 
social relations are commodified; it is about modelling all sociality 
according to the logic of businesses. Neoliberal control initiates an “endless 
postponement” in the mundane realm of the capitalist market that is never 
complete (see Deleuze, 1995: 179). With the biopolitical production of 
infinity, “don’t make money, be money” becomes the capitalist dictum, a 
weightless, infinitely circulating, immortal idea. The biopolitical production 
of infinity through market exchange means that the potentialities of life 
itself become subject to the pernicious logics of capitalist accumulation. 
 
All of this brings us to surplus-enjoyment, a concept that lies at the heart of 
neoliberal capitalism. With neoliberal control, the extended regime of 
capitalist accumulation is coterminous with the constant availability of all 
social relations that create surplus-value. Indeed, surplus-enjoyment is the 
main target of neoliberal capitalism because it is where the exchange-value 
and the subject’s relation to infinity coincide. Enjoyment occurs only in the 
surplus; it “is constitutively an excess” because subtracting the surplus in 
enjoyment means losing “enjoyment itself” (Žižek, 1989: 52). Human 
beings usually seek to satisfy life by satisfying the needs of human life. But 
more importantly, this results from our desire for life. As Aristotle (1992: 
84) argues, human beings “are eager for life but not for the good life; so 
desire for life being unlimited, they desire also an unlimited amount of 
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what enables it to go on.” By misunderstanding the “unlimited desire for 
life” with what good things that make life worth living, we are forced to 
believe that we need an unlimited amount of goods, services, or unlimited 
wealth, to satisfy the unlimited human wants. Turning morality and value 
into a source of enjoyment, the unlimited desire for life thus comes to be 
actualised in “excess.” While aiming at good life, human beings act and 
communicate in the pursuit of enjoyment; what they seek is nothing other 
than enjoyment. For, Aristotle (1992: 85; see also Kordela, 2011: 18) goes 
on to suggest, “where enjoyment consists in excess, men look for that skill 
which produces the excess that is enjoyed.” Consequently, this excess or 
enjoyment is never fully achieved in itself; instead what we get here is a 
distinct mode of enjoyment, a “surplus enjoyment” (see Zupančič, 2003: 
47). ‘Shopping’ is a case in point. Shopping goes on ceaselessly precisely 
because “surplus-enjoyment enables infinity to conquer lived life in the act 
of shopping - a central biopolitical frustration machine that sustains (the 
illusion of) immortality” (Kordela, 2011: 19). Shopping must continue for 
the excess of enjoyment of the ‘dividual’ who really benefits from the cynic 
participation in the market. 
 
In neoliberal capitalism, enjoyment and (the illusion of) immortality do not 
require belief in order to function. On the contrary, enjoyment and 
immortality operate through perpetually infinite mechanisms of surplus-
enjoyment predicated on the figure of homo economicus. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, if the figure of homo economicus is a “man without a 
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past or a history”, then the key to a metaphysical grasp of surplus-
enjoyment and immortality is self-interest. Indeed, self-interest is not 
empirical, utilitarian or pragmatic, but metaphysical. And it is here, in that 
secular eschaton, that neoliberal control coincides with its affective 
subjectivity of the ‘dividual’ ‘motivated only by self-interest.’ In other 
words, a cynical dividual of ‘I know I am motivated by neoliberal capitalism-
induced self-interest but I still obey’ is indispensable for the analysis of 
neoliberal control to advance. Thus, what is distinctive about the form of 
cynicism characteristic of and necessary for neoliberal control is that it 
legitimises and ultimately (re)produces ‘dividuals’ based on market defined 
self-interest(s). In what follows I argue that the cynical dividual is able to 
participate within neoliberal capitalism without internally accepting its 
truth value. Put simply, an understanding of neoliberal control is sustained 
exactly through the allowance of cynical disagreement (‘I am motivated by 
self-interest but I still obey’) premised on the perceived (in)ability to 
change the existing social order. 
 
5.3 Neoliberal Capitalism and Cynicism 
 
“From something he clings to something he has come to see through; but 
he calls it ‘faithfulness’.” (Nietzsche, 2001: 145). 
 
 
As argued above, the logic of operation of neoliberal capitalism is axiomatic 
in the sense that it does not create any code; neoliberal capitalism does 
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not require belief in order to function. Hence, it is characterised by “the 
age of cynicism” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 225; see also Žižek, 1989). 
However, it should be emphasised that more than one affect may coexist 
within neoliberal control. The reason why cynicism should be considered as 
the main affect of neoliberal capitalism is that it invites us to pay attention 
to how neoliberal capitalism relies not only on the carrot, but the stick as 
well (Glaser, 2012: 15). Cynicism is a crucial concept for the examination of 
the affective politics of neoliberal control. However, in neoliberal 
capitalism cynicism is accompanied by a “strange”, false piety (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983: 225) in the sense that it is a structural effect of neoliberal 
capitalism in which dividuals are “ruled by abstractions” of money and 
labour rather than other individuals, as in the case of despotism (Read, 
2008: 147). Due to its cynical modus operandi, the essence of capital is 
indifferent to the intentions of its rulers. The fundamental characteristic of 
capital is not simply the difference between being ruled by abstractions of 
market-defined self-interest(s), but that “being ruled by abstractions” 
produces its own particular form of subjectivity, namely the cynical dividual 
(ibid. 147). Subjectivity is, in other words, inseparable from the mode of 
production that makes it possible. At this point, Žižek’s psychoanalytic 
interpretation of fantasy I find especially telling because it helps us 
understand how cynicism reinforces neoliberal capitalism. 
 
In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek (1989) argues that jouissance plays 
an important role for the hegemony. To be sure, jouissance “always 
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emerges within a certain phantasmatic field”, as Žižek (1997: 48) writes, 
and “the crucial precondition for breaking the chains of servitude is thus to 
‘traverse the fantasy’ which structures our jouissance in a way which keeps 
us attached to the Master - makes use accept the framework of the social 
relationship of domination.” For Žižek, what psychoanalysis can do to help 
is precisely to clarify how the dominant understandings are indeed 
sustained through the surplus-enjoyment individuals gain from the 
hegemonic world-view. Just as neoliberal capitalism is characterised by 
atomism and individualism, fantasy is individualistic by nature. The law, on 
the other hand, is constructed against the particularity of the fantasy, for it 
regulates individuality and sets collective limits on individual desires. The 
law is the set of rules, mandates, and norms that creates collective limits 
for individual desire, while fantasy is borne out of respect for the law and 
yet, at the same time, necessitates a law to be transgressed. 
 
This ‘tension’ between fantasy and the law is crucial for a proper 
understanding of cynicism. It is the continued transgression of the law that 
ensures the continued obedience of the subject. Since transgression 
becomes a norm, a rule, it ends up affirming the principles of law. This 
contradiction is what Žižek, recalling a long line of Freudian and Marxist 
analysis, calls the “fetishist disavowal.” Here, the subject recognises the 
absurdity of failures of the existing system yet nonetheless continues to 
partake in perpetually infinite mechanisms of that absurd system. In other 
words, it is the perspective of the obedient cynical dividual, who justifies its 
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submissive attitude by internally declaring “I know that I am governed by 
market-defined self-interest(s), but still, I am doing it.’ Such an attitude is 
based on a deep ideological commitment to the necessity of a given order 
and thus serving as its positive condition of possibility of its effective 
functioning. 
 
It is this awareness of the distance “between the ideological mask and the 
social reality” that explains the actions of the cynic (Žižek, 1989: 29-30). 
Even at her most frustrated moments, the cynical dividual remains 
committed to the necessity of the law, of the socio-symbolic order. In this 
way the subject transgresses the law yet subservient to the hegemony, and 
thus reflecting the affective role of the fetishist disavowal for reproducing 
the existing power relations/configurations. The cynical dividual is able to 
gain the enjoyment of transgressing the law without engaging in the ‘Real’ 
of social conflict and antagonism. When the cynical dividual says ‘I know 
that I am ruled by abstractions of money and labour , but still, I am doing it’ 
what s/he is articulating is the surplus-enjoyment gained through the 
fetishist disavowal, the calculated distance s/he retains to the actual 
reality, to the set of ideological relations commanding its actions. 
 
Crucially, therefore, this hegemonic strategy prevents cynical dividuals 
from demanding or even imagining radical social change, that is, disruptive 
(‘revolutionary’) events. In this sense cynicism is the relief from 
responsibility because it provides dividuals to accept the hegemonic power 
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of neoliberal capitalism even in disagreement yet still comfortably acting as 
they please. As a result, to radically question hegemonic configurations of 
power becomes impossible, for it is conceived as a challenge to the entire 
structures of society. Cynicism enables the disenchanted dividual to show 
internal dissent without confronting the neoliberal hegemony as 
spectacular gestalt totality. 
 
Cynicism is internal dissent at its purest, relieving the subject from the 
obligation of revolutionary act. It is a rational consent to the absurdity of 
failures of the existing order. If law, in the Lacanian sense, is irrational, then 
“it follows from this continuously senseless character of the Law, that we 
must obey it not because it is just, good or even beneficial, but simply 
because it is the law” (Žižek, 1989: 37). For this reason, cynicism is stronger 
than the ideological compliance that is based on an unconscious belief. For 
it differs from unconscious belief in that it requires a self-conscious 
submission to the irrational symbolic order, or authority. “The only real 
obedience”, Žižek notes, “is an ‘external’ one: obedience out of conviction 
is not real obedience because it is already ‘mediated’ through our 
subjectivity.” That is to say, “we are not really obeying the authority”, Žižek 
maintains, “but simply following our judgement, which tells us that the 
authority deserves to be obeyed in so far as it is good, wise, beneficent” 
(ibid. 37). 
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The cynical dividual expresses a more complete acceptance of the 
neoliberal framework, and thereby demonstrates ‘real obedience’, the 
belief and desire that are necessary for the capitalist mode of production. 
Cynicism is an assertion and consolidation of power, capable of cancelling 
out social solidarity and collective human action. It claims the force of 
‘special loyalty’ to the existing order. And when special loyalty, real 
obedience is to be dealt with, other considerations must be put aside. The 
cynic’s real obedience comes not out of belief or a rational acceptance of 
its mandates, but out of duty and fidelity to the need for power as such. 
Paradoxically, therefore, the cynic’s real obedience relies on not believing 
but disbelieving. Rationally accepting the irrational order, the disbelieving 
fetishist cynics “are not dreamers lost in their private worlds, they are 
thoroughly realists able to accept the things the way they actually are” 
(Žižek, 2001: 14). It is in pragmatic realism of the cynical dividual that 
fantasies remain at their most effective, for pragmatic realism makes the 
subject cling even more tightly to hegemonic ideology. However, if the 
ruling ideology seems to be taken seriously, pragmatic realism can 
disintegrate. This is because the rationalisation of an ideology as a fantasy 
paves the way for radically questioning its legitimacy. The cynic registers 
not only her obedience but also her complicity in upholding the system. 
And to be complicit is to become bound up in crimes committed by the 
existing regime in everyday lives. The ruling ideology (and the law) is not an 
object of belief but a clear means to the end where the subject is aware of 
his own complicity and continues to act accordingly. It is for this reason 
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that neoliberal capitalism is at its strongest when it contributes to the rise 
of depoliticising conditions in which passive or cynical compliance becomes 
habitual and self-enforcing. Cynicism is, in short, the perceived inability to 
positively confront hegemonic power. This mode of regulation and thinking 
is by no means apolitical. Instead, it is political: the cynic’s principal 
concern is individual survival and the avoidance of conflict. 
 
Central to cynicism, then, is individual consent that is motivated by self-
interest. The reduction of the subject to market-defined self-interest(s) is 
precisely an example of how human beings become cynical dividuals. And 
economic crisis is not an exception to cynic’s surplus-enjoyment. Even in 
times of crisis, capital increases its own power and ultimately reproduces 
cynical dividuals burdened by credit cards. This is why consuming should be 
seen as an extension of surplus or the regime of indebtedness. By 
consuming during times of crisis, the cynical conformist enters the infinite 
diachronic temporality of surplus and debt. From a biopolitical perspective, 
the cynical dividual is one in whom certain amounts of capital will flow 
through her, extending the regime of indebtedness. And it is this that I shall 
turn to next. 
 
5.4 Debt as a Mode of Governance 
 
“A Man is no longer a man confined, but a man in debt.” (Deleuze, 1995: 
181) 
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Neoliberal capitalism has ‘biopolitical’ control over life. Hence Deleuze’s 
above statement in his text on the societies of control, where the regime of 
indebtedness is as much about biopolitical control as it is an extension of 
capital. In primitive society, debt is charged through the primitive inscrip-
tion, or coding, on the body. Blood-revenge and cruelty address a non-
exchangist power. In the despotic society, all debts become infinite debts 
to the divine ruler. In capitalism, all debts finally break free from the sover-
eign and become infinite by conjoining flows. With capitalism, debt is con-
tinuous and without limit: student debt, credit card debt, mortgage debt, 
medical debt. What is distinctive about neoliberalism is the privatisation of 
public goods and services which has become an integral part of ‘debt 
governance’ in contemporary post-political society. Whereas in the primit-
ive system debt is incurred through inscription and, in despotism, exercised 
by divine law, in capitalism “the market-eye keeps a watch over 
everything” (Dienst, 2011: 124-5). With neoliberal capitalism, the market-
eye becomes the new normal that constitutes a biopolitical control around 
a weightless, infinitely circulating, immortal debt. We now live in the era of 
debt in which it is the soul of the individual that is imprisoned. 
 
In neoliberal capitalism, the innovation of the market coincides with the di-
vidual that owes nothing except to itself. We should, however, stress that 
this self-interested dividual is also one indebted to others. In contemporary 
society, the subject is literally locked into a regime of indebtedness whose 
belonging is infused with insecurity and isolation (see Read, 2012). For a 
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better grasp of what is at stake in the politics of debt, we must therefore 
see debt as a mode of governance, which predetermines political out-
comes. Debt is a mode of governance, a future acting, restricting and cur-
tailing human imagination. Debt defies a collective response precisely 
because it is seen less as a regime problem, as part of a capitalist free-
market ideology, than as an individual fate. 
 
Student debt is a case in point. As students take on loans in order to fund 
their studies, their future changes form. Debt transforms the educational 
experience of students, producing desperate individuals who try to match 
their actions to the laws of the market, rather than radically question their 
place within society (Read, 2012). As an exceptionally punishing kind, debt 
prevents students from engaging in politics that makes them think creat-
ively and critically about society, and ask questions. As such, it has a pro-
found disciplining effect on them, taylorizing their studies and undermining 
the sociality and politicisation that has traditionally been one of the main 
benefits of college and university life (Caffentzis, 2011: 32). With the inter-
nalisation of debt, politics and critical thinking are transformed into a 
monetary relation and the subject’s individuality and morality become 
parts of the market by emptying public life of moral argument. Thus, to 
quote Marx (1844), “instead of money, or paper, it is one’s own personal 
existence, flesh and blood, social virtue and importance, which constitutes 
the material, corporeal form of the spirit of money.” 
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More importantly, student debt produces what Paul Mason (2012) calls 
“the graduate without a future.”12 As individual carriers of unpayable debt, 
students are simply facing a future without a future because it “has disap-
peared, shielded by a wall of debt” (Armstrong, 2011: 4). Further, carrying 
so much debt on their shoulders, they are forced to accept insecure, part-
time, temporary, casual, intern, flexible, project-based, contingent and 
adjunct positions, and are thus becoming a source of cheap, instructional 
labour.  
 
Viewed in this way, debt perpetuates a subjectivity of desperation whose 
morality and individuality become enslaved by money. The subject of debt 
is a new figure of homo economicus as a grid of intelligibility that is 
trapped in isolation and insecurity. With debt, therefore, there is only an 
isolated and fragmented dividual who cannot show a collective response. 
To put it bluntly, “debt is a collective phenomenon suffered individually” 
(Armstrong, 2011: 5). The subject of debt is one that must be left on its 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 “The graduate without a future” refers to an indebted student who is “part of a wider 
precariat, poorer and with less life chances than previous generations. The affluence and 
welfare state that benefited cohorts post-1945 is being replaced by unemployment and 
the reduction and marketisation of public services” (Martell, 2011). 
210 
 
own. It is told to blame itself, rather than look to the economic and social 
conditions that have driven individuals into deeper and more unsustainable 
debt. Enslaved by its own isolation and anxiety, the subject of debt is 
rendered governable, just as neoliberalism is the ‘the art of governing’, 
dealing with competing interests. In this context, debt expresses a biopolit-
ical control that aims to defuse the idea of radical structural change. Debt 
should be understood as a mode of neoliberal governance that keeps 
people off the streets, preventing them from protesting. Underemployed 
and broke, the subject of debt is an atomized but networked dividual 
whose lack of collective response is presented as a kind of autonomy and 
liberation. All that remains is, therefore, individual responsibility, which is 
often branded as ‘freedom.’ 
 
Saddled with massive debt, the subject of debt cannot act, resist. Unable to 
collectivise struggles against indebtedness and unemployment, the in(di-
vidual) is thus produced and governed by the idea of maximising value and 
minimising risks where the notion of social solidarity is excluded, in which 
any connection with other groups in the ‘precariat’ is avoided. Collective 
action to remedy these precarious conditions is also foreclosed as the state 
of exception becomes the rule. And when governmentalities act, they do 
so to further control based entirely on individual self-interest, or individual 
human motives and intentions that are ethically justified in capitalism. 
 
211 
 
Locked into isolated and immiserated futures, the subject of debt becomes 
an investor in its own human capital in which relations of trust and collect-
ive action are replaced by security and biopolitical control that aims at life’s 
global pacification. The regime of debt not only appears to become a defin-
ing characteristic of neoliberal biopolitics, but also a precondition of human 
life in general in which the subject is simultaneously bound to capitalism 
while potentially cynical to its rule. Debt presupposes a kind of (un)sociality 
of people who are connected only by self-interest, but not engaged in dir-
ect conflict. In other words, debt is, like neoliberal capitalism, indifferent to 
the idea of sociability and politicality, or, worse still, exploits them. The 
regime of debt creates responsible, insecure yet cynical dividuals aimed at 
decreasing desires for radical social change. Isolation and insecurity com-
bined with cynicism about the world are the marks of the subject of debt. 
Here, the dividual realises its isolation and disillusion yet refuses or is 
unable to actualise its dissent. Debt is a future war on human imagination 
that disempowers dividuals from demanding positive social transforma-
tion, or collective action. 
 
To cut a long story short, debt functions as a mode of governance for the 
subjection of populations to neoliberal control. However, it is not to be 
seen as the only rationality enabling that subjection. In contemporary 
society, the governmentalities of neoliberalism can take several and often 
multiple forms. This is because the modelling of the cynical dividual under 
conditions of neoliberal biopolitics reifies life as the main object of inquiry, 
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of governance. As a result, life itself takes the privileged form of 
surreptitiously oppressive governmentalities as the state of emergency 
becomes a second nature. Indeed, neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
operates by ‘capture’, through a culture of a perpetual state of emergency 
that immobilise thinking and restrain collective action. It endlessly 
attempts to appropriate collective action and resistance by sovereign 
exceptionalism, which consists of military apparatuses of security and 
police. Neoliberal biopolitics is, in short, hostile to collective action and 
attempts to own the future. However, it is essentially different from a 
“lawless state of exception and more in relation to the laws and counter-
laws”, forms of post-political expertise and governmental regulation which 
constitute the growing state security apparatus (Dean, 2010: 469; see also 
Aradau & Van Munster, 2008; Aradau et. all 2008).13 Let us, at this point, 
move on and investigate the military-security complex in relation to 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 Thus, in adopting a realist ontology of risk by itself is (risks are out there), as Beck (2002: 
211-12) does, insufficient to explicate the role of preemptive risk-security management in 
contemporary society; it fails to grasp how the risk-security complex has become an 
intrinsic modality of neoliberal governmentality that is being normalized through its very 
repetition. For what happens in the life “out there” (Dean, 1999) becomes the main 
political problematique of our times. Instead of Beck’s realist notion of risk I have opted 
for a new concept, preemptive indifference, which can be understood as a way of 
governmentality developed by Michel Foucault (1991). 
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contemporary biopolitical mechanisms. Neoliberal control rearticulates a 
new problematic in which all our political capacities and adaptive and 
creative potentialities, that is, all radical politics of event, are in danger of 
becoming the object of delegitimation and indeed elimination. This power 
is what I would like to call a ‘preemptive indifference.’ The remainder of 
this chapter is dedicated to thinking through this new concept and teasing 
out its biopolitical implications. 
 
5.5 Preemptive Indifference 
 
“Unpredictability in every field is the result of the conquest of the whole of 
the present world by scientific power. This invasion by active knowledge 
tends to transform man’s environment and man himself … to what extent, 
with what risks, what deviations from the basic conditions of the existence 
and of the preservation of life we simply do not know. Life has become, in 
short, the object of an experiment of which we can only say one 
thing that it tends to estrange us more and more from what we were, or 
what we think we are, and that it is leading us … we don’t know and can by 
no means imagine where.” (Valery, 1962: 71) 
 
“[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns the ones 
we don’t know we don’t know.” (Donald Rumsfeld, 2002) 
 
 
To be sure, many have argued that the events of 9/11 have only 
strengthened Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks that we live in a society of 
“unknown unknowns” marked by the radical uncertainty of any subjective 
position. ‘Inescapable dangers’ are real and imminent, we are continually 
told, and they are just beyond our ability to understand and control. In the 
214 
 
terms of Rumsfeldian terminology, “we not only do not know where the 
tipping point is, we do not even know exactly what we do not know” (Žižek, 
2008b: 456). A certain radical reflexivity becomes the positive condition of 
contemporary society where life no longer ‘goes by itself’ but by ‘unknown 
unknowns’ – things we do not know we do not know. Unknown unknowns 
thus reveal the neoliberal aporia; a condition in which ‘fighting 
emergencies’ become the sole centre of security politics. 
 
To better understand the actual and the possible future implications of the 
continued reworking of security framework, we need to look no further 
than the advances in complexity thinking, which focus on the mystery of 
‘emergent properties’, on the conditions that constitute unknown, yet 
disruptive future ‘events.’ Simply put, events will happen. Overall, 
complexity approaches tell us that interdependent emerging properties 
involve a sense of unpredictable and unstable openness. Through a 
conversation with complexity sciences the world is rendered open to the 
future where unknown unknowns open up the social world to the virtual. 
In contemporary society under neoliberal control, politics of security’s 
principal response to the problem of unknown unknowns is now fully 
reliant upon the virtual. Thus, it is precisely the virtual that now serves to 
consolidate the liberal post-political imaginary. As Brian Massumi (1993: 
11) succinctly expresses: 
 
“Viral or environmental…these faceless, unseen and unseeable enemies 
operate on an inhuman scale. The enemy is not simply indefinite (masked 
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or at a hidden location). In the infinity of its here-and-to-come, it is 
elsewhere, by nature. It is humanly ungraspable. It exists in a different 
dimension of space from the human, and in a different dimension of 
time…The pertinent enemy question is not who, where, when, or even 
what. The enemy is a what not; an unspecifiable may-come-to-pass, in 
another dimension. In a word, the enemy is virtual.” 
 
In other words, the enemy has attained a summit of virtualisation, an 
unknowable futurity, which involves a sense of contingent openness and 
multiple futures. Central, then, to security governance is the idea of 
‘event’, which makes it possible to restructure the virtual from within the 
actual. An event is what calls the future into being. “The virtual is abstract 
event potential” (Massumi, 2011b: 16). The question is clearly whether the 
event will take place. But we shall never know. What we have in neoliberal 
control, then, is the real repression of a virtual event. The cost of rendering 
a future event unproblematic is precisely the focus of security politics. 
Although future events cannot be known, they can nevertheless be 
enacted. Through its conversation with complexity sciences, politics of 
security concerns how the future events are understood, how the 
emergent properties are understood, how the virtual potentialities are 
understood, or how the abstractions are understood. To consider security 
politics under the heading of virtuality is “relative to an experimental 
practice”: 
 
“Abstraction is not the product of an ‘abstract way of seeing things’. It has 
nothing psychological or methodological about it. It is relative to the 
invention of an experimental practice that distinguishes it from one fiction 
among others while creating a fact that singularizes one class of 
phenomena among others.” (Stengers, 2000: 86) 
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In this climate of abstraction and uncertainty everything truly matters. 
Nothing exists in vain. Anything moves, anything circulates has the 
potential to be truly catastrophic. Neoliberal control is, therefore, 
concerned with “circulation” as the main object of security shifts from the 
traditional disciplinary enclosure to life: “circulation concerns a world 
understood in terms of the biological structures and functions of species 
existence together with the relations that obtain between species life and 
all its contingent local and global correlations” (Dillon, 2007: 11). 
Concerned with circulation, control operates in an “aleatory” and statistical 
field in the sense that it is concerned with the “aleatory events that occur 
within a population that exists over a period of time” (Foucault, 2003: 246). 
Thus, it is population that becomes the key to security governance. At the 
most basic level, population is identified as the biopolitical collective that 
‘unpredictable dangers’ emerge from and are sustained by. In other words, 
a population is defined by its ‘potentiality of danger’ rather than actuality. 
The potentiality of danger has value because it introduces uncertainty and 
unpredictability. Thus, the final twist that circulation adds to the prospect 
of the society of control concerns what moves: problems not solutions. 
This means posing new problems rather than working out solutions to the 
old ones, which ultimately only mask the dynamics of neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics. 
 
Therefore within the language of neoliberal control, there is clearly the 
possibility for a movement towards a more pervasive and sophisticated 
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nature of power in which distinctions such as reality/representation, 
politics of event/non-politics of event, terrorism/war against terrorism 
tend to disappear today. This power is what I call a ‘preemptive 
indifference.’ I shall suggest here that preemptive indifference is a form of 
contemporary biopolitics, but life is defined and assayed in a very different 
way. Contemporary developments suggest that a reengagement with 
biopolitics is more pressing than ever. In order to broach such a 
reengagement it is necessary to focus on the differing biopolitical 
mechanisms and politics embedded within it. It is my hope that preemptive 
indifference can augment Foucault’s discussion of biopolitics and Deleuze’s 
framework on the society of control. The first pole of this power works by 
preemption, but this pole also makes another pole that works by a 
constitutive indifference. 
 
5.5.1 Preemption 
 
Neoliberal control is concerned with the ‘making live’ of the threat. 
However, it does so at the level of preemption in order to identify 
populations who serve as threats to the existence of the prevailing 
neoliberal order. Preemption is fought ‘amongst’ a population and for 
‘total security’ of a population. Through ‘controlling’ a population 
preemption, then, is the vehicle that attempts to prevent any event 
whatever from occurring. In other words, preemption signifies a desire to 
oppose the event, both before and after it takes place. An ‘uncertain 
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future’ is a key term for preemption. Consuming its own imaginable 
futurity, preemption involves “assimilation of powers of existence, at the 
moment of their emergence” (Massumi, 1998: 57). Taking unknown 
unknowns to be its point of departure, it is concerned with the things 
which have yet to emerge (the virtual). Taking as its target potential as well 
as actual risks, it “operates in the present on a future threat” (Massumi, 
2007). Within this thread, in which unknowable and uncertain 
performances hold the potential to be truly ‘eventful’, what is now 
rendered terrifying “is anything which could unsettle the normal Liberal 
flows of life” (Evans, 2010). 
 
Preemptive indifference implies a relation to our experience in the present. 
In attempting to prevent future bad occurrences, it also colonises the 
future (see Aradau & Munster, 2008: 198). The value of an act of 
preemption speaks in an indefinite future tense, for it takes into account 
the unexpected “eventualities that may or may not occur.” (Bush, cited in 
Massumi, 2005). Yet it must be borne in mind that the aim of preemption is 
not simply the future that needs to be ordered against unpredictability and 
‘bad occurrences’ caused by potential disruptive events and terrorism. 
Rather, it oscillates in between present and future, to make sure that 
nothing dangerous really happens, that antagonisms do not occur. For 
preemption, there are disruptive events that are unexpected, but which, in 
hindsight, can be anticipated and enacted. As 9/11 illustrated (perhaps 
above all else), it is now the ‘catastrophic individual’ who holds the 
219 
 
potential to tell a micro-apocalyptic tale. The events of 9/11, therefore, 
transformed the dimensions of security politics. 
 
In contemporary society, sovereignty is made up of the use of social and 
political imaginative techniques. The sovereign order is no longer simply 
that of decision, but that of preemption. Thus ‘who is to be killed’ is 
supplemented by ‘who gets to preempt the future?’ In other words, 
preemptive ontology is governed less by “sovereign wills” and more by the 
contingency of the “event” (Dillon, 2008a: 327-8). The problem of 
preemption is not simply that of contingency, but that of catastrophic 
contingency (Aradau & Munster, 2007: 101). What counts therefore is a 
coherent scenario of catastrophic events and the preemption of the future. 
Preemptive indifference is characterised as a way of optimising the forces 
of individual and collective life. It is on this basis that sovereign power “‘to 
make die’ has been derogated from the state in favour of private security 
firms, management consultants and contractors and delegated onto 
multiple agents, including police officers, air marshals, security operatives”, 
or the multinational security companies (Dean, 2010: 470). Similarly, 
decisions on unjust drone killings, which become a ‘legitimate’ tool for 
preemptive indifference, are made by either presidents or ‘their men’, 
including the CIA and FBI directors or military planners (ibid. 470). 
Preemptive indifference is placed in the continuity of national security 
practices (Aradau & Munster, 2008: 194). 
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5.5.2 Indifference 
 
Preemption, however, tells only part of the story. In colonising the future 
to preempt the event, neoliberal control also creates an “affective 
uncertainty”, which becomes a political operator (Massumi, 2005). In 
agreeing to eliminate all future events, affective uncertainty introduces 
potentiality within the realm of neoliberal control. What is crucial in this 
respect is the centrality of the affective exploitation of the present. In this 
way, future uncertain events can be translated into more growth. As such, 
they help restore subjects to social life. Affective uncertainty has a value 
because it is a tool for disruption. Thanks to a radically uncertain future, 
disruptions can be stabilised and absorbed by a system which attempts to 
preserve its identity. No culture of risk, no preemptive indifference. Or, no 
culture of risk, no neoliberal post-politics. For risk is politically operative. 
And in so far as these affective uncertain risks signify irruption, the 
neoliberal order cannot do without preemptive indifference. For 
preemptive indifference, the question of order is the question of politics. 
Its logic is of course counterrevolutionary. 
 
Preemptive indifference is based on order and certainty in the face of 
continual ‘disorder’, resistance and uncertainty. It merely uses the future 
to secure the existing order and thereby denies the possibility for any 
radical structural change. Colonising the future through an orderly process, 
it de-dramatises social struggles and thus defuses the possibility of an 
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event. The possibility of an event in the future upsets preemptive 
indifference. After all, it knows that history is replete with invocations of 
revolutions to come. And the next revolution, or the event, can radically 
disrupt and destroy the “liberal way of life” (Evans, 2010). Put simply, the 
next revolution is nothing other than the breakdown of order tout court. 
Hence the temporal effect of preemptive indifference is not simply the 
future that needs to be rendered palpable and governable against events; 
rather, it is the event that appears to be the problem to be solved, for it 
can appear to interrupt the temporality of neoliberalism. 
 
Since the event is an experimental practice, security governance takes as 
its target virtual as well as the actual. The virtual threat calls for a virtual 
non-politics of event. Put simply, a non-politics of event needs to act 
against the ‘events’ to effectively counter them. Assimilating and 
appropriating the concepts and thoughts of ‘radical politics of event’, 
preemptive indifference has learned to counter the unknowable, the 
uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected. Since the event-based 
neoliberalism becomes the focus in which power struggles take shape and 
function, the question then becomes how to think through a non-politics of 
event that aims at exploiting differences and antagonisms without allowing 
them to be eventful. For Deleuze (1994), for instance, the politics of event 
is a belief in the possibility of radical social change, while for security 
politics it consists in the problem posed in the future it creates (see 
Stengers, 2000: 67). For Deleuze an event, an act is a virtual potentiality, as 
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excess, up against the actual, whereas for security politics it is what 
enables a living life, a ‘species-life’, to continually renew and generate 
itself. While for Deleuze “the event is the immanent consequence of 
becomings or of life” and, for Badiou, “the immanent principle of 
exceptions to becoming, or Truths” (Badiou, 2009b: 385), for security 
governance it is opened up to military strategies and tactics which today 
seek to anticipate and preempt future catastrophic events. In this sense 
the politics of event becomes a non-politics of event, transforming the 
possibility of social change into a new array of tactics for security-risk 
governance, ensuring that ‘disruptive events’ do not take place. Since it is 
precisely the event as problem-formation which now appears to be the 
problem of neoliberal control, the ‘cancelling out of differences’ becomes 
the generative principle of life: 
 
“We see the emergence of a completely different problem that is no longer 
of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take 
place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that 
things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually 
going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent 
dangers of this circulation are cancelled out.” (Foucault, 2003: 65) 
 
The ‘cancelling out of differences’, however, is a nihilistic principle 
(Deleuze, 1983: 46). The more you cancel out of differences the more you 
will remove the sources of conflict. The more you exploit differences and 
antagonisms, the more you will empty out the emancipatory potential of 
revolutionary events in advance. What neoliberal post-politics lacks is the 
ability for enmity, the capacity to live with antagonism, conflict and ‘true’ 
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events. Indeed the argument here is that, in its range and in its depth, the 
cancelling out of differences requires a power which acknowledges no 
immanent limit, which assimilates actual as well as virtual differences and 
risks without allowing them to be ‘eventful.’ It is precisely actual as well as 
the virtual event as problem-formation which now appears to be the 
problem to be solved by preemptive indifference. 
 
In attempting to create a society without potential events, life in this 
context becomes the main object of study for preemptive indifference. 
However, preemptive indifference is not simply interested in life, but in the 
political and historical context in which life functions and is consistent with 
the event-based neoliberal capitalism. The life to be protected is 
‘propertied’ life, life that is assayed, organised and optimised through a 
range of mechanisms. Thus preemptive indifference should be understood 
as a governmentality that orders society and life through managing social 
problems and surveying populations (Aradau & Munster, 2008: 97). It is a 
way in which we can become clear on the truth of the neoliberal control 
society such that it becomes available for contestation. 
 
Cancelling out of differences, upon which politics is based, the act of 
preemption is, in short, accompanied by a constitutive indifference, which 
refers to a model of ‘affective disengagement.’ Absorbing and thus 
emptying out the emancipatory core of differences and antagonisms and 
egalitarian movements in advance, the challenge is not to solve a problem, 
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but manage a panoply of risks at every level, from that of society to the 
state. Preemptive indifference depicts the given reality as the only reality, 
pushing radical social change to the background. It always compromises 
with what exists and thus sustains the functioning of the existing order. In 
short, the defence of neoliberal and militarised post-politics is fundamental 
to preemptive indifference. Like all counterrevolutionary thoughts and 
doctrines, preemptive indifference accepts the existing situation as it is, 
while, at the same time, depicts it as a fragile order in the face of potential 
upheavals and revolts. The event, therefore, is an unthinkable idea because 
preemptive indifference can only think from the perspective of the given. 
As can be seen in every counterrevolutionary thought, it is also 
characterised by a desire to oppose the event, both before and after it 
occurs, fighting for the preservation of the existing order. Preemptive 
indifference is, in other words, a principled reaction that keeps the 
emergence of future events at bay. 
 
In so far as the event transcends the given by opening up new realms for 
experimental thought, preemptive indifference seeks to delimit those 
realms by (re)defining what is acceptable and unacceptable. Therefore, the 
centre of gravity is always what exists. But it also revises, rather than 
simply opposes, new possibilities. In this sense, the indifference I am 
referring to constitutes a strategic field of appropriation, in which the 
struggle revolves around revising and accommodating ideas and 
progressive principles. In this, freedom and revolt are possible as long as 
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they do not challenge the given. Preemptive indifference understands 
freedom only in terms of existing values. 
 
As an infinite extension of the capitalist market ideology, preemptive 
indifference is always limited and finitised by an event through which it 
naturalises and legitimises itself eternally. Naturalising and presenting 
radical structural change as ‘impossible’, preemptive indifference 
condenses in a single statement: market freedom=cynical dividual and its 
separable body, interests, desires=privatised enclaves. The vision of 
preemptive indifference is limited to cynical subjects and biopolitical 
bodies as objective existence, without allowing them to universalise 
themselves and lead to an event. In other words, preemptive indifference 
involves the abstract uniformity of a cynical conformist and infinitely 
circulating immortal bodies that produce a general abstract equivalence 
and indifference and thus condensates all differences into one single 
choice: market freedom. When humanity is reduced to cynical indifference 
and sheer animality, politics becomes a negative power of preemption. 
When the relation between the human and the animal becomes one of 
non-relation, freedom disappears. True freedom is not something given; it 
is regained through a hard struggle, discipline, in which one must be ready 
to bear the consequences of a true choice. True freedom is the realisation 
of being able to produce truths, eternal ideas. 
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So far so good! Does the act of preemption, and constitutive indifference 
that accompanies, make preemptive indifference a peaceful order? Surely 
not. Since the goal of preemptive indifference is to care for a ‘liberal life’ by 
neutralising threats to that life through some form of intervention, it is 
itself based on war and violence. Preemptive indifference, that is, signifies 
the end of the event, not necessarily the end of war and violence. Hence, in 
the pursuing the ‘liberal flows of life’, it can wage war on whatever 
threatens it. With preemptive indifference, war becomes a permanent 
condition “with no beginning or end, no front and rear… life itself is war” 
(Agre, 2001). Preemptive indifference and war are two sides of the same 
experiential coin. They are inseparable. 
 
Under the signifier of the event, revolution, the virtual threat implies 
action, the action that is war. It is total war in so far as there is no ‘outside’ 
of preemptive indifference, that the politics of preemption and constitutive 
indifference should extend to all domains of everyday life. It is total war in 
so far as it uses surveillance, total control and information culture to 
effectively counter the event. Preemptive indifference is a total war on 
human imagination: a virtual threat legitimates all kinds of preemptive 
security measures and violence. Since total war is seen as a natural 
phenomenon, preemptive indifference should be understood not purely as 
a form of social control, but as a form of counterrevolution that aims to 
extend the power of constitutive indifference and preemptive 
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securitisation, and thus manage all forms of virtual threats. Its vocation is 
to be the anti-event. 
 
Here, preemptive indifference defines a space in which “the liberal way of 
war” (Dillon & Reid, 2009) meets the necessities of securitisation and 
violence, extending the circulations of capital even during times of crisis. 
Making threat its business and identifying the threats which do not simply 
challenge the capitalist flows of life, preemptive indifference requires “the 
regulation of each and every type of circulation which propagates either a 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ way of life” (Bell & Evans, 2010: 383). Even though there are 
certain threats and abnormalities that currently exist outside of this 
regulation, they must be somehow incorporated into contemporary society 
and the capitalist economic activity. Circulation is both threat and an 
opportunity in a ‘reflexive’ world in which life is suspended between 
‘freedom’ and ‘danger.’ This is why preemptive indifference operates in 
relation to the ‘technologies of optimisation’, which sustains the basic 
integrities of life itself. Unlike the standard security/biopolitics, the threat 
in preemptive indifference is essential to the management of society. 
Preemptive indifference would not succeed without the event. Thus, unlike 
classic accounts of biopolitics, the preemptive threat must be enabled to 
survive so that it does have a continued presence in the collective social 
consciousness. Preemptive indifference focuses on the management of a 
population that is a threat to sovereign power and to a good circulation, 
not necessarily to eradicate it but to manage it as a way of organising the 
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social. More sinisterly and expectedly, it prevents individuals from 
demanding radical social change so that they end up imagining alternatives 
within the boundaries of the neoliberal market. 
 
Foucault argued for a biopolitics that is concerned with the biological 
species of the population that acts in relation to war and security. 
Preemptive indifference is an updated formulation of Foucault’s biopolitics, 
a condition in which immanent biological species and preemptive security 
measures are inextricably intertwined in a set of practices. Preemptive 
indifference is the nexus of the species of eternity and war and security 
that aims at a total pacification of life and society. For order and public 
security can only be improved through the condition of permanent 
exception (pacification), that security of the population can only be 
improved by continually targeting the population as vulnerable. 
 
For preemptive indifference, the permanent biopolitical state of 
emergency is maintained by constantly producing virtual threats. Here, 
security, preemption, and indifference fold into a single problem: how to 
identify virtual threats to the life of the biological species, such that 
preemption and indifference will coincide perfectly. The threat to eternal 
bodies based on market freedom is also a threat to society, and thus the 
threat to ‘market freedom’ is also considered a threat to ‘life itself.’ In the 
context of preemptive indifference, the biopolitical concern over biological 
species (the population) is thus transposed into a call for a politics of life 
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itself because the common threat to biological species is ‘life itself.’ By 
definition, the war against everything is without end, precisely because ‘life 
itself’ constantly threatens to end ‘life itself.’ As a foundation upon which 
the politics of life is constituted, preemptive indifference, therefore, aims 
to own a future. Its aim is to erase the event, revolution. The same reason 
that establishes preemptive indifference and the politics of life that it 
carries, is therefore also the reason that dissolves it: the common, the 
multitude, dissent, chaos, revolution. 
 
In brief, preemptive indifference is the ongoing management of a political 
order by constituting points of threat and the event. The importance of 
preemptive indifference is that it does not require the ‘taking of life’; 
exclusion and elimination are not the hidden truths of preemptive 
indifference. Although it has some territorial consequences, preemptive 
indifference today does not operate only in a problem space defined in 
relation to its physical, surface area, or in relation to its territory and 
nation, but in relation to the management of life. Today, more than ever, 
life has become a “strategic enterprise”, but those “strategies” are not 
made by a state managing the populations en masse (see Rose, 2007: 107). 
While preemptive indifference works hand in hand with sovereign 
exceptionalism, it does not draw upon threats only in terms of states of 
exception, but also in terms of “circulation” by identifying threats which do 
not simply challenge the “liberal way of life”, but becomes the generative 
principle of formation for life (Evans, 2010). With preemptive indifference, 
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sovereignty gains a new legitimacy to continually identify, assess and 
manage potential and actual events to the population. For preemptive 
indifference, no situation is more exceptional than the event, revolution. It 
is in relation to the event that preemptive indifference opens up a body to 
a different set of biopolitical practices, what is to come. Since the body is 
conceived by labour power as an immanent quality, the becoming of the 
body is now the unifying driver for preemptive indifference, which is taken 
by security practitioners to wage a permanent war in the name of the 
capital, of life necessity. Let us examine this shift more closely. 
 
5.6 The Body Politic of Preemptive Indifference 
 
In The Republic, Plato (2001) argues that the body has three registers: 
head, heart, and belly. The head rules, while the other parts play 
supporting roles. Although each part pursues a different goal, they share a 
common ground: to rule over the body and its soul so that society keeps 
together harmony and stability. Since society functions in a similar manner 
to the body, the notion of the “body politic” is crucial to the preservation 
and safety of the “common good.” Hence Plato uses the concept the body 
politic to describe not only the actual body, but its soul, man and the unity 
of society as well. Referring to both technical and organic sides of the body, 
the body politic is thus described as a “secure and harmonious” regime 
(Plato, 2001: 195). 
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The body and the body politic alike were seen as threats to the harmonious 
ancient Greek city. More importantly, the notion of the body politic was 
always accompanied by a reflection on ‘disorder.’ For Plato, therefore, the 
history of the body politic was the history of order against disorder. The 
body politic aimed at rendering the uncertain certain, indeterminate 
determinate, that is, a governmentality that ruled over and masters society 
against the threat of chaos. The body, in other words, was seen as a 
‘battlespace’ because it was capable of disrupting the national and social 
unity of an order. The body politic of preemptive indifference functions in a 
similar manner to the body politic of Ancient Greece. When Deleuze (1992: 
255) argues that Spinoza’s claim “we do not know what a body can do” is 
practically a war cry, his aim was to define a new concept of philosophy 
and subjectivity, a battle against the transcendental philosophy. For 
preemptive indifference, in a similar vein, “what a body can do” functions 
as a war cry because the body is conceived of as an organ capable of 
everything. Preemptive indifference is a methodical response to the 
question ‘What is a body?’ Thus any(body) and every(body) truly matters. 
What a body is capable of becoming is fundamental to preemptive 
indifference because the body is what threatens to unleash catastrophe 
(see Dillon & Reid, 2009: 108). 
 
In the society of neoliberal control, the body is digitalised. Digital networks 
have become the new base structuring of body, society and life. The global 
control of bodies via technologies deriving from digital networks, the 
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targeting of individual bodies through advanced surveillance technologies 
such as biometrics, interface life into new complex digital arrangements 
which are manipulative by ‘codes’ and ‘passwords.’ Neoliberal control 
works by new biopolitical strategies that constitute bodies in relation to 
populations. The body and life in passwords mean that populations are 
now considered to be databanks of digital networks. Targeting the 
affectivity of the body through which digital technologies function, 
neoliberal control, in short, turns the human body into a password (Lyon, 
2001: 75). In contemporary society, the body becomes a property of the 
state, functioning as an instrument of domination, or better yet, as a 
dispositif against the event. Catastrophe is always incubating. The body 
may be on the verge of becoming catastrophic. The body threatens to 
produce catastrophe because it is where individuation takes place, 
especially in relation to every living form’s independence with other 
existing forms. As discussed before, since the body is perfectly aligned 
between finitude and immortality, it is both thing and the possibility 
together. Precisely because the body necessarily belongs to infinity, it is 
conceived of as an element of mass materiality - as an ‘eternal’ body. The 
body is this world itself, it is the source from which immanent life and 
perception unfold. And yet, the body is also flesh. It exists in the world, it 
wants what it lacks, it knows what it wants and strives after what it values. 
In short, the body is an organism that strives to enhance its life conditions. 
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Preemptive indifference knows very well that the body has a freedom that 
lodges itself in a realm of historical possibilities. It is not somehow devoid 
of context, society, history, economy and so on. And it exerts its presence 
from this historical realm beyond phenomena. The body has its own voice 
that speaks from the flesh. In other words, the body’s own voice can 
exceed the experience of the body itself. The body is a limit, a border, 
against which the self is both subjectified and objectified. Thus the body 
implicates the subject and the object at the same time. The body either 
brings the self into life, or prevents the self from life. The body thinks, for 
itself; it goes on. 
 
Displacing any absolute normative thinking, the body is indefinite and 
immanent to living. The body threatens to create the event because it has 
a creative capacity, a ‘vital’ power through which being becomes. The body 
creates the event because it is where the event takes place. Or, to say this 
differently, the body is the set of everything that the ‘eventful individual’ 
mobilises. This is nowhere better illustrated than by the events of 9/11, 
when the potential of the event changes the way we think and act. 
Because the event is catastrophic, preemptive indifference cannot but 
counter/preempt the event before it is visited upon it.  
 
In this sense preemptive indifference expresses a fantasised dominance 
over the movement of ‘bad’ bodies, protecting the security of the 
threatened ‘good’ bodies. In brief, the circulation of bad bodies has to be 
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distinguished from the circulation of good bodies. What has changed under 
the regime of neoliberal control is the geography of ‘body’ security, for in 
an age of global capitalism it is not enough to protect borders. Thus “the 
fight must be taken ‘over there’, before it ‘reaches here’” (see Bruce, 2007: 
22). With preemptive indifference, it is necessary to have an “ontological 
premise” that “what is dangerous is precisely that which has yet to be 
formed, what has “not yet even emerged”’ (Massumi, 2007). Thus, any 
virtual challenge before it can take actual root should be eradicated. For 
preemptive indifference, not all bodies are subjected to emergency in the 
same way and emergency is rarely arbitrary as Agamben seems to imply. 
 
What we should abandon therefore is merely the classic narrative of the 
state of exception, which negates the possibility of considering 
contemporary biopolitics as a differential and universal regime. What 
needs emphasis today is how circulation is fundamental to the effective 
functioning of neoliberal capitalism, for, in the society of control, capitalism 
thrives on “circuits of movement and mixture” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: 198). 
Nowhere is this process stronger than in the world of gated communities, 
which house a very specific politics of place wherein the logic of good 
circulation (preemptive indifference) and the global capital collide. In the 
society of control, gated communities are necessary if the desirable 
attributes of responsibility, reliability, and rationality are to flourish. They 
are also necessary, for the desired outcome is to stop potential events to 
the existing order. 
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5.7 Gated Communities 
 
“The new global elite…avoids the urban political realm. It wants to operate 
in the city, but not rule it; it composes a regime of power without 
responsibility.” (Sennett, 2000: 27) 
 
 
The contemporary gated community first emerged as a response to 
transformations in the political economy of late twentieth century urban 
America (Low, 2008: 51; see also Harvey, 1990). As Low (2008: 51) argues, 
“the increasing mobility of capital, marginalization of the labour force, and 
dismantling of the welfare state began with the change in labour practices 
and deindustrialization of the 1970s.” This process accelerated with the 
“Reaganomics” of the 1980s. Globalisation and ‘economic restructuring’ 
weakened governments and dissolved patterns of existing social relations, 
causing a “breakdown of traditional ways of maintaining social order” 
(ibid.). Furthermore, social control mechanisms such as police and schools 
were seen as either ineffective or absent. The breakdown in local control 
mechanisms “threatened some neighbourhood residents”, and it is in this 
context that gated communities appeared to become viable and socially 
acceptable options of contemporary societies (Low, 2008: 51-2). 
 
The creation of gated communities is an integral part of the building of 
“the new military urbanism” (Graham, 2010), a disciplinary control 
technique, hinted at by Davis (1990: 226-236), in which “the contemporary 
city prescribes security as a lifestyle.” Gating is only one example of 
236 
 
neoliberal control in which policing and enclosures create areas where 
people (wealthy urban elite) “seek to ‘capsularize’ themselves away from 
people, experiences, and spaces that they perceive as risky, vulnerable, or 
unpredictable” (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 16; see also De Cauter, 2004). 
The main goal is to create a safe, controlled environment that excludes all 
those who are considered ‘unsuitable’ or potentially ‘dangerous.’ Thus it is 
the fear of external social life itself that leads people to the building of 
walls and the construction of exclusive enclosed estates all around the 
world, protecting the rich from the poor, the desirables from the 
undesirables. 
 
Gated communities are the new borders within society, where preemption 
coincides with constitutive indifference. High walls, security guards, video 
surveillance systems, CCTV cameras and the like tell you that you enter into 
a new territory, a territory essentially different from what is traditionally 
understood by ‘city.’ With their technologies of preemptive social sorting, 
they mean to some that they are home, and in a place that they can feel 
safe, while they are warnings to ‘urban others’ that they are not where 
they are supposed to be, and should leave immediately. In this sense, 
gated communities are the materialisation of othering. With the deepening 
of socio-economic and geographical polarisation, the ‘happy minority’ now 
seek to refuge in gated communities, occupying a different realm of 
circulation. 
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To be sure, such thinking translates urban others into potential targets, and 
potential targets into war and violence. In contemporary society ‘urban 
others’ (the homeless, the poor, ethnic minorities and alternative 
subcultures) are they who must be seen. Today’s seeing is preemptive (or 
discriminatory) and its object is discriminated. Control and surveillance 
operate through technologies of preemption that continuously zone city 
space by drawing lines that urban others cannot cross and the powerful 
cannot see. The act of preemption is a technology of power that maintains 
and secures a ‘liberal way of life.’ Urban others are the focus of preemption 
that are made to embody all that appears to threaten the neoliberal order. 
For this reason, they have to be always watched. 
 
As machines of exclusion, gated communities also demonstrate how the 
city is “fragmented” and “splintered” today (Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
This process of “splintering” can be characterized by two main features. 
First, physical infrastructure (water, roads, power, and communication 
technologies), various social services and public spaces are continuously 
being fragmented through the process of privatisation. Second, selective 
re-bundling of the fragments and public monopolies are being replaced by 
“contested profit-driven markets”, which in turn has placed advanced 
premium networked infrastructures at the centre of global flows of capital 
and finance (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 13-4). The latter also emerged in a 
context where mobility and power are two essential concepts. “The people 
of the ‘upper tier’ do not apparently belong to the place they inhabit”, 
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observes Zygmunt Bauman (2003: 16), “their concerns lie (or rather float) 
elsewhere.” 
 
The result is that the new global elite are allowed to lose touch with 
society. If gated communities are the signature material form of ‘exclusive 
capitalist power relations’, they often entail a particular biopolitical 
imaginary in which isolation seems to be a remedy for vulnerability. As 
Massey (1995: 201) rightly observes, “those who already have more 
strength within the shifting power-geometry can wall themselves more 
tightly in.” The result is a willed isolation which obscures the political 
context of social inequalities of capitalist power relations, and privatises 
public issues. This of course undermines public values and the centrality of 
togetherness and nearness, dissent and strife that are fundamental 
ingredients of society. Displaying armed guards, high walls, electric fences, 
CCTV and automatic gates, the ostentatious power of gated communities 
contrast starkly with the extreme poverty that, in many cases, literally 
surrounds their walls. Indeed, the construction of these powerful enclaves 
always involves the construction of barriers for others (see Graham and 
Marvin, 2001: 11). Simply put, one person’s mobility may be another’s 
immobility. While some can buy £40m homes “without giving it a second 
thought” (Neate, 2011: 27), others lack even the most basic of services. 
The result appears to be an increasingly “acute sense of relative 
deprivation among the poor and heightened fears among the rich” 
(Massey, 1996: 395). Hence the simultaneous expression of fear and 
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cynicism in the affective exploitation on ‘the event management’ in 
neoliberal and militarised post-political societies. Since the fear of potential 
events and cynicism are embedded into geography, it expresses total 
surveillance and control over the movement of ‘bad’ circulation, protecting 
the intact territory and security of the fearful and threatened ‘good’ 
circulation. 
 
In supporting good circulation, a gated community is a desired place of 
neoliberalism where disagreements are suppressed, antagonisms are 
foreclosed, and ‘the contingency of the event’ is sought to be preempted 
through risk-security management. Viewed through such a lens, gated 
communities that span global cities provide an important material 
dimension to the society of control. In a neoliberal world in which power 
operates as pure strategy (Evans & Hardt, 2010), and where people are 
abandoned to a fabricated event and thus left responsible for their own 
survival, gated communities are said to be ‘necessary’ sites of refuge and 
strategisation for the political, economic, and urban elite. In other words, 
gated communities are defended enclaves from which non-negotiable 
power can be strategized in the face of induced uncertainty (Duffield, 
2011: 765). 
 
Neoliberal post-politics is only ‘possible’ because the forces of global 
corporate capital need biopolitical preemptive indifference to actualise 
itself in concrete contexts. In the society of control, conflict and danger 
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arise when bad flows occur and threaten the expansion of good flows. If 
greater financial flows cannot move on and interact with each other, the 
global mobility regime is broken down. Since circulation is essential to the 
functioning of the capitalist market, preemptive indifference uses very 
specific mechanisms in which the reduction and investment of human life 
will be constituted. Preemptive indifference reduces some bodies to 
surveillance and control. It does advocate killing some types of life: those 
that cease to be a political adversary but become a biopolitical threat. In 
advocating a certain sort of intervention over life, preemptive indifference 
also invests in the bodies of others, as the maintenance of spectacular 
capital. In brief, as we have discovered, not all circulation is good. While 
some bodies are offered continuous mobile navigation, others are 
suspended under the national security acts. This continuous 
navigation/circulation, and the discontinuous suspension that follows, is 
part and parcel of the functioning of preemptive indifference in that it 
compels people to recognize power as “vitality”, not those of “mortality” 
(Rose, 2007: 70). 
 
In this sense a gated community is a place wherein good circulation and 
global capital enter into an interdependent relationship: a voluntary camp 
with Starbucks. Voluntary in the sense that the residents seek escape from 
a chaotic and damaged world outside the gates using spectacular capital. 
As voluntary camps, gated communities are structured by design to enable 
consumption, (im)mobility, and social sorting. As such, they are places 
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where the violence of sovereignty is hidden by the blinding lights of 
consumption. One the one hand there are sophisticated surveillance 
technologies, private security guards - paired with sniffer dogs, controlling 
and thus preventing events. By passing through metal detectors and body 
scanners, possible threats are meant to be filtered out, thus resulting in the 
‘sterilised dividual’ who enters the sterile zone of the community inside. In 
gated communities, in short, nothing accidental is allowed to happen as 
the environment is homogenised and standardised as much as possible, 
defusing the fears of potential events. On the other, there are upscale 
shopping malls, golf courses, expensive restaurants, and clubhouses which 
offer a vast variety of choices, including gourmet meals and spa 
treatments. Within gated communities, the political ‘reduction’ and 
‘investment’ of the body goes hand in hand with ‘docile’ and equally 
productive mobile ‘dividuals’ who are governed by codes and passwords. 
Thanks to banks, restaurants, hotels and shopping malls in the immediate 
vicinity, the gated community resembles a megacity in flux, which 
incorporates differential and affective power relations sutured along good 
circulation and the capitalist spectacle. 
 
The mixed regime of circulation and the global capital has the potential to 
take on several forms, forms that are biopolitically contingent upon 
territorial divisions of power. The political reduction and investment of the 
body will be differentially determined according to the locality and 
geopolitical context. “Sovereignty”, therefore, “becomes wholly 
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contingent” (Bell & Evans, 2010: 384). It seeks to create secure spaces of 
modern wealth and luxury consumption, and defended enclaves from 
which liberalism’s “permanent emergency of its emergence” can be 
managed safely (Duffield, 2011). This irrevocably blurs the boundaries 
between circulation and suspension, as different authorities seek to act 
upon the one through action upon the other (Rose, 2007: 53). Like 
sovereignty, preemptive indifference is also a wholly contingent term to 
both reduce and invest the human body to optimise, and organise the 
forces of individual and collective life. 
 
Gated communities refer to the political strategisation of human lives 
through dispositifs of power so that they can be defined and naturalised 
eternally. The perceived events from the outside are translated into a 
demand for cynical conformity on the inside. The sterile dividuals have a 
right to live their freedom, particularly economic freedom, as they please. 
Other freedoms will invariably follow. Hence transgression is elevated into 
a moral injunction, enjoyment is rendered a duty, all social relations are 
reduced to economic relations, deprived of justice and equality. Gated 
communities, in other words, produce self-secure (in)dividuals who are not 
only less of a threat to themselves but to neoliberal capitalism as well (see 
Reid, 2012: 74). The principle of neoliberal self-interest undermines, if not 
completely disappears, politicality and democratic public life. Gated 
communities employ deception by seizing upon self-reliance/interest – all 
of which works to personalise responsibility and collapse political problems 
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into private problems. As a consequence, responsibility towards others is 
replaced by a self-secure dividual who develops a narrow and inflexible 
responsibility only for itself. Self-secure gated subjects demonstrate an 
inability to act politically. 
 
Self-secure dividuals are, by definition, cynical subjects which cannot 
radically question their place within society and which accepts the world 
poverty, inequality and injustice as a condition for partaking of that world. 
And to be cynical, as we have discovered, is to forego the very power of 
resistance. If all sociality and politicality is reduced to a cynical reduction of 
capitalist exchange, if there is nothing but bodies and cynical (in)dividuals 
who pursue economic freedom, “live without idea” necessarily becomes 
the violent subjective injunction (Badiou, 2009b: 510). Gated communities 
are the signature architectural response to the denial of the political; walls, 
electric fences and checkpoints occupy the space abandoned by politics. 
They work hard to make ‘idea’, ‘thought’, an act of stupidity, demonising 
oppositional ideas so that they cannot reach the public. Gated dividuals 
and the privatised enclaves that support them believe in a society that “has 
stopped questioning itself” (Castoriadis, quoted in Bauman, 2000: 22). 
Control and surveillance, targeted drone killings, armed guards, and other 
forces contribute to the power of neoliberal hegemony, making sure that 
no one is allowed to trespass on privatised enclaves, that disruptive events 
do not take place. Gated communities of market capitalism have walled 
off, if not disappeared, critical thinking and the values of social 
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responsibility. Thus a fortress of constitutive indifference and 
manufactured stupidity are no longer exceptional but part of a normality in 
contemporary society.  
 
In short, gated communities and its gated individuals do not work with 
ideas, thoughts, but build a moat around revolutionary ideas (e.g. 
communism) so they cannot be accessed and organise egalitarian 
movements against the system. They don’t engage in debates, ideas, for 
they are ‘unbearable’ and tied to ‘dangerous events.’ If gated (in)dividuals 
are believed, harmony rather than dissent, life without idea rather than 
debate, pacifism rather than antagonism, cynicism rather than courage is 
the hallmark of the ‘progressive’ outlook. If the horizon of life with an idea 
is vanishing, then the horizon of life without an idea based on the capitalist 
market system of social exchange can still arise to save the day. And this is 
where life without idea coincides with the imperative ‘Enjoy’, thereby 
producing a generalised ‘cynical conformity’ in which any questioning of 
radical social change appears to be ignored. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
As I argued throughout the chapter, the object of neoliberal control – and 
its biopolitical governmentality preemptive indifference - is a mere 
functioning of the ‘dividual’ that is reduced to its bodily vitality, an organic 
constitution of a factical finitude of life as an immanent quality. Reducing 
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bodies to commercial capacities, to surplus enjoyments and furnishing 
secure spaces of a liberal way of life, the violent injunction is to live life in a 
purely bodily fashion, in pure animality without an idea. The continuation 
of life through market exchange and bodily survival strategies means that 
subjects are left with their own, and thus become passive spectators 
whose only aim and vision is economic freedom and biological survival.  
 
Despite its hegemony, however, neoliberal control is not a peaceful 
regime. What’s more, no victories are permanent or final. Since neoliberal 
capitalism (and preemptive indifference) deals with future as a virtual 
indeterminacy, then its neutrality and declared indifference becomes a 
source of an affect, provoking the potential/virtual to become an actual 
event it can respond to. Neoliberal control is therefore incitatory in that it 
allows the subject no freedom to be, but summons it to reveal itself just as 
it is. After all, “the most effective way to fight an unspecified threat is to 
actively contribute to producing it” (Massumi, 2007). Indeed, the more 
capable you are of revealing, producing, creating, provoking, mimicking, 
supporting and ultimately proliferating your enemy, the better. For it 
allows the enemy to reveal herself and press the button. Neoliberal 
control, in this sense, actively provokes a ‘fatal’ threat to emerge, bringing 
with itself a unique logic of (self)destruction, spite. Now the ‘cheap 
happiness’ is gone. All that is left is spite, and the only glorious ending the 
subject can imagine is pure destruction. Spite is a stochastic principle in 
that anyone can become a potential “hostage” (Baudrillard, 1990: 34-5). 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Age of Spite: Revisiting Terrorism 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that neoliberal control manages and 
regulates life in its vital new capacities. Drawing on Deleuze’s “Postscript 
on the Societies of Control”, I suggested that biopolitical control is directly 
related to neoliberal capitalism, which cannot be thought of without its 
associated affect, cynicism. Furthermore, I claimed that neoliberal control 
goes hand in hand with preemptive indifference, a new concept, which 
attempts to create a society without antagonism, conflict and struggle. 
 
This chapter aims at theorising a new affect, spite, which may be defined as 
a willingness to cause harm for harm’s sake. With spite, everything is 
pushed to its boundaries; everything is taken to the extreme, to its 
outermost limit. The chapter contends that spite has become one of the 
major affective dimensions of neoliberal and militarised post-politics. The 
question is, however, what corresponding social regime would produce the 
distinctive affective modality of ‘spite.’ I contend that spite corresponds to 
a fourth, paradoxical social ‘regime’: terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, I 
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argue, terrorism is no longer merely an ‘exceptional’ event but seems to 
have become a social regime, which reveals a new model of truth on 
contemporary society by restructuring the social. 
 
Spite is the antithesis of one of the most cherished of aims commonly 
espoused by ‘progressive ideologies.’ Indeed, ‘enlightenment’ ideologies 
such as liberalism and conservatism have had a longstanding interest in the 
value of reason because it enables people to become ‘rational’ and 
‘controllable.’ Progressive ideologies, in other words, have been always 
aiming to produce rational individuals who are abstracted from their 
passions and thus become harmless and faithful to the existing order. And 
the same goes for neoliberalism. As a ‘progressive’ ideology, neoliberalism 
asserts rationality and reason as the proper bases for nature and society. It 
desires self-interested human beings who act rationally so that they 
become not only less of a threat to themselves but to neoliberal capitalism 
as well. 
 
However, a growing body of scholarship has called into question the liberal 
democratic assumptions about rationality and the consequences of reason. 
Ranging from Marxists, poststructuralists to postcolonialists and 
postmodernists, such critiques have explored the importance of affects and 
emotions, arguing that reason cannot be thought of independently of 
affect (See, for example, Ahmed, 2004; Anderson, 2006; Anderson and 
Smith, 2001; Ansell Pearson, 1997; Balibar, 1997; Bauman, 1991; Boltanski, 
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1999; Borch-Jacobsen, 1988, 1993; Buchanan, 1999; Butler, 1997; Butler et 
al., 2000; Damasio, 1999, 2003; Deleuze, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1992, 
1994; Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1987; Furedi, 2002; 2005; Game and 
Metcalfe, 1996; Goodchild, 1996; Hardt and Negri, 1994, 2000, 2004; 
Jameson, 1981; Massumi, 1993, 2002; Ngai, 2005; Rubin, 2004; Sedgwick, 
2003; Sloterdijk, 1987; Thrift, 2007). In seeking to analyse the meaning of 
reason and affect in human lives, novels and novellas can be helpful 
because they can allow us to see how reason and affect are understood 
and expressed by individuals, under historical circumstances. They can take 
us into the workings of rationality and irrationality and show how the inner 
world of human beings is shaped by the society in which they live; novels 
and novellas, in short, can prompt us to question the validity of deeply 
embedded assumptions about reason and unreason. 
 
At this point, Fyodor Dostoevsky might be especially helpful. For his 
characters tell us as much about weaknesses of reason as they do about its 
strengths. Here I analyse this theme, with particular reference to Notes 
from Underground (1864/2008). I provide a theoretical reading of Notes 
from Underground, arguing that the novella is remarkable in two points at 
least. First, the novella is Dostoevsky’s critical response to what he saw as 
disturbing trends in Western European thought and Russia: that of the 
rational philosophies of naturalism and scientism. In Winter Notes on 
Summer Impressions (1863/1997), a novel which Dostoevsky published 
before Notes from Underground, he provided some reflections from his 
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recent visits to London, Paris, Berlin, and other European cities. Dostoevsky 
was the inheritor of a longer-standing Romantic tradition that was formed 
as a counter discourse against enlightenment rationalism. Wrestling with 
an early form of modern existential questions which deal with human 
beings’ role in a world where the idea of God was dying, he noted with 
alarm the absence of friendship and love and the rise of a new society 
based on individual self-interest. 
 
In Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky’s target is the rational human 
being, which has a good deal in common with neoliberal post-politics. To 
be sure, Dostoevsky didn’t write specifically about neoliberalism but what 
he had in mind was the enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries’ 
ideologies, which espoused the value of reason and rationality. The 
novella, therefore, provides an important critique of a particular type of 
rationality, an important aspect which can reappear, in a different guise, as 
one of the dominant mode of thinking in contemporary society. In fact, 
Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground was written in response to Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky’s (1863/1989) What Is to Be Done? - a key text for rational 
egoists and scientists. What Is to Be Done? was written in the mid-
nineteenth century Russia, which then became an emblem of orthodox 
historical materialism and the philosophical doctrine of rational egoism - a 
branch of utilitarian and ‘scientific’ utopian thought that began to influence 
Europeans (Frank, 2010; Scanlan, 1999). 
 
250 
 
1863-1864 are years of social and economic upheavals that hit Russia, 
following emancipation of the serfs. Both Chernyshevsky and Dostoevsky 
seek to provide mainly ‘intellectual’ solutions to complex social, political 
and human problems. The debate is especially focused on the idea of 
‘progress.’ Chernyshevsky implicitly asserts that human beings are ‘good’ 
and when governed by reason and science, they can form an ideal socialist 
society. Together with other rational egoists, he believes that rational 
egoists can be beneficial to society; they cannot disintegrate society into 
disorder or conflict. To the contrary, if human beings should act in 
accordance with their own best interests, this can lead to harmony and 
order. Strongly critiquing this philosophy, Dostoevsky thus writes Notes 
from Underground, claiming that human beings are emotional and 
conflictual characters and their complex social and political problems 
cannot be solved such simplistic solutions proposed by Chernyshevsky and 
other rational egoists. Dostoevsky advances the claim that human beings 
also have an ‘irrational’ side, that they cannot be confined to act according 
to the rational philosophies of rationalism and scientism. In short, a man of 
reason, for Dostoevsky, is also full of multiple affects and emotions. 
 
Notes from Underground was written in the mid-19th century. And this was 
not an age of neoliberalism. There are, however, striking similarities 
between the assumptions underlying neoliberal and militarised post-
politics and Dostoevsky’s critique of rational egoism. While ‘not drawing an 
exact parallel’ to his time, present-day readers will find analogies in 
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contemporary society. First, like the rational philosophies of naturalism and 
scientism Chernyshevsky and other rational egoists preached, 
neoliberalism assumes behaviour is rational. Like rational egoists and 
naturalists of Dostoevsky’s time, it claims that rationality is essential for 
creating utility maximising, self-interested, choosing individuals, whose 
benefits go hand in hand with the benefits of society. Pursuing their real 
interests, reasonable self-interested individuals, neoliberalism believes, are 
also essential for maintaining a healthy and harmonious liberal democratic 
society, and thus preventing potential events from occurring.14 
 
Second, through the words and actions of the Underground Man, the 
development of the spiteful personality comes into sharp focus. Providing a 
valuable source on reason and its limits, Notes from Underground is a 
carnival of spite, expressed by the Underground Man - an example of the 
extremes to which the physical side of a human being can go when it is not 
restrained inwardly by any reason, by any law. Strongly opposed to the 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
 It is worth noting that enlightenment and 19th century rationalists wanted 
revolutionary events to occur. Rationalism proposed by Chernyshevsky and others was 
revolutionary, it was meant as a form of critique, while Romanticism was a counter 
critique. 
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philosophical doctrine of rational egoism, Dostoevsky argues that human 
beings might not act rationally under given circumstances because they are 
also ruled by passions and emotions. There are certain situations in which 
humans might not want, or even be unable to abandon desires and 
passions. Thus they act not only in accordance with reason, but also with 
their wanting and willing. Once again, the same goes for neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics. Let me add that I do not mean to equate the 
political lessons from 19th century Russia with the current developments in 
contemporary society. Rather I use Dostoevsky’s diagnoses of the mid-19th 
century Russia in order to understand the relationship between the 
rational philosophies of naturalism and scientism swept through Europe 
and Russia and neoliberalism as a progressive ideology. For both of them 
espouse the value of reason and rationality, claiming that human beings 
are good and can act only according to the laws of reason and rationality. 
‘While not an exact parallel’ to the rational philosophies of naturalism of 
the mid-19th century Russia, neoliberalism, in a similar vein, proposes that 
individuals should act rationally and always serve the interests of society 
based on individual self-interest. Valuing certainty, neoliberalism attempts 
to create a society without irrational and uncontrollable human beings, 
whose affects and emotions are transformed into ‘neoliberal harmony.’ 
Thus I reflect on what Dostoevsky’s novella can teach us about the limits of 
reason and neoliberalism, offering that spite corresponds to a fourth, 
paradoxical social ‘regime’: terrorism. Let us now turn to Notes from 
Underground. 
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6.2 Notes from Underground: Theorising Spite 
 
“We shall not know what to join on to, what to cling to, what to love and 
what to hate, what to respect and what to despise. We are oppressed at 
being men—men with a real individual body and blood, we are ashamed of 
it, we think it a disgrace and try to contrive to be some sort of impossible 
generalised man.” (Dostoevsky, 1864/2008: 115) 
 
 
Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground poses significant questions 
regarding the limits of reason and rationality. The novella is in two parts. In 
Part One of the novella, the Underground Man – a retired civil servant from 
St. Petersburg – attacks rationality with irrationality (especially the one 
proposed by Nikolay Chernyshevsky in What Is to Be Done?), spite against 
rational and purposive social activity that dominates emerging Western 
philosophy. In Part Two, we encounter certain events that both destroy 
and renew the Underground Man. His world seems to be nothing more 
than a world of conflicting and traumatic events in which a heightened 
consciousness is painfully suspended between the convictions of his reason 
and the revolt of his conflictual emotions. He is aware of his contradictions, 
of his own marginality. He is, he declares, “a sick man…a spiteful man” 
(Dostoevsky, 1864/2008: 1). Then the question is this: how did the 
Underground Man come to this point? The struggle between the individual 
freedom (full, heightened consciousness) based on passions and instincts 
and oppressive rationalism that devalues passions and emotions is what 
constitutes the tragedy of the Underground Man. In short, his is a theory 
that is against the philosophy of rational egoism. 
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Virtually, every conceivable aspect of Notes from Underground would seem 
to have been discussed countless times (See, for example, Bakhtin, 1984; 
Bercovitch, 1964; Blumenkrantz, 1996; Diken, 2009; Frank, 1961; 2010; 
Scanlan, 1999; 2002; Williams, 1995; Wyman, 2007). However, I want to 
examine a genuinely unique aspect of the novella: that of spite. Though 
many readings of Notes from Underground are fascinating and valid, they 
have missed spiteful musings of the Underground Man. One significant 
exception is Bulent Diken’s (2009) work on Nihilism, where he discusses 
The Underground Man’s paradoxical weakness, that is, his ressentiment in 
relation to spite. Diken (2009: 68) asks whether it is possible to imagine a 
radically nihilist society of spite, “which cannot exist in actuality but 
nevertheless persists as a constant threat of deformation.” With “society of 
spite”, Diken (ibid. 12, 119) goes on to suggest, “everything (power, 
meaning, subjectivity) is taken to the extreme and disappears.” However, 
even in his work the link between the Underground Man’s spite and 
contemporary society has been hastily suggested. These readings, 
therefore, have not considered how the ‘social’ is closely related to the 
Underground Man’s spite understood as a total (self)destruction. Thus 
Notes from Underground allows us to theorise and develop spite as a new 
affect. And as such, it offers an invaluable opportunity for diagnostic social 
and spatial theory to study terrorism, especially how spiteful destruction 
has increasingly become a social regime in contemporary society. 
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The Underground Man is unwilling to meaningfully interact with others. 
What he desperately needs is dreams of ‘faith’ as the fundamental capacity 
for free will. He is, in short, a man of ressentiment who is inspired by his 
‘weakness’ or ‘impotence.’ As argued in the sovereignty chapter, the man 
of ressentiment has a soul that oscillates between a desire to live the life 
he values and the belief that he is unable to satisfy it. Likewise, 
Dostoevsky’s bitterly tragic anti-hero is suspended in two stages of 
ressentiment, during which self-consciousness is oscillated between 
negation and affirmation. In Part One of the novella, the strategy of the 
underground revolt is essentially reactive: his revenge is postponed. He 
cannot act but instead feels; reaction becomes a defining feature of his life. 
Unable to act, his ressentiment is prevented from expressing itself directly 
and is forced to take a detour through internal suffering. A man of action 
(Chernyshevsky and other rational egoists are the targets), on the other 
hand, with whom he argues all through the first part of the novella, 
inspired by a feeling of revenge, “dashes straight for his object like an 
infuriated bull with its horns down” (Dostoevsky, 2008: 8). He envies “such 
a man with all the forces of his embittered heart”, says the Underground 
Man. “He is stupid I am not disputing that. But perhaps the normal man 
should be stupid” (ibid.8). Such ‘normal’ men have a single-mindedness; 
they do not have a heightened consciousness. For this reason, they do not 
seek vengeance when offended by others. The men of action are stupid 
because their actions are determined by the laws of nature (statistical 
analyses and scientiﬁc considerations), which devalue the importance of 
256 
 
passions and instincts. The men of action simply do not understand how 
the laws of nature prevent them from being “morally decisive about 
anything”; they accept “its conclusions with a smug awareness of being up-
to-date, while they go on behaving exactly as in the past” (Frank, 1961: 10-
11). 
 
It is at this point that the Underground Man realises that it is necessary to 
go ‘beyond good and evil’, that is, to act. This, of course, means that he 
both accepts the basic premises of natural laws on the rational level and 
then suspends them on the level of belief. “Good Heavens!”, he says, 
“what sort of free will is left when we come to tabulation and arithmetic, 
when it will be a case of twice two make four? Twice two makes four 
without my will. As if free will meant that!” (Dostoevsky, 1864/2008: 26). 
This statement is an extreme depiction of his revolt against scientific 
determinism. The Underground Man points out that for thousands of years 
humans have acted “deliberately” and “consciously” against their 
perceived best interests. Thus, contrary to utilitarian and ‘scientific’ 
utopian thought advocated by Chernyshevsky and other rational egoists he 
is addressing, the Underground Man asserts the importance of ‘free will’, 
even destruction and chaos. Human beings, for the Underground Man, 
assert their right to defy reason and to suffer. Humans act, in short, in 
accordance with their free will. 
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Laws of nature - the conclusions of natural science and mathematics - 
assume human behaviour is rational; human beings are thus simply 
conceived as a piece of material that should act according to the laws of 
rationalism. Reason must be an excellent thing, but “reason is nothing but 
reason and satisfies only the rational side of man’s nature”, whereas 
wanting, or will “is a manifestation of the whole life, that is, of the whole 
human life including reason and all the impulses” (Dostoevsky, 1864/2008: 
30). Furthermore, “although our life, in this manifestation of it, is often 
worthless, yet it is life and not simply extracting square roots” (ibid. 30). “I 
quite naturally want to live”, declares the Underground Man, “in order to 
satisfy all my capacities for life, and not simply my capacity for reasoning” 
(ibid). In Part Two of the novella, he thus enters the second but more 
caustic, stage of ressentiment, during which self-consciousness is 
indissolubly linked with negation: spite takes the place of reaction. The 
Underground Man begins to defy reason and to embrace suffering. One 
can take pleasure even in “toothache, and in humiliation”, he asserts 
(ibid.15-16). This stage allows him to retain his “personality”, his 
“individuality” (ibid. 31). Will may go hand in hand with reason, but it 
remains stubbornly at odds with it. 
 
Contrary to oppressive rationalism advocated by the gentlemen he is 
addressing, the Underground Man asserts the importance of wilfulness, 
even spite, for this separates human beings from the beasts, making them 
“human, all too human”, not just a spiritless organ. In Notes from 
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Underground, Dostoevsky, therefore, provides some important challenges 
not only to scientific rationality but to other ideologies and systems based 
on similar assumptions, including neoliberal post-politics. His observations 
run parallel to the spirit of our age, where technocratic and market-
oriented solutions to complex human, social and political problems have 
become the norm. To be sure, rational egoism of the Chernyshevskian 
variety may no longer dominate the current debates but other doctrines 
and ‘progressive ideologies’ sharing similar assumptions have been 
dominant in the Western world over recent decades. Neoliberalism, with 
the utilitarian, competitive individuals ‘motivated only by self-interest’ at 
its heart, takes it as given that human beings act ‘rationally’ and that they 
want to act rationally. However, as I noted in the previous chapters, the 
forms of freedom and rationality fostered by neoliberalism are limited and 
subject to forms of coercion. The concept of freedom and rationality make 
sense only as far as they facilitate the consumer choice-making process. 
Both rational egoism and neoliberalism are underpinned by the idea that 
human beings are governed by reason, science and self-interest in their 
activities. In this sense, Dostoevsky’s critique of reason and rationality still 
rings true. 
 
Neoliberalism proposes that one serves one’s own interests over those of 
others. Dostoevsky, however, shows that humans consciously and 
knowingly act against their real interests, seeking sometimes their 
complete annihilation and destruction. Contrary to scientific determinism 
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and other systems such as neoliberalism which advances the notion that 
human beings are good, and when governed by science and reason, they 
can act only according to the laws of rationalism, Dostoevsky asserts that 
although our decisions may be irrational, and even can lead to chaos and 
destruction, they are still decisions of our heightened consciousness, or 
free will. Where neoliberal post-politics (and its biopolitical 
governmentality preemptive indifference) seeks to maximise utility and 
minimise harm through the pursuit of happiness by individuals ‘motivated 
only by self-interest’, Dostoevsky insists that life also consists of suffering, 
and this does not ‘make sense’ under neoliberal post-politics in which 
happiness is reduced to surplus-value and politics to securitised/militarised 
conformism. Certain things can be gained through reason and rationality 
but through suffering and spite as well. One can find truth in reason and 
scientific determinism, but one can also love destruction and chaos.  
 
Neoliberal post-politics wants an efficient, well-ordered society that is 
based on an implied quest for order and certainty. Against this, Dostoevsky 
posits a view of human beings as complex, conflicted and paralysed 
characters, which makes it impossible to transform them into truly 
‘rational’ and ‘enlightened’ beings. Precisely in this sense, Dostoevsky’s 
concept of ‘free subject’ with a ‘free will’ differs greatly from the form 
understood by rational egoism, or consumer-style choices under 
neoliberalism. The Underground Man, for instance, is not satisfied with 
respecting or guaranteeing any kind of ‘pseudo-freedom’ provided by 
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rational egoism; he demands freedom that is beyond rational egoism. His 
notion of freedom is more akin to the idea of wanting, which includes the 
human capacity to say ‘no’, even where it can lead to total annihilation. 
 
For neoliberalism, wants, desires, needs, wishes and affects are useful in 
securing a politics of consensus, while for Dostoevsky they have profound 
value for the development of human beings. Wants, desires, thoughts, 
feelings, ideas exert a powerful influence on our everyday lives. They are, 
in other words, linked to the moment of self-realisation of human beings, 
seeking freedom from oppressive rationality. Reason, Dostoevsky believes, 
cannot be separated from affects and passions. For neoliberalism, 
emotions and affects have some utility in producing faithful and law-
abiding subjects, and they need to be kept in line with serving perceived 
best interests. They have, in short, a place in advancing a well-regulated 
freedom. As such, passions and instincts make sense only as far as they 
create consumer desires to buy goods and services and thus increase the 
capitalist accumulation of surplus-value. Dostoevsky, in contrast, sees life 
as a source of rich emotions and affects, including suffering. Emotions and 
affects, passions and instincts are forms of violence which are ecstatic 
eruptions from the background of normativity and reason. “Reason is only 
one part of our temperament”, the Underground Man reminds us. 
“Individualism as a value includes the right to screw yourself up” (Denby, 
2012). Reason does not disappear under affects and emotions, but it has its 
own limits. “What does reason know? Reason only knows what it has 
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succeeded in learning (some things, perhaps, it will never learn” 
(Dostoevsky, 1864/2008: 24). The Underground Man’s spite is on the one 
hand sheer, irrationalist rejection of oppressive rationality, but on the 
other hand it is in fact in partly related to reasoning: it is as much about 
using irrational capacities as it is about reasoning capacities. And it is as 
much about reasoning capacities as it is about passions as a guide. The 
Underground Man is ‘insulted’ and ‘humiliated’ by an oppressive social 
system, hence he wants to destroy that which destroys him. The world he 
created turns around him, not around God because ‘God is dead.’ He 
rejects God in the name of a ‘mysterious loathsome truth’, a truth in which 
pain and suffering are necessary to construct a spiteful subjectivity. 
 
In this sense the spiteful personality of the Underground Man brings to 
mind Nietzsche’s radical (or ‘suicidal’) nihilist, whose will becomes a will to 
nothingness, to annihilation. Nietzsche (1967a: 318) argues that the ascetic 
ideal is ultimately a failure, an illusion. When the illusion disappears, this is 
followed by the emergence of radical and passive nihilisms. A radical 
nihilist is a human being “who judges of the world as it is that it ought not 
to be” (ibid. 318). In other words, a radical nihilist wants to destroy all 
values, including those that are attached to ‘this’ world. Passive nihilism, 
on the other hand, is a sign of weakness: “the strength of the spirit can be 
tired, exhausted, so that the previous goals and values are insufficient and 
no longer inspire belief” (ibid. 23). Thus it refers to “a depreciated life…a 
world without values, stripped of meaning and purpose” (Deleuze, 1983: 
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148). If the passive nihilist seeks to deny the virtual, the radical nihilist 
seeks to deny and destroy actual existence for the sake of realising his 
values. Since freedom from the existing world is her goal, the radical nihilist 
comes to realise that she has values and goals but they are not realisable in 
this (actual) world. Hence she hopes for another, transcendent or ‘true’ 
world, and her world tends to lose its virtual dimension. 
 
Such a comparison between nihilism and the Underground Man is of 
crucial importance, for it serves to strengthen the view that spite is an 
active feeling that results from passive nihilism (Nietzsche 1996: 67, 119). 
Passive nihilism emerges when the man of ressentiment turns “his 
ressentiment against God”, when he puts “himself in the place of the God 
he has killed” (Deleuze, 1983: 155). Seen in this perspective, the 
relationship between passive and radical nihilism can be described as a 
non-dialectical, complementary synthesis in which full consciousness or 
free will is oscillated between spite and passivity. Spite, that is to say, has 
become legitimated as a technique of governance because it justifies itself 
with reference to and thus mirrors passivity and slavish comforts imposed 
by rational egoism and neoliberal and militarised post-politics. While the 
passive nihilist, rational egoist, or neoliberal society is obsessed with 
fear/security, the radical nihilist is addicted to danger. Whereas the 
rational philosophies of naturalism and scientism and neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics opt for a pseudo-freedom devoid of passions and 
instincts, the radical nihilist is ready to destroy the ‘society’ for his 
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passionate attachment. Thus spite has become the only object of 
‘fascination’ for human beings who destroy the actual in the name of the 
virtual. 
 
In this way, although the Crystal Palace - namely Chernyshevsky’s socialist 
utopianism for human happiness, where the whole world run according 
scientific rationality - seeks to expel violence from its system of values with 
the aim of producing rational and controllable individuals who thus 
become harmless and faithful to the existing order, it itself produces a 
paradoxical, ecstatic violence: that of spite. Underground versus the Crystal 
Palace, or spite versus slavish comforts. In the process, every slavish 
comfort and the notion of pseudo-happiness espoused by rational egoism 
can become the source of spiteful musings of the Underground Man. Spite, 
therefore, becomes a radical nihilist strategy which does not mirror the 
level of antagonism and conflict but the level of reason and rationality. 
Thus, while spite aims at radicalising the society “through sacrifice” 
(Baudrillard, 2003: 97), rational egoism aims at realising the society 
through reason and rationality which are identical to terrorism. Spite, 
which is generated by the system, is thus normalised as a factor of sociality, 
as a social regime. Spite is the mirror image of rational egoism, and this is 
why it is again and again generated by the Crystal Palace. Located outside 
the Crystal Palace, the Underground Man is continually renewed through 
negation and suffering because they are necessary in order to construct his 
spiteful subjectivity. Hence he poses a ‘true’ against the ‘false’ totalitarian 
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ready-made happiness devoid of passions, against the reduction of human 
beings to “piano keys” (see Dostoevsky, 1864/2008: 26). 
 
Cheap, ready-made happiness describes the lot of the people who 
overwhelm the Underground Man “with spiteful and pitiful derision” 
because he feels he is not like any of them (ibid. 57). His humiliation at 
their hands leads him to ignore the cheap happiness, denying the given 
world as it is. Thus he chooses suffering which will ‘raise and purify’ him: 
the continual experience of the moment of choice that the man of action 
rejects. And this is what makes him an inherently tragic figure: he is 
condemned to his ultimate failure. The tragedy of the Underground Man 
derives from his acceptance of suffering as a way of spiritual growth, as a 
path to redemption. Suffering as doubt constitutes the terminal character 
of this tragedy. His struggle between the individual freedom and natural 
determinism do not oppose each other; they are united in disunion, in a 
non-dialectical, complementary synthesis. At the root of his vaunted 
struggle/false choice, then, is a cycle of negation (humiliation) and 
affirmation (revolt) in which he is at both the aggressor and the victim of 
aggression. 
 
The Underground Man’s spite is a celebration of human perversity which 
knows no bounds. He seems to be a ‘rational’ human being, but much of 
what he does seems to be utterly ‘irrational.’ He has formidable reasoning 
capacities, but he is spiteful at the same time. He has clearly an affective 
265 
 
personality who is not afraid to show his passions and instincts. He can be 
rational and controllable one moment, filled with spite the next. What 
really drives him is not only reason, but affects and instincts as well. Thus 
reason and affect are intimately connected. In this sense, the Underground 
Man unsettles us as ‘rational’ and ‘enlightened’ beings. Not just the fact 
that spiteful individuals are capable of performing the most horrible deeds. 
But also the fact that the basic idea of ‘human beings as primarily rational’ 
is an imagination, possessing no moral safety nets. In other words, moral 
laws are not absolute. Human beings make their own moral laws without 
respecting the moral boundaries provided by the established order. 
 
How might we view contemporary society in the light of the Underground 
Man? In what follows I argue that the Underground Man is one of the 
representatives of a generation that is still with us. Like the Underground 
Man, today’s spiteful terrorist has a critique of both himself and the ideas 
provided by neoliberal post-politics; yet, in his full consciousness, he also 
understands that reason and rationality espoused by neoliberalism have 
their limits. In this sense, the terrorist lives constantly on the edge, an 
abyss, whose soul oscillates between reason and unreason. He is a 
troubled and conflicted character who is shaped in important ways by 
neoliberalism. 
 
Contrary to neoliberalism that wants a ‘ready-made’ happiness, separated 
from action and reduced to passivity, the spiteful terrorist lives suffering as 
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a state of (self)punishment. As I develop in the following section, 
neoliberalism is an inability to accept pain, conflict and antagonism, 
whereas terrorism is an internal condition of neoliberalism which insists 
that pain/suffering, conflict and antagonism are necessary in order to 
construct a subjectivity. Neoliberalism is content with the actual world; it 
opts for a decaffeinated reality by directing desires, emotions into surplus 
value and security/militarism, whereas terrorism primarily seeks to negate 
the value of such ready-made decaffeinated reality for the sake of passions 
and values, including suffering. 
 
6.3 The Art of Terror 
 
“Hello there, mice! Don’t be sad - it is far better to be angry.” (Ulrike 
Meinhof, quoted in Lewis, 2008) 
 
“What have I painted? Three times Baader, shot. Three times Ensslin, 
hanged. Three times the dead Meinhof after they cut her down. Once the 
dead Meins. Three times Ensslin, neutral (almost like pop stars). Then a big, 
unspecific burial—a cell dominated by a bookcase—a silent, grey record 
player—a youthful portrait of Meinhof, sentimental in a bourgeois way—
twice the arrest of Meins, forced to surrender to the clenched power of the 
state. All the pictures are dull, grey, mostly very blurred, diffuse. Their 
presence is the horror and the hard-to-bear refusal to answer, to explain, to 
give an opinion.” (Richter, 1995: 125) 
 
Perhaps the most famous paintings about the Baader-Meinhof group, later 
known as the Red Army Faction (RAF), is a series of 15 canvases by Gerhard 
Richter, entitled ‘October 18, 1977’ (1988). The title names not the group, 
nor its members, but a date. For anyone familiar with revolutionary 
violence and state violence in post-war Germany, 18 October 1977 is 
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deeply shocking. On that date, three principal members of the Baader-
Meinhof group, Andreas Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Gudrun Ensslin, were 
found dead in Stuttgart’s Stammheim prison. Andreas Baader was found 
dead with a bullet wound to his head, Raspe lay dying of gunshot wounds, 
and Enslin was hanging from a grate in her cell. The official explanation on 
Stammheim was suicide, as was Ulrike Meinhof, a co-founder of the group, 
who was earlier found hanged in her cell. 
 
Richter’s paintings show the scenes copied from magazines and police 
photographs. There is violence lurking within the pictures: three versions of 
Ulrike Meinhof’s corpse, one with a rope still around her neck, Andreas 
Baader’s bookshelves and record player in his cell at Stammheim prison in 
which Baader was said to have hidden a gun, two versions of Baader’s 
corpse, his comrade Gudrun Ensslin hanging from her Stammheim prison 
cell, and their vast public funeral, a blurred landscape in which the painful 
and tragic complicity of the aggressors and the victims of aggression tend 
to coincide in a zone of indistinction. 
 
What Richter’s paintings eloquently convey “is absence, emptiness, the 
howling space of the void; the rest is silence” (Kauffman, 2008: 357). 
Indeed, there is no communication in the paintings, for the political itself is 
foreclosed, leaving spite as the only ‘political’ (re)action by distilling a will 
to destruction. The guerrillas’ journey to this psychological state is hinted 
at but not seriously considered. “Strange, touching hints at the normality of 
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these people are everywhere” – Baader’s cell, with its hundreds of books, 
the record player, and an empty coat (Jones, 2002). However, the 
ambiguity is deliberate. Spiteful destruction is absorbed into the very act of 
representing; paintings and violence become one and the same gesture. 
Thus, we are given, not guerrilla Ulrike Meinhof, but a sentimental beauty, 
not Baader but a bookcase, a record player, and not spite, but ‘funeral.’ In 
their engagements with the historical subjects the paintings serve as a 
critique of something deeply disturbing: literal as well as social martyrdom 
as justification for war against the German state. 
 
The Baader-Meinhof group were some of the most notorious violent 
guerrillas among German youth, like many elsewhere, during the 60’s and 
70’s. The silence of German society led them to begin by peacefully 
protesting against materialism, nuclear proliferation, the cold war and 
Vietnam, and support for authoritarian regimes (like that of the Shah of 
Iran), but more specifically in West Germany against the country’s Nazi 
past. At that time, the very venom of fascist ideology still had not been 
removed from the very pores of German society, including the police and 
the military. “This is the Auschwitz generation”, announced Gudrun Ensslin, 
“and there’s no argument with them!” (quoted in Aust, 2008: 44). Peaceful 
protests sometimes provoked repressive responses from the authorities, 
which caused even more violent responses. The Baader-Meinhof group 
became antiheroes to many young Germans disaffected from their parents 
who had acquiesced to Hitler (Kimmelman, 2002). 
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The RAF members strongly believed that urban guerrilla tactics were 
necessary to battle the government of West Germany and the economic 
leaders within that system. Ulrike Meinhof (quoted in Guelke, 1998: 93, 97) 
explains the RAF’s mission: “nauseated by the … system, the total 
commercialisation and absolute mendacity … deeply disappointed by the 
actions of the student movement … they thought it essential to spread the 
idea of armed struggle.” “Not because they were so blind”, she writes, “as 
to believe they could keep that initiative going until the revolution 
triumphed in Germany, or that they would not be killed and imprisoned.” 
Their aim was to “salvage historically the whole state of understanding 
attained by the movement of 1967/68; it was a case of not letting the 
struggle fall apart again” (ibid. 97). 
 
Pursuing the same idea Ulrike Meinhof (2001: 278) writes elsewhere: “in its 
first phase the guerrilla is shocking.” The aim of the shock, of course, was 
triggering a revolt through sabotage and violence. In this way, Meinhof 
argues, people would “act without being determined by the pressure of the 
system, without seeing themselves with the eyes of the media, without 
fear.” Sabotage, or action, Meinhof (ibid. 278) insists, could awaken the 
masses, enabling them “to have a consciousness of their history”, for “all 
history is history of class struggle.” By provoking an even greater state 
terror through sabotage, “the enemy betrays himself, becomes visible”, 
writes Meinhof (ibid. 279), and this “allows contradictions to escalate and 
thus forces the revolutionary struggle.” The group, now growing in 
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numbers, carried out a campaign of violence, targeting and murdering 
West German politicians, the leading business figures, American soldiers 
and German policemen. The act of sabotage, however, “did not precipitate 
any revolutionary situation in the former East Germany.” Rather, “the 
campaign was widely condemned and led to the defeat of the RAF and its 
eventual disbandment” (see Mcdonald, 2010: 13). ‘Liberal Germany’ 
became more draconian and cruel. Consequently, anyone linked not only 
to the Baader-Meinhof, but also to the radical left risked being barred from 
public service. 
 
Their campaign of violence was aimed at leading to a socialist state. The 
ideological struggle of “six RAF members against sixty million West German 
citizens”, as Henrich Boll (quoted in Aust, 2008: 147) characterized it, 
turned out to be a tragic failure. The Baader-Meinhof failed to win the 
support of the disaffected workers. More importantly, they failed to bring 
about the desired change. As Wollen (2001) succinctly put it, “armoured 
against doubt, driven by fear of what might happen if their certainties were 
abandoned, desperately struggling to maintain their sense of self, afraid of 
each other’s contempt, they staggered from idealism to self-destruction.” 
That is, idealism transformed into spiteful violence that could not create 
something new. 
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6.4 Spiteful Fundamentalism 
 
The Baader-Meinhof’s universe was godless. Death as an idea had 
preoccupied them for a long time. “Suicide is the last act of rebellion”, 
writes Ulrike Meinhof (quoted in Aust, 2008: 347). “The struggle goes on”, 
as Ensslin says. “Even if they have taken the guns out of our hands, we are 
still left with our bodies. These we will now use as our ultimate weapon” 
(quoted in Becker, 1989: 264). In the era of a ‘permanent war on terror’ 
their words and suicides have acquired a new resonance. In short, they 
continue to disturb. In a society which seeks to maximise utility and 
minimise harm through self-interested, choosing individuals in the pursuit 
of enjoyment, suicide is a toxic act. Now the toxicity has spread. Compared 
to the Baader-Meinhof’s strategy of sabotage, today’s terrorism uses spite 
as a strategy, the spectacle of death against ‘the pacified life’ on offer in 
neoliberal post-politics. 
 
The Underground Man’s fantasy aimed at targeting oppressive rationalism. 
His society, in short, was based on a constantly rationalised, pacified and 
administered life, devoid of passions and desires. The Baader-Meinhof’s 
fantasy aimed at targeting the capitalist consumerist ideology that 
dominated West Germany. They believed that capitalism had complete 
dominance over the working class through ideological state apparatuses, 
including the media and the education system. Hence, they asserted, 
capitalism could only be destroyed through ‘spectacles’ or terror acts 
272 
 
which blew a hole into the functioning of the consumerist society. Theirs, 
in other words, was a society where the marketisation of social relations 
went hand in hand with the pacifism of their generations. Neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics, in a similar vein, attempts to create a reactive life 
in which ‘happiness’ is reduced to consumerism, politics to a depoliticised 
expert administration, to something that “appears essentially as narcotic, 
anesthetic, calm, peace” (Nietzsche, 1996: 23–4). The mission of 
neoliberalism is, in short, to pacify life by turning passions and affects into 
the language of market freedom and ‘neoliberal harmony.’ However, in a 
society of the spectacle, in a neoliberal age that constantly produces 
‘radical losers’ (Enzensberger, 2005) some of them are not resigned to their 
fate, waiting for their ‘moment’ to come. Indeed, not all radical losers “can 
be pacified by pointing out that their status corresponds to their poor 
placement in a contest.” Many will disagree by declaring that “they have 
never gotten a chance to participate in order to be positioned according to 
their merits” (Sloterdijk, 2010: 40). Their spite turns not just against the 
happy-indifferent centre of society but also against the whole system. The 
spiteful individual always remembers the injustices inflicted upon him. But, 
more importantly, he pays them back with his burning spite. Touching the 
void, the ‘nothing’, becomes the truth of the spiteful individual. The person 
who pays back is the one with the “lasting will” (Nietzsche, 1996). Once this 
subject is constituted, spite can last for long periods of time. 
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In the age of the spectacle, the radical other goes by the name of 
terrorism, which is frequently associated with religious spiteful 
fundamentalism: “Our men are eager to die just as the Americans are 
eager to live” declared Bin Laden (2001). “We want to create a European 
version of Al-Qaeda”, “the most successful revolutionary movement in the 
world”, says far-right Norwegian mass killer Anders Behring Breivik (quoted 
in Malik, 2012). While Al-Qaeda sees itself as warriors defending the 
Islamic world against Crusaders from the West, Anders Behring Breivik sees 
himself as a crusader warrior defending European Christian civilization 
against ‘Muslims’, ‘immigrants’ and ‘cultural Marxism.’  
 
Significantly in this context, previous forms of revolutionary groups claimed 
to represent clear and specific political demands. As such, the classical 
attacks “were usually directed at well-defined highly symbolic targets of 
the authority”, which could include police, military and government 
officials, political leaders, or other symbolic targets such as government 
buildings (Spencer, 2006: 7). Contemporary terror, however, signifies the 
return of the foreclosed with a vengeance, a seemingly medieval 
vengeance against the passive nihilist consumer society in which to die for 
a cause seems impossible or crazy. 
 
Moreover, whereas ‘old terrorism’ was predominantly secular in 
orientation (Spencer, 2006: 9), fundamentalist terrorism signifies ‘holy war’ 
with religious belief, mainly radical Islam and Christianity. Thus new 
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terrorists hold themselves accountable only to God (Hoffman, 1995: 273). 
A fundamentalist terrorist is convinced that her narrative is the only true 
one, she is certain that she is the elect of God. Hence she pledges her 
submission to God and meditates on the blood to come (DeLillo, 2001). In 
appealing to the divine world, she builds a plot around spite and eliminates 
all contradictions in order to serve God’s purpose on Earth. Taking the 
scriptures and commandments and prophecies literally, fundamentalist 
terrorism “liberates the true believer from secular morals, from obligations 
to tolerance and other norms of the Enlightenment and allows him – even 
demands of him – to dehumanise the ‘others’” (Hess, 2003: 348-9). Thus, 
anything can be justified by an appeal to God and judiciously selected 
passages from the holy books such as Koran and Holy Bible. The spiteful 
terrorist is convinced that his is the only truth, and this truth loves not just 
happiness but also suffering and spite. The fundamentalist terrorist uses 
spite in the name of a loathsome truth. For her, the truth lies in complete 
annihilation and destruction. 
 
Because of the abstract, monological character of religious 
fundamentalism, there can be no commerce with it, no mediation; in short, 
there is nothing to discuss, nothing to sort out. Hence spiteful 
fundamentalism is empty of affect capable of promoting spite and violence 
in principle. When spite and destruction become sole principles, the idea of 
freedom becomes an abstract idea, something that is felt or perceived in 
full consciousness, as in the Underground Man, and here the claim is that 
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‘freedom’ is only so felt or perceived through acts of spiteful destruction. In 
an attempt to feel freedom, the terrorist becomes committed to the 
abstract character of harming or destroying sociality, rather than the hard 
work and discipline of political collective action or political praxis. She 
believes that only the whole-hearted affirmation based on faith can save 
her from the ready-made happiness of neoliberal post-politics, which 
desires self-interested human beings who act rationally so that they 
become not only less of a threat to themselves but to the system as well. 
 
Further, the realisation of god’s will on earth is the prototype for all 
fundamentalist terrorists, the ideal in whose shadow religious ethics and 
political theory all developed. In other words, the fundamentalist terrorist 
is certain that he represents God’s will and sees himself merely as the 
appointee of God. For extremists who see themselves as instruments of 
God’s will, everything is allowed. To paraphrase Augustine, “Love God, and 
then everything is permitted.” 
 
As a result, earthly ends are devalued, even as they are pursued. The 
fundamentalist terrorist realises that her values and goals cannot find a 
place in this world. Beyond this world, there is that other world, which 
promises ‘emancipation’ from decaffeinated reality of the existing world. It 
is precisely for this reason that this world must be annihilated for the world 
to come. Thus her will becomes a will to destruction and suicide and 
martyrdom become paths that lead to heaven. An overall religious 
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devaluation of existence becomes exploited and expressed in spite where it 
does not matter who dies, self or other. Religion is capable of offering its 
followers a clear, aggressive, and grandiosely theatrical ‘worldview’ that 
rests on a clear differentiation of friend and enemy (Sloterdijk, 2010: 220). 
The dominant discourse of spite is thus fundamentally Manichean, 
introducing a binary opposition between good and evil, us and them. 
Fuelling future cycles of spite and violence, such a discourse evil is 
apocalyptic, evoking a permanent war with ‘enemies.’ When a binary logic 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is invoked, terror could happen everywhere, it could 
happen anywhere. The spiteful terrorist knows where it wants to hit. It 
enters society “like the bullet enters the battle” (ibid. 10). Thus, he dares to 
face the abyss of the real, in the form of suicide, martyrdom, as a 
terrorising jouissance. Being indifferent to the choice of targets, 
fundamentalist terrorists have an active desire for the spectacular acts of 
destruction: a conscious, spiteful denunciation of the actual city in the 
name of the City of God. 
 
In this regard, fundamentalist terrorism articulates a symbolic sacrifice of 
life which is ‘alien’ to neoliberal post-politics; it is deeply shocking to 
neoliberalism governed by the principle of the preservation of life and the 
careful, methodical and administrative functioning of the established social 
and biopolitical regimes. In other words, what is truly ‘shocking’ about 
fundamentalist terrorism is that we are witnessing a religious dimension, 
an ‘apocalyptic’ tradition, that is entirely alien to neoliberalism, which 
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assumes human beings are ‘good’ and when governed by reason and self-
interest in their activities, they can become harmless to the existing order, 
and that spite is an impossible affect in a ‘rational’ and ‘enlightened’ 
society. Fundamentalist terrorism, therefore, shares the foundation of the 
eschatological tradition as it declares that one should always ‘act’ in order 
to destroy the given. It urges the believer to act in the name of God and 
other believers (see Moussali, 1999: 38; Münklerr, 2002: 70-1). 
 
As argued in the discipline chapter, today there are two responses that 
endlessly call the nature of the eschatological tradition into question: the 
first response is katechontic, which sides with the given, the second is 
revolutionary, which seeks a total deligitimisation of the given. At first 
glance, fundamentalist terrorism looks like a continuation of the 
eschatological tradition, but a closer look reveals that it is not radical 
enough to be seen as a ‘real apocalypticism.’ Real apocalypticism not only 
draws a distinction between this and that world, but also employs a 
dialectical thinking, which puts the actual and the virtual, or history and 
what is to come into interaction (see Diken, 2012: 117). In fundamentalist 
terrorism, on the other hand, the gap between divine liberation and 
earthly realms is no longer mediated but cancelled, for it believes that it 
has direct access to willing God and is appointed by God. In other words, 
the dialectic between the actual and the virtual, the earth and heaven, is 
not preserved; divine justice is found in that other world. Thus everything 
is permitted, at whatever cost, to eliminate evil from the earth. Precisely in 
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this sense, spiteful fundamentalism cannot be seen as revolutionary. Real 
apocalypticism seeks to combine violence with a transvaluation. And this is 
what is missing in fundamentalist terrorism. While real apocalypticism 
targets the given framework of sensibility, fundamentalist terrorism plays a 
given game, using spite against neoliberal capitalism. 
 
Hence, I suggest that spite is not actually ‘political.’ What defines 
fundamentalist terrorism is a depoliticised gesture, that is, nihilistic quality 
of the violence that leads to a state of disengagement from politics as 
purposive, collective action. Fundamentalist terrorism is not acting without 
purpose; rather its actions consist only of ‘reactions’ because it justifies 
itself with reference to and thus mirrors the preemptive war against terror. 
Spiteful fundamentalism is thus post-political in the sense that it is “the 
product of listless and indifferent forces” (Baudrillard, 1993: 76) rather 
than social and political conflicts and antagonisms. And this also explains 
why we are witnessing the rise of fundamentalist terrorism today. Precisely 
because ours is a post-political society in which the politics is reactive, and 
conflict/antagonism is eliminated. Precisely because neoliberal post-
politics proposes that change is no longer desirable or possible, and that 
there is no alternative. Precisely because neoliberal post-politics is an 
inability to act politically. Weakened by preemptive indifference, hedonism 
and consumerism accompanying neoliberal capitalism, we ‘the Westerners’ 
cannot find a worthy cause to fight for (see Žižek, 2002: 40-1). Dead men, 
on the other hand, have a cause to fight for. There is always ‘something’ 
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for which the ‘fight’ takes place. And if there is one thing that is repressed 
and banished from ‘rational’ and ‘enlightened’ neoliberal post-politics, it is 
spite, death, suicide, martyrdom. Fundamentalist terrorism is marked with 
the return of the repressed with a vengeance (Diken, 2009; Žižek, 2006). 
 
It is true that spiteful terrorism has social origins in the global neoliberal 
order, in social, political and economic forces that attempt to create 
homogenous global networks. However, it is also equally true that today, 
terrorism produces contemporary society. Terrorism is the state’s 
pronouncedly evil changeling, its perfect friend and enemy, whose 
existence prefigures and summons forth the (re)production of the social by 
the global security state as our saviour and redeemer. In the aftermath of 
9/11, terrorism (and the war against terrorism) has become a social 
regime, a factor of sociality, which sustains, rather than challenges the 
consensual neoliberal order. 
 
It would seem that in an age where the concept of death has vanished 
from the register of politics and contemporary society, it has returned as a 
spectacle itself – the spectacle of spiteful terrorism paralyses our gaze. 
However, I argue that the spectacle of terrorism is inseparable from the 
spectacle of security. The spectacle of security, conjured by the established 
social regimes and counterrevolutionary principles of the antiterrorist 
state, must produce the state’s most necessary social and political enemy, 
terrorism. And terrorism has become a generative principle of formation 
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for neoliberal post-politics. The social regime of terrorism does not only 
mean the global security state that is now embodied in the war against 
terrorism. It also demonstrates how neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
is now also governed by multiple affects such as a widespread fear of 
terroristic events, or spiteful fundamentalism. It locates those affects in the 
way that the global security state has made “contingency” as a generative 
principle of formation for rule (Dillon, 2007; see also Aradau & Munster, 
2007; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). In this way, the aim is not simply to 
eliminate terrorism, but the “contingency of terrorism” as well. In the 
process, therefore, “the contingency of terrorism” goes parallel with 
“terrorism of contingency”, a process in which governing technologies of 
security have permeated in every aspects of daily life (Dillon, 2007: 8). 
Thus, it is the contingency itself that makes terrorism as the generative 
principle of formation for rule. But contingency is also the very operational 
practice of security politics as well (ibid. 9). 
 
When fear escapes state control and instead is disseminated by the 
‘dangerous multitudes’, absolute terrorism and the spectre of security can 
easily return. Such a fear of terrorism should not only be understood as a 
fear of spiteful destruction though. This fear (or a biopolitics of fear) is also 
crucial to the administration and pacification of society and life. For it 
follows those who mobilise its spectre periodically to renew and modify 
neoliberal governmentality that is distributed among political rationalities 
and governmental technologies that have accompanied the development 
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of the global security state (Butler 2004; Brown 2006; Paye, 2007). This also 
means that the global security state is tempted to create policies for the 
management of fear. Fear, then, becomes part of the ‘military industrial 
complex’ through which the neoliberal security state sustains and extends 
its activities. If fear becomes a generative principle in neoliberal biopolitics, 
it can no longer be to prevent a transgression of the existing order 
maintained by the security state (Debrix and Barder, 2009: 406). Rather, it 
can also help produce, create, proliferate spiteful terrorism with the 
established social regimes and security technologies. Thus, the biopolitics 
of fear and terrorism seem to accompany the deployment of political 
technologies and governmental rationalities, as much as it precipitated by 
a contingent terroristic event (Dillon, 2007: 8). In the context of neoliberal 
governmentality, the biopolitical (re)production of fear is the result of a 
series of scare tactics, political rationalities, or terrorism regimes that can 
only produce ‘good’ social and political effects by agents of government. 
Terrorism thus has both a philosophical and political logic, and on the other 
as an affective logic. 
 
The primary purpose of the war against terrorism is to bring terrorism with 
the established social regimes and the corresponding characteristics of the 
neoliberal security state with the aim of destroying it, or preempting it. In 
this sense, the aim is to eliminate terrorism through the massive global 
security effort, or make terrorism at least manageable through preemptive 
risk-security measures (Aradau and Munster, 2012; Dillon, 2007). This 
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radical ambiguity – to govern terrorism in order to bring terrorism within 
the orbit of the established social regimes and security technologies – 
bears within it an essential risk. As Agamben (2001) notes, “a state which 
has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it 
can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic.” The 
obscene/off-scene reality behind the politics of fear/security is that the 
fetishisation of security generates more terrorism. 
 
If a contingent terroristic event is the problem, and if the biopolitics of fear 
and the social regime of terrorism is the answer, governmental 
technologies and political rationalities must ensure that the conduct 
responsible for ‘unknown threats’ is done away with (before they shape 
and become eventful). But, more importantly, these terrorism regimes 
upon which the political rationalities and governing technologies of 
neoliberalism rely must also make certain that human beings are not only 
to become mobilised and adaptively govern themselves. Rather, the self-
rationalising, self-governable individuals that act, react, and interact in 
coordination with governmental technologies and the established social 
regimes of neoliberalism that are found at the heart of fear and terrorism 
production are more likely to represent what Michael Dillon has called 
“emergent life” (Dillon, 2007). 
 
Dillon argues that emergent life in societies “governed by terror” can be 
understood “as a constant potential for adaptation in biopolitical terror 
283 
 
apparatuses” (Dillon, 2007: 8). As he (ibid. 14) notes, “emergent means 
that they [human beings] are capable of moving out of phase with 
themselves and becoming other than what they were.” The “living things” 
that are governed “by a widespread fear of terror” have no choice but to 
rely on the contingency of terrorism and terrorism of contingency. This 
means that they have to redefine themselves constantly inside the 
established social regimes and governmental technologies. Yet, because 
the social regime of terrorism and the biopoliticised fear and security 
technologies create conditions that allow it to thrive, emergent life 
undergoes constant change and transformation but always remains on the 
look-out (Debrix and Barder, 2009). And, as discussed throughout the 
dissertation, it is a life that endlessly needs to monitor itself so that it can 
fear today what can be tomorrow’s terrorism. Thus, unlike the standard 
security/biopolitics in which individuals are rendered inert, emergent 
human beings actively and energetically partake of the biopolitical 
(re)production of fear, terrorism and, ultimately, neoliberal capitalism. 
Today there are no ‘passive’ subjects, only actively driven subjects of the 
liberal struggle and war. 
 
Indeed, what emergent life and emergent human beings (re)produce 
through their constant ‘events watch’ is nothing else than the perpetuation 
of the biopolitical regimes of terrorism. As Dillon (2007: 8) pithily put it, 
“the more effort that is put into governing terror, the more terror comes to 
govern the governors.” Emergent life in today’s neoliberal society guided 
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by the established social regimes, governing technologies of security and 
the affective politics ensures that terrorism (no matter which enemy or 
dangerous situations such as ‘chaos’, ‘disorder’, ‘revolution’ are targeted) 
will not be completely eliminated but, instead, will remain as one of the 
main generative principle of formation, of government. Terrorism, in other 
words, has become legitimated as a social regime on account of how it 
functions to ‘make life live’ for neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Or, 
to say this differently, neoliberal post-politics needs terrorism in order to 
depoliticise politics, to recast “political and economic choices as military 
necessities” (Bauman, 2008: 246-247). 
 
It is on this basis that terrorism joins the previous social regimes of 
sovereignty, discipline and control. Sovereign operates through cruel and 
contingent acts, transforming the state of exception into a form of 
sociality. In other words, sovereignty is at the intersection of war and 
violence, an intersection which cannot be separated from contingency. The 
always present possibility of war and of violence is what defines state 
sovereignty’s legitimacy. As such, cruel and contingent acts are mobilised 
alongside other techniques of governance (the war on terror) to avoid 
future terrorist threats within a population. In targeting a population in 
order to defuse events, sovereign political power thus creates more 
enemies from a population. In the end, the vengeful acts of sovereignty 
produce ressentiment. And, as discussed before, ressentiment can 
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transform itself into spite, an aggressive will to deny and destroy 
everything, including sociality. 
 
Terrorism, in a similar vein, speaks of a governmentality that radically 
disrupts the normal state of affairs, or ruptures the usual flow of sociality. 
Significantly, however, terrorism does not come from the outside, it is 
terrorism within, a spiteful terrorism that has become the rule. Established 
as a social regime based upon war, violence and permanent states of 
exception, sovereign political power reconstitutes itself in the form of an 
endless terrorisation of life’s “radical undecidability” (Reid, 2005). Life’s 
radical contingency, however, initiates a politics of security. Moreover, 
what we see in the politics of security’s response to terrorism is nothing 
other than sovereign vengeance at the very heart of state authority, which 
disguises this violence and cruelty through a terrorism of its own. The 
desire to continually justify state terrorism is more than a mere feature of 
the war against terrorism being waged by the contemporary state. That is 
to say, if we are to understand terrorism as a social regime of violence, it is 
difficult to distinguish it from the violence that is carried out by the 
sovereign power of the state. The social regime of terrorism has the effect 
of unmasking the intimate relationship between law, war and violence at 
the heart of sovereign political power. In this sense, the concept of 
terrorism is internal to state sovereignty, or the politics of security in 
contemporary society. Hence the emergence and development of 
liberalism as an art of government conditioned by what Foucault (2008: 65) 
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called as “strategies of security.” And strategies of security, as we have 
discovered, generate more terrorism. The permanence of security serves to 
continually reinvest and justify terrorism. To cut a long story short, 
vengeful sovereignty generates ressentiment, ressentiment can easily be 
radicalised into spiteful terrorism. Cruel and contingent sovereignty then 
sustains and enhances the social regime of terrorism. Or, to put this more 
forcefully, vengeful sovereignty begets spiteful terrorism. 
 
In contrast to discipline and control, which operate through confinement 
and decoded and flexible flows, terrorism functions through fear, insecurity 
and uncertainty. Thus the fantasy generated by insecurity is terrorism, 
which allows the neoliberal state to extend its power and makes the state 
of exception permanent. The very mode of being of terrorism is that 
radically contingent terrorist violence, “characteristic of every state of 
emergency including that of emergence, in which law is suspended, and 
the contingent necessity/the necessary contingency of pure operationality 
prevails” (Dillon, 2007: 19). 
 
Indeed, post 9/11, the global security state increasingly needs to generate 
and intensify the evil of terrorism as a ‘fact’ of contemporary society. Its 
‘evildoers’, ultimately, needs a materialised enemy. Further, the spectacle 
of security has fixated upon the fetish of evil terrorist, the enemy 
combatant through where the war on terrorism may be practically and 
physically realized (De Genova, 2007; 2009). For the spectacle of security, 
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our life and labour power supply the global neoliberal state with the 
innumerable and multiple manifestations of its perfect enemy and friend. 
Indeed, as Marx (1843/1978: 43) rightly argues, “security is the supreme 
social concept of civil society; the concept of the police…Security is…the 
assurance of its egotism.” The egotism of the global security state operates 
through both the capitalist market and the established social regimes that 
legitimise and protect it, but also through the spectacle of terrorism that 
(re)produces an alienated everyday life. 
 
6.5 ‘Clash’ 
 
Significantly in this context, both spiteful terrorism and the war against 
terrorism have convergences and divergences, differences and similarities, 
without, of course, being the same. The forces of terrorism and the war 
against terrorism function with equal strength in opposite directions: the 
former driven by religious spiteful fundamentalism, the latter by the 
market ideology, the nihilism of capital. While terrorism negates this world 
for the freedom in the other world, the war against terrorism seeks to 
sustain this world, recognising it only in a conservative manner, specifically 
as neoliberal market. If the first perceives terrorism as a means of 
destruction to open up a space for a God to come, the latter turns (state) 
terror into a form of governmentality, aiming to counter preempting 
eventualities. 
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Yet, there are significant convergences between terrorism and the war 
against terrorism. In both the dominant discourse is fundamentally 
Manichean, introducing a binary rift between us and them. Whereas, for 
instance, the religious emphasis of spiteful terrorism lies on absolute 
values such as Jihad, the religious emphasis of the war against terrorism 
lies on freedom and neoliberal democracy. The war against terrorism 
sacralises the liberal democratic market as an unquestionable, naturalised 
background, and understands ‘freedom’ only in terms of existing neoliberal 
values. Just as the war against terrorism needs the figure of fundamentalist 
terrorism as a ‘radical evil, religious fundamentalism needs the figure of 
‘evil empire.’ Whereas religious fundamentalism is seen “an unruly subject 
in a modern world” (Holsinger, 2007: iv), the war against terrorism is 
understood as a ‘secular’ war or as a ‘humanistic’ version of evangelical 
Christian empire (Huntington, 1997). Thus both justify their actions, attacks 
with reference to hostility and spite. This mirroring reveals a 
complementary synthesis between terrorism and the war against terrorism 
in which it is a ‘moral duty’ to wage war either in the name of God 
(religious fundamentalism) or democracy and civilisation (neoliberal post-
politics). 
 
Thus, what we see in both is an utter abandonment of politics in favour of 
hostilities through a use of “empty rhetoric and gesture politics” (Schehr, 
2006: 147) that obfuscate antagonisms and conflicts inherent to society. In 
this sense, neither offer much hope to human beings looking for practical 
289 
 
ways to democratically integrate themselves into the society they live. 
Further, both reduce politics to a clash between “MacWorld and Jihad” 
(Barber, 1996). In other words, both speak in absolutes of the ideologies, 
the one driven by religious fundamentalism, the other by universalising 
capitalist markets. And finally, both are convinced that their narrative is the 
only ‘true’ one, that they possess the truth (religious orthodoxy, and 
neoliberal capitalism as a new religion). Thus they are united in disunion, in 
a non-dialectical, complementary synthesis in which the war against 
terrorism (politics of security/fear) justifies itself with reference to and thus 
feeds terrorism. In such a space, the only form protest can take is 
‘meaningless spiteful violence.’ The overall result of this ‘clash’ then 
remains a register constituted by the “bloody and nihilistic games of power 
without purpose and without truth” (Badiou, 2005: 120). 
 
However, by turning security into an internal perversion, and with its 
neutrality and indifference to social and political reality, neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics provokes lethality and radicality, a ‘fatal’ violence 
to emerge. Affirming the ‘good’ and getting rid of the ‘bad’, neoliberal 
post-politics (and its biopolitical governmentality preemptive indifference) 
actively incites an abstraction, a terrorism to itself to emerge. Neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics is being reproduced by terrorism, just as 
terrorism is being actualised through “a terror based on “law and order 
measures”, that is ‘a security terror’ (Baudrillard, 2003: 32). Neoliberal 
post-politics, in short, “needs the otherness of the terrorist in order to 
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legitimate itself affectively and in order to self-actuate” (Massumi, 2007). It 
tames terrorism, turning its radical potentiality into a counterrevolutionary 
justification of the system. Since neoliberalism is an open ontogenetic 
governance productive of otherness, it should be seen as a heterogeneous 
‘consensual’ order rather than a stable order strictly speaking. In this 
sense, neoliberal post-politics brings with it a violence of a system based on 
a consensual ‘preemptive order’ by transforming antagonisms into 
harmony, by excluding those who understand themselves as increasingly 
alienated and abandoned by neoliberal forms of power and rationality. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the nightmare of neoliberal 
capitalism is that of living in an eternal present, while prey to a preemptive 
order based on certainty in the face of continual ‘event’, a life governed by 
an infinite extension of the market ideology, the nihilism of capital. A world 
devoid of all passion, of all meaning. A world constructed with the sole 
intent of surplus with regard to capital accumulation and the 
commodification of human relations and life. The violence involved in such 
a situation is relative to neutralisation, that is, the violence of consensus, 
which forces the ‘enemy’ to reveal itself in a violent manner, without 
bringing real political change. To put it bluntly, capital’s indifference to 
social and political reality is the source of a complex, systemic violence that 
cannot be attributed to concrete individuals and their intentions. 
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Most importantly, neoliberal post-politics cannot attain consensual unity 
other than through war and violence. Violence and war are modalities of 
neoliberal post-politics. Neoliberal post-politics, I suggest, is a complex of 
enforcements and exclusions, devoted to the suppression of all radicalisms 
and their energies, with the demonisation and the victimisation of those 
energies being only one (among many) of its apparatuses. Consensual 
neoliberal order, that is to say, is deeply (constantly) a form of violence, a 
deliberate action against political possibilities that can lead to an event. In 
fact, violence and neoliberal post-politics are central to each other. As I 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, violence and war have not been 
‘others’, or optional, means of neoliberalism. They have been what 
neoliberal post-politics most fully and essentially is. Indeed, violence (and 
war) is necessary to the symbiosis of the market and state, stimulating the 
economy in difficult times (see Stallbrass, 2006: 88). Colonising social life 
by capital and neutralising antagonisms and conflicts, neoliberal post-
politics is “the submission of more and more facets of human 
sociability…to the deadly solicitations of the market” (Retort, 2005: 19). It 
produces opportunities for endless accumulation and inures the population 
“to the spectacle of their armed forces punishing some recalcitrant state by 
killing and maiming its citizens” (Stallbrass, 2006: 88). In these 
circumstances, the ‘liberal peace’ is nothing other than peace as 
permanent pacification, and it is achieved through pacification and 
elimination not only of the spiteful individual, but also of all non-liberal 
elements. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics is the nexus of war and 
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violence that aims at a total pacification of nature and society. Violence as 
peace, peace as permanent pacification. 
 
Through an endless biopolitical war and violence against the forces of 
dissent, neoliberalism would fight tooth and nail to maintain the current 
order to the end. Since ‘factical finitude’ conditions the problematisation of 
politics, neoliberalism and rule in the modern age (Dillon, 2011), war and 
violence are normalised bio-political conditions “in which the attempted 
closure of geo-political space merely proved to be an initial experiment in 
the attempts at setting out the all embracing political terrain” (Evans, 
2010). Today, therefore, everybody becomes part of the liberal way of war, 
a biopolitical regime aimed at “producing and reproducing all aspects of 
social life” (Hardt & Negri, 2004: 31). The exercise of neoliberal post-
politics is thus incitatory in that it seeks to actively produce (hence profit 
from) spiteful terrorism. That is to say, neoliberal post-politics informs and 
enforces spite. Mostly that fact is hidden. Neoliberal post-politics is that 
hiding. And it is the endless (re)production of spiteful terrorism, to 
whatever immediate end, serves also to normalise and keep neoliberalism 
running. Thus, any analysis that claims to explain spiteful terrorism without 
paying full heed to the momentum of this thoroughly violent strategic 
neoliberal governmentality will be fundamentally incomplete. 
 
The banality of the Underground Man was tied to the rationalisation of 
spiteful acts and the senseless destruction of all sociality. Rather than a 
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political act, his spite was a will to negation that no longer indicates a 
creation and a will to act (uniquely). For the Baader-Meinhof, violence was 
a process of reflection which mirrors the level of German state terror. They 
believed that the group’s ‘enlightened violence’ was a form of pedagogical 
communication, which enables the workers and the German society to 
understand them. Violence was seen as a form of language, both the 
language of the ‘system’ and of the working class. In other words, their 
spite, too, was produced by the ‘fascist German state.’ Religious or 
fundamentalist terrorism, similarly, reproduces the militarism of neoliberal 
post-politics which it originated. Sheer spiteful destruction is merely the 
reverse side of creation and radical social change. 
 
Thus, in contrast to political violence, which is based on the internal 
systemic contradictions of neoliberal capitalism, spite only reflects the level 
of neoliberal consensus. Rather than a political act, the fantasy of a 
salvation through the suffering of violence, through spite should be seen 
as, to borrow Žižek’s term (1997: 61), “a trancelike subjective experience” 
in which the traditional political subject ceases to exist. Being reactionary, 
spiteful fundamentalism, like an ‘antibody’, turns against the system that 
creates it. This lethality does not have the capacity to create new, 
immanent values. Yet, when violence and spite are normalised and become 
embedded in political norms, it will be almost impossible to interpret its 
qualities as a political act. Politics proper only occurs when the existing 
order is questioned and interrupted. The rationalisation of violence and 
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spiteful destruction, however, suggests a fantasy of direct and immediate 
access to the real. In this way, the spiteful individual reproduces neoliberal 
and militarised post-politics which it is against. If the mise en scène of 
contemporary society is, after all, the disappearance of the political 
subject, the only hope for resistance seems to come from “a politics of 
abstraction … overly attached to an idea at the expense of a frontal denial 
of reality” (Critchley, 2009: 300). 
 
Let us put it differently. One cannot destroy rational egoism (the 
Underground Man), fascism and totalitarianism (the Baader-Meinhof 
group), and neoliberal post-politics (fundamentalist terrorism) by 
producing the same spite and indifference. Politics proper cannot occur 
within the bounds of spiteful terrorism. Since neoliberal post-politics is 
intimately linked to war and violence, anything else that goes by the same 
name is simply a reproduction of neoliberal capitalism. Seen in this 
perspective, spiteful fundamentalism and neoliberal post-politics become 
two aspects of the same cycle of bare repetition, that is, repetition without 
real political change. As noted before, productive repetition resurrects past 
events, while bare repetition takes an empty form of history, the 
consequence of which is ‘farce.’ The farcical character of neoliberal post-
politics and religious fundamentalism derives from the fact they both 
produce non-events within the confines of the given; they are both 
characterised by the absence of revolutionary events. In the end, 
therefore, they do not provide an all together different perspective on 
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social change and everybody returns to the same position as in the 
beginning. Neoliberal post-politics versus terror: such is the wager, since no 
other exists. Although they are opposed, both spiteful terrorism and 
neoliberal post-politics are Siamese twins of sorts, as they both agree “on 
the meaninglessness of reality, or rather its essential unreality, which 
inspires either passive withdrawal or violent destruction” (Critchley, 2007: 
6). 
 
6.6 Consequences 
 
In this dissertation I theorised the depoliticised conditions of late 
capitalism through what I have come to call a ‘neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics’, and through it I addressed key debates on governmental 
social regimes of neoliberal post-politics, the inseparability of neoliberalism 
and war/militarism, and the historical/geographical unevenness of global 
capitalism. I argued that ours is a neoliberal post-political society that 
cannot imagine radical social change as an ‘event.’ Using Marx’s The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte as a model, I found also that there 
are some resonances between Marx’s analysis of the French counter-
revolution and the assumptions underlying neoliberal and militarised post-
politics. In so doing, I offered an original topological analysis that makes 
the following critical interventions: an exploration of how the much-
discussed social regimes of sovereignty, discipline and control relate to 
each other in the production of neoliberal governmentality; an analysis of 
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the affective logic each regime entails and how they inter-relate; a 
proposal for a fourth regime, ‘terrorism’, and a theorization of its 
associated affect, ‘spite.’ Through my empirical discussions I put social and 
cultural theory in conversation with Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Gilles 
Deleuze and Michel Foucault, as well as Slavoj Žižek and Walter Benjamin, 
all of whom I contextualise as crucial to understanding contemporary 
neoliberal governance and radical politics. 
 
And so we have moved from neoliberal and militarised post-politics to 
radical politics as an ‘event.’ So how can one theorise an intimate 
relationship between critique and revolution in neoliberal and militarised 
post-political society? Before proceeding, let us, at this point, summarise 
the relationship between four social regimes and their affective structures. 
As I argued throughout the dissertation, neoliberal and militarised post-
politics is a moving target. And the same goes for social regimes and their 
associated affects. The established social regimes and the corresponding 
affects are means to, and methods of, neo-liberal post-politics. This line of 
thinking enables us to question and interpret the dynamics of social 
regimes and their relation to neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
mentioned so far. So the aim is to discuss concepts from the point of view 
of the dissertation, focusing on truths, tendencies, and affects each regime 
produces. Any social regime, any sociality, contains within itself all the four 
social regimes, just as it contains within itself all the four affects. In other 
words, the aim is to construct a perspective on the social by illustrating a 
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dynamic field of forces between social regimes and the corresponding 
characteristics. 
 
Modernity has traditionally understood the social as an ‘ordered’ and 
‘stable’ process. Deleuze, however, views the social as a contingent 
process, incorporating hybridity and ambivalence into modernity itself. If 
modernity seeks to purify the social, Deleuze seeks to impurify it. Whereas 
modernity emphasises the ordered aspects of a differentiated sociality, 
Deleuze moves beyond differentiation and depict the social from the point 
of view of de-differentiation.  
 
‘Sovereignty’, for instance, implies a process, a radical contingency rather 
than a state of being without dependence on territory. Sovereignty is a 
social regime, a set of contingent governmental practices and rationalities, 
where ‘cruel manifestations’ of the modern state manifest itself. As such, it 
endlessly attempts to ‘appropriate’, or ‘capture’, countermovements and 
utilise them for its own purposes. In doing so, it employs a ‘regime of 
violence’ which creates its counter-affect, ressentiment. Sovereignty 
signifies an eternal vengeance, whereas ressentiment refers to a passive, 
powerless emotion. However, ressentiment also gains an astonishing 
potential for unproductive violence when it encounters sovereign 
vengeance. Put differently, ressentiment can easily be radicalised into 
spite, whereby victims of the state terror can become enemies of the state. 
The victims of sovereignty do not, cannot forget. After all, what defines 
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objects of ressentiment is their weakness, their technique “for 
remembering things” (Nietzsche, 1996: 42). 
 
We are witnessing in sovereignty also the revival of ‘cruel manifestations’ 
such as torture by depoliticising conflicts via permanent states of 
exception. In this sense torture and the state of exception are inextricably 
connected. Intimately connected to a liberal way of war, torture is not only 
the most privileged actualisation of sovereign political power, but also a 
form of sovereign exceptionalism. Cruel and contingent practices and the 
state of exception are thus fundamental to the operation of political 
sovereign power as a social regime as well as neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics. 
 
However, sovereignty is not simply the only social regime that constitutes 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics. ‘Discipline’ is our second social 
regime where neoliberal governmentality as a grid of intelligibility, is born 
and takes shape. The birth of neoliberalism goes hand in hand with the 
market, with its competition between self-governing subjects in which 
everything can be bought and sold. This, however, does not mean that we 
have left behind state sovereignty. Rather, disciplinary neoliberalism is a 
social regime in which sovereign political power is still present. Whereas 
sovereignty puts cruel manifestations into play, declaring states of 
exception, neoliberal governmnetality emphasises the individual as a homo 
economicus that is motivated by neoliberal self-interest. Sovereignty plays 
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at the potentiality of the ban, while disciplinary neoliberalism acts both on 
virtuality and actuality. Whereas sovereignty declares the state of 
exception, discipline is based on high levels of normalisation upon life so 
that the neoliberal order is maintained and thus remains intact. In this 
sense disciplinary neoliberalism is a social regime constructed to make 
individuals internalise the sovereign gaze, creating docile, yet free, bodies 
that are governed by a culture of competition as an eidos. The primary goal 
of disciplinary neoliberalism is, therefore, the extension of free-market 
policies to all aspects of society. Neoliberal biopolitics necessitates free 
trade and competition rather than a totalitarian party that adopts 
individual freedom understood as ‘economic freedom’ from a given menu.  
 
Moreover, sovereignty puts death into play, addressing bodies from the 
angle of fear and danger. With neoliberal governance fear becomes a 
productive affect, an organising force, that secures and pacifies a life to 
make life live. With disciplinary panoptic, in short, fear becomes a 
productive aspect of everyday life, individually and collectively. For it is 
essential for defusing revolutionary events. In this way a biopolitics of fear 
not only becomes essential for producing docile-species bodies but also for 
preventing revolutionary events from occurring. The biopolitics of fear is a 
necessary condition of neoliberalism because it converts fearful bodies of 
the sovereign into productive subjects of neoliberalism. This, however, tells 
only part of the story. Neoliberal biopolitics should also be viewed as a 
political eschatological katechontic response whose aim is to defuse the 
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idea of the event. Thus, when we analyse neoliberal biopolitics, we should 
also pay attention to its theological reasoning because how to delay radical 
structural change is motivated by ‘secularised theological concepts.” And 
neoliberal biopolitics is one of them. As an eschatological katechontic 
response, neoliberal biopolitics is a preemptive counterrevolutionary 
principle whose mission is to keep ‘the threat of the event’ at bay. 
 
‘Control’, our third social regime, is a heterogeneous order that 
incorporates hybridity, flexibility and an axiomatic of decoded flows into 
the heart of the social. Thus neoliberal control is discipline without walls, 
regulating subjects and objects on the move. In the process, ‘freedom of 
movement’ (along the regulation of each and every type of circulation 
which is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to the liberal way of life) coexists with disciplinary 
surveillance and the mechanisms of normalisation. Neoliberal control 
works by codifying the flows, again, arguably targets bodies, but in a very 
different way by reducing them to codes and passwords. With neoliberal 
control the individual is replaced by the ‘dividual’, who is governed through 
multiple systemic codes and inscriptions. Nevertheless, the main affect 
that pertains to neoliberal capitalism is cynicism, which continuously 
reinforces and (re)produces perpetually infinite mechanisms of surplus-
enjoyment based on the figure of homo economicus. Whereas disciplinary 
panoptic works through instruments of correction and normalisation, 
neoliberal control works through preemptive indifference, a contemporary 
biopolitical mechanism, whose aim is to prevent any disruptive event 
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whatever from occurring. Disciplinary panoptic sustains the political 
economy of neoliberal capitalism, while the society of control produces 
hybrid and reflexive subjectivities that are governed through free-floating 
surveillance as is the case with preemptive risk management in relation to 
‘networks.’ Whereas disciplinary neoliberalism manages and regulates 
individuals qua homo economicus, neoliberal control targets the conduct 
of “mobile” subjects (Bauman, 1998: 51-2), accommodating them for its 
own purposes.  
 
Moving from disciplinary panoptic to “generalised surveillance” (Foucault, 
1977: 209), the biopolitics of control extends the power of neoliberalism. 
With preemptive risk and security mechanisms and circulation which have 
direct access to life, neoliberal control “knows no outside” (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 413). Whereas disciplinary panoptic is about constituting a 
differentiation between an inside and outside, neoliberal control focuses 
on the conditions that constitute unknown unknowns. Thus, it is precisely 
the virtual that now serves to consolidate neoliberal control. Since 
unknown disruptive events are the problem, the becoming of the body 
becomes one of the organising principles for the society of control to wage 
war on whatever threatens the neoliberal order. 
 
And finally there is ‘spite’, which corresponds to a fourth social regime: 
‘terrorism.’ Despite its hegemony, however, the lack of conflict and 
antagonism does not make neoliberal control a peaceful social regime. 
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Instead, it has its own discontents, bringing with it a new form of 
repression with a vengeance: that of terrorism. With sovereignty, 
neoliberal post-politics governs the population through cruel 
manifestations of the state within spaces of exception. Within disciplinary 
panoptic, neoliberal governmentality produces docile and obedient 
subjects through agents/agencies of fear and market mechanisms that 
facilitate competition as an eidos. With neoliberal control (the global 
capitalist market), multiple governmental rationalities monitor the mobile 
dividuals through generalised biopolitical surveillance. Yet, this creates 
immanent problems, bringing forth a suicidal line of flight that is indifferent 
to neoliberalism. When the political is foreclosed through the very 
proliferation of neutrality and cynicism, this provokes a ‘fatal’ violence to 
emerge, expressing a radical nihilist passion that can find truth only in 
nothingness, in spiteful terrorism. In today’s society terrorism has become 
normalised as a fourth social regime which sustains, rather than challenges, 
‘business as usual.’ Thus, what previously appeared exceptional has 
become the rule in everyday life. Neoliberal and militarised post-politics 
finds a perfect enemy in terrorism where politics is reduced to “insecurity” 
(Huysmans, 2006), and in which political problems are presented as 
military necessities. Neoliberal post-politics and spiteful terrorism are thus 
the twin faces of contemporary society, embodying a non-dialectical, 
complementary synthesis, a synthesis between passive and radical nihilism. 
In other words, cynicism and spite together form a vicious cycle, a 
synthesis, in which neoliberal post-politics generates the violent passage à 
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l’acte and thus mimics the very force it tries to ward off, spiteful 
fundamentalism. Rather than a political act, the fantasy of a salvation 
through terrorism should thus be seen as bare repetition, that is, repetition 
without difference or real events. Spiteful terrorism is ‘pure chaos’ that 
does not produce anything. 
 
Sovereign political power produces subjects of ressentiment that are 
rendered reactive and obedient through cruel acts and practices. The 
subject produced by disciplinary panoptic is that of the fearful subject, who 
is not a passive subject but an active one, continuously reproduced through 
normalisation and free-market regulation. With neoliberal control, we have 
the cynical ‘dividual’, governed through codes and passwords as well as the 
infinite diachronic temporality of surplus-enjoyment. The figure of the 
subject produced by terrorism is that of the spiteful individual, who 
destroys the existing, sensual world in the name of a true, other world. 
When the difference between terrorism and state terrorism disappears, 
they start to mimic each other, without bringing radical political change. In 
other words, they do not seek to find political solutions to political 
problems. Therefore, the key to understand both neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics and spiteful terrorism is bare repetition, that is, an inability to 
create immanent values, a new way of life. 
 
Neoliberal and militarised post-politics, then, is a dynamic field of forces, 
which consists of differentiation and de-differentiation, hybrid networks as 
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well as lines of death. It is not an ontological term, but an expression of 
changing and contingent social regimes, rationalities and affects that are 
historical and political in formation. What is at issue here is how these four 
social regimes and associated affects interact with and differ from each 
other. Sovereignty, discipline, control and terrorism do not merely follow a 
chronological order. What is interesting is how sovereignty enables 
discipline, how disciplinary panoptic enables biopolitical control, how from 
within neoliberal control spiteful terrorism emerges, and how terrorism 
normalises state terrorism. To put it in other terms, sovereign political 
power opens the space for disciplinary neoliberalism, disciplinary 
neoliberalism for neoliberal control, neoliberal control for spiteful 
fundamentalism and spiteful terrorism for state terrorism, or the politics of 
security. In order to continually justify itself, neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics accommodates spiteful terrorism, transforming it into a public 
spectacle. 
 
As seen throughout the dissertation, the basic movement corresponds to 
the two poles of revolution and counterrevolution. Taking life as its point 
of departure, both in thought and in practice, neoliberal and militarised 
post-politics is a principled counterrevolutionary logic that aims at defusing 
the fear of the event. Thus there is a constant struggle between 
neoliberalism and revolution. There is the fear of revolution that there is 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics. If neoliberal and militarised post-
politics stabilises, radical social change as an event destabilises. Neoliberal 
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and militarised post-politics refers to a given social situation, while 
revolution is marked by paradoxical lines of flight that escape organisation 
and centralisation. 
 
And as a line of flight, the desire for revolution has its own dangers. In this 
sense there is a crucial difference between revolutionary violence and 
spite, or between the deconstruction of the actual, or, what Deleuze (1990: 
182) calls “counter-actualization” as a moment of becoming, and the 
nihilist destruction of the actual, that is, spiteful destruction as anti-
actualisation. Hence the task of revolutionary violence: to redefine itself by 
resisting spiteful destruction. After all, creative destruction is not the 
renunciation of the world. Revolutionary violence is not only a “direct, 
brutal violence of l’action directe’ (Žižek, 2006: 311). What is significant in 
this context is the preservation of the link, of the ‘surface’, between the 
actual and the virtual. In contrast, spiteful destruction is anti-actualisation, 
an assault on the actual. Spite in this respect is “a pure plane of abolition or 
death”, or a plane of “regression to the undifferentiated” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987: 270). The problem of revolution, then, is to avoid ‘pure 
chaos’, while, at the same time, to establish a plane of immanence, that is, 
“to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994: 42). The idea of deciding about creative destruction is revolutionary 
politics par excellence, as an immanent exception. 
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Importantly, none of these social regimes and the corresponding 
characteristics exist in a pure form; each type simply seeks to mark out the 
consistency of a concept and is valid only to the degree that it provides a 
critical tool for analysing concrete dispositifs and modes of existence, 
which are by definition mixed states requiring a “microanalysis” of the 
characteristics they have and lines they actualize (see Deleuze, 1995: 86). 
In this sense, each social regime can be taken up into another social 
regime, like, for example, the return of sovereignty in the neoliberal 
control society. Within one social regime we can always find a coextensive 
functioning of different social regimes and their associated affects. 
 
To sum up, every social regime is connected with the other social regimes 
in a specific way without one determining the others. Within discipline, 
tendencies toward neoliberal control constantly coexist, just as within 
control, tendencies towards sovereignty and discipline coexist. In this 
sense, one no longer has to follow the succession of sovereignty, discipline, 
control and terrorism; they develop alongside of it throughout 
neoliberalism. Any social regime contains within itself all the four 
characteristics and the corresponding affects that are actualised in varying 
degrees. However, the regimes and affects characterising neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics do not mean the end of politics, only its 
reconfiguration. The central question, then, is how one can theorise the 
intimate relationship between radical critique and revolution in neoliberal 
and militarised post-political society. This is examined in the last chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
Critique as Divine Violence, Divine Violence as Critique 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I theorised spite as a fourth affect. Drawing on 
Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, I suggested that today, spite (and 
related affects ressentiment, fear and cynicism) plays a major role in 
relation to the ‘social.’ I found also that spite corresponds to a fourth social 
‘regime’, terrorism, which uses pain/suffering against passivity and 
cynicism offered by neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Furthermore, I 
argued that spite is not to be seen as a political act, for it refers to a will to 
nothingness that no longer creates new values. However, the regimes and 
affects characterising neoliberal and militarised post-politics do not 
completely foreclose the possibility of radical politics. The central question, 
then, is how one can theorise radical critique and revolution in neoliberal 
and militarised post-political society. 
 
What gives rise to neoliberal post-politics is also what gives rise to 
alternative social and political imaginaries for radical politics. The 
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possibility of radical politics exists within neoliberal post-politics. Or, to say 
this differently, the possibility of revolution exists within 
counterrevolution. And in so far as the contemporary regime of 
governmentality is neoliberal, neoliberalism constitutes the problematic of 
critique today. Ours is, after all, a neoliberal society in which the idea of 
revolution seems to be ignored. And so this chapter is an attempt to retain 
the belief in two interrelated ideas: revolution and critique. It focuses on 
the intimate relationship between revolution and critique, arguing that 
radical critique within social and aesthetic theory is strictly inseparable 
from the concept of revolution. 
 
Critique in contemporary neoliberal capitalism represents a troubling 
paradox. On the one hand, we are free to ‘criticise’ everything. Today, we 
are constantly critical. On the other hand, contemporary critique functions 
as an impotent and ‘disengaged’ gesture, which sustains, rather than 
challenges, the hegemonic relations in a given political constellation. 
Against this background, the chapter argues that critique can be 
approached via two lines. First, critique locates politics on the basis of the 
interaction between the virtual and the actual; it implies a virtual aspect, a 
spectral dimension in all sociality that cannot be reduced to actual social 
space and chronological time. Second, critique is the paradoxical 
constitution of politics through the relationship between strategy and 
intoxication without referring to a stable synthesis between them. In this 
context critique is a paradoxical concept, an indeterminacy, which can be 
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articulated in the context of ‘divine violence.’ Referring to a radically 
contingent time, critique has a creative and a divine dimension, for it 
enables a passage between the virtual and the actual. However, in order to 
be critical, one must first understand what critique means in neoliberal 
times. 
 
7.2 Critique in Neoliberal Times 
 
In The Dreamers (2003), a film by Bernardo Bertolucci, the conjoined twins 
Isabelle and Theo live at home in their ramshackle apartment with their 
relatively well-to-do parents. As two French petty narcissistic bourgeoisies 
who are madly and only excited by the movies, they are inattentive, almost 
blind, towards others, and have no meaningful insight into the complex 
socio-political climate of the world outside. 
 
Matthew, however, is a provincial teenage American student who is also 
cocooned in a love affair with cinema. He meets Isabelle and Theo in a 
protest and is invited to move into their apartment while the parents 
depart France to take an extended holiday. Matthew joins them and gets 
easily seduced by the sadist twins, who usually sleep together and wander 
around completely naked. Closeted in their apartment, the trio lose 
contact with the real world, engaging in their hedonistic earthly pleasures 
as if the pursuit of them is the only goal in life. Outside, however, ‘Paris is 
burning.’ 
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Matthew soon gets bored, accusing the twins of being unworldly. He says, 
“There’s something going on out there. Something that feels like it could 
be really important.” But neither Isabelle nor Theo seem to care. It is at this 
moment that their window is broken by a brick thrown through outside 
their apartment and they realize that there is another world out there. 
After witnessing the protests and revolutionary events outside, the happy 
trio split up. Isabelle and Theo - once having been accused of being 
unworldly - join the protesters and become involved in violence by carrying 
Molotov cocktails, while the liberal Matthew disagrees with them over 
political violence and remains loyal to his self-proclaimed passivity. 
 
The Dreamers is set in Paris, at the time of May ’68 uprisings. And there is a 
big difference between then and now. However, it has a crucial resonance 
today. At its best, it mirrors the paradoxical relationship between passivity 
and violence that surrounded the events of May ’68, which can be 
experienced now and in the future. Indeed, the greatest strength of the 
movie lies showing us that neither unproductive violence nor social 
passivity are the ‘grave diggers’ of neoliberal capitalism. For it needs both 
forms in order to continually justify itself. On the one hand, spiteful 
musings of May ’68 (sabotage, meaningless violence) have repeatedly 
provoked an even greater state terror that invokes the impossibility of 
revolutionary events. In other words, spiteful terrorism resulted in a brutal 
backlash against revolutionary ideas (e.g. communism). But, on the other 
hand, some of the leftist critique of May ’68 within social and aesthetic 
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theory, which is strictly inseparable from the concept of revolution, has 
become exquisitely incorporated - and depoliticised in “the new spirit of 
capitalism” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005). The Dreamers shows, therefore 
how the recuperation of May ’68 prefigures, and indeed prepared the 
ground for, a contemporary political quietism, which is now embodied in 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics.  
 
As Boltanski & Chiapello (2005) argue, there have been the two major 
types of critique of capitalism: “the social critique” based on the notion of 
inequality and exploitation characteristic of a capitalist economy, and “the 
artistic critique” based on concepts such as inauthenticity, ugliness and 
alienation of life. However, as Boltanski & Chiapello suggest, faced with a 
fundamental economic, social and cultural crisis in the 1960s and 1970s, 
capitalism had to respond by assimilating the concepts of individual liberty, 
anti-bureaucracy, and equality. Capitalism recognised the demands of the 
artistic critique, while it largely silenced the social critique (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2005: 190, 199). The recognition of the artistic critique, 
however, meant its incorporation by neoliberal capitalism. As a result, the 
new spirit of capitalism domesticated and thus accommodated the artistic 
critique, especially in the form of self-management and the 
institutionalization of art and its lifestyle, while sidestepping the demands 
of the social critique. 
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With the new spirit of neoliberal capitalism, critique is stuck into a paradox. 
On the one hand, we are witnessing an “immense and proliferating 
criticizability of things, institutions, practices, and discourses” (Foucault, 
2003: 6). In this era of ‘unprecedented freedom’, we all, to a greater or 
lesser extent, sometimes more and sometimes less, find ourselves in an 
endless critique. This is the objective irony of neoliberal capitalism: nothing 
sells better than critique. Or, even more directly, the new spirit of 
neoliberal capitalism is anti-capitalist. Thus today everything can be 
politicized and discussed, but in a reserved way, in so far as our critique 
remains within the bounds of neoliberal dialogue. Consensus, not 
antagonism, is the essence of contemporary critique. On the other hand, 
the foundations, instruments and aims of contemporary critique turn out 
to be, to borrow Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000: 23) felicitous term, “toothless”; 
they support, rather than subvert, neoliberal capitalism. In other words, 
contemporary critique does not seek to transcend but to transform 
neoliberalism as neoliberalism. 
 
Indeed, in neoliberal times critique no longer refers to radical structural 
change. It is unable to accede to a true creation that would disrupt the 
existing social order and constitute a new political scene. Contemporary 
critique becomes fundamentally outmoded, which no longer supplements 
the given situation with an ‘event’, with a subject that can create a new 
present beyond the temporality of neoliberal capitalism. Contemporary 
critique is, therefore, locked into an ‘atonic reality’, a hellish Groundhog 
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Day: we are left without a possibility of a radical change regarding the 
existing order. In this sense critique is incapable of breaking the shackles of 
neoliberal and militarised post-politics, for it is aligned with the 
meaninglessness of the present, with the resigned acceptance of ‘anything 
goes.’ Thus, a depoliticised radical politics, Marxism, and a Marx without 
revolution are no longer exceptional but part of a normality in 
contemporary society. Marx is acceptable only in so far as “the revolt, 
which initially inspired uprising, indignation, insurrection, revolutionary 
momentum, does not come back” (Derrida, 1994: 38). Differently put, 
Marx, Marxism, the revolt, uprising and revolutionary momentum can 
reappear as long as they speak the language of power and sustain the 
belief that it is possible to achieve real change within the boundaries of 
neoliberal capitalism. We have a softened, decaffeinated Marx and 
Marxism that no longer refer to revolutionary events. 
 
Is critique useless then? Or should critique function like an ‘emergency 
break’ of neoliberal capitalism? What might constitute a form of critique 
that is antithetical to neoliberal and militarised post-politics? I contend that 
a softened, decaffeinated critique leaves nothing but to rethink the idea of 
revolution. Revolution, in short, has turned into an urgent task. In so far as 
neoliberal capitalism is characterised as ‘business as usual’, critique is a 
break with the given. Critique is an answer to the problem of neoliberalism. 
Thus neoliberal post-politics and the established social regimes – their 
penetration through one another, their assimilation of counter spaces – 
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must be critiqued, as an immediate task. This requires that one cannot 
accept the existing order as it is, including the reformist sides of neoliberal 
post-political promises. What needs to be recovered is the promise of 
emancipation. Together, a rational strategy and (a-rational) intoxication 
and a certain realism which would not fall into the trap of capitalist 
cynicism appear to become necessary values of an effective critique. 
 
Since neoliberal capitalism is presented as the ‘end of history’, it relies on 
the denial of a radical, utopian dimension to politics and depicts the given 
reality as the only reality, pushing the idea of revolution to the background. 
While it sacralises the neoliberal market as an unquestionable, naturalised 
background, it also builds a moat around revolutionary possibilities so that 
they become redundant. However, social life can become a problematic, an 
object of critique and radical structural change, on the condition that 
people can imagine the possibility of a better world. As Bauman (1976: 35) 
had put it long ago, “all…events belong to the class of possibilities, which 
are not present in daily reality in any other way but ideally.” Is it, then, 
possible to problematise an indeterminacy, an aporetic dimension to 
critique on the basis of this paradoxical coincidence, the simultaneous 
absence and presence of critique in contemporary post-political society? 
How can one revitalise – indeed, to reinvent – the idea of critique which 
inspires the idea of revolution as a genuine politics of emancipation? 
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Revolution is a style of thinking, it is “a question of life” (Deleuze, 2007: 
234). To continue to take inspiration from the spirit of revolution, however, 
entails keeping faith in a radical critique, which contains within itself the 
possibility of its own self-critique, its “own transformation, re-valuation, 
self-interpretation” (Derrida, 1994: 110). “Proletarian revolutions”, Marx 
(1852/2002: 22) writes, “such as those of the nineteenth century, 
constantly engage in self-criticism, always stopping in their own tracks; 
they return to what is apparently complete in order to begin it anew.” This 
return, however, is not a bare repetition, that is, repetition without real 
events, but an always situated process that creates new values which 
belong to this world. This is why, for Marx, the proletarian social revolution 
can create its poetry “only from the future” (ibid. 22). 
 
What we have here is revolution which is nourished on ‘ruthless and 
permanent criticism’ and a realistic understanding of the task at hand, a 
revolution which is the desire to create ever anew despite the misery of 
the present. If we want to witness the experience of revolutionary 
engagement in its pure form, we should return to May ’68, since it was “a 
demonstration, an eruption, of becoming in its pure state” (Deleuze, 1995: 
171). In this sense, May ’68 was a flight from “normative causality”; it is a 
“pure event”: 
 
“May ’68 is more of the order of a pure event, free of all normal, or 
normative causality. Its history is a ‘series of amplified instabilities and 
fluctuations’. There were a lot of agitations, gesticulations, slogans, idiocies, 
illusions in ’68, but this is not what counts. What counts is what amounted 
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to a visionary phenomenon, as if a society suddenly saw what was 
intolerable in it and also saw the possibility for something else. It is a 
collective phenomenon in the form of: ‘Give me the possible, or else I’ll 
suffocate…’ The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a 
question of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a new 
subjectivity (new relations with the body, with time, sexuality, the 
immediate surroundings, with culture, work…)” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2007: 234) 
 
In this sense May ’68 refers to something that interrupted ‘social 
determinations’, the normal flow of things. This is what makes May ’68 a 
revolutionary becoming. Today we are more than ever in need of new 
revolutionary becomings because they open up new realms for 
experimental thought. What is needed is a move toward the painstaking 
work of constructing a radical critique, which remains tied to the idea of 
revolution. If the straightforward aspect of neoliberal post-politics is its 
negation of the domain of alternative social imaginaries, critique situates 
itself in relation to new possibilities given a utopian horizon. If 
counterrevolution is a belief in the existing society, revolution promises 
another society, world; it is a flight from the existing order of things. To put 
it bluntly, the more critique fails, the more it is compelled to find new lines 
of flight. Thus, critique must be immanent in the sense that it is based on 
the internal systemic contradictions of neoliberal capitalism. After all, if 
“fidelity” to revolution (Badiou, 2006) only emerges as the result of a 
struggle based on the “naming” of actual contemporary conditions, such 
naming depends on an analysis of neoliberal capitalism. Radical critique 
can have meaning only if it results “from the now existing premise” (Marx 
and Engels, 1998: 57). As such, it is valuable in so far as it transcends the 
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actual, that is, the finite, and links us to the virtual, the infinite (Diken, 
2012: 158-164). In short, critique is valuable if it can have a dissensual 
relation to the actual. If revolution is at once a creative historical process 
(the actual) and an idea (the virtual), it refers to an event that is separated 
from the historical situation. In other words, critique cannot be reduced to 
history but is per definition ‘untimely’ in the Deleuzean sense of a 
philosophy of history, and the Benjaminian sense of an anti-historicist 
immediacy, which I will elaborate below.  
 
In what follows I argue that critique is an ‘untimely intervention’, an 
indeterminancy, which can be articulated in the context of “divine 
violence” (Benjamin, 1999a). The paradoxical relationship between the 
actual and the virtual creates a dynamic disequilibrium, and it is this 
“perpetual disequilibrium” which “makes revolutions possible” (Deleuze, 
1990: 49). The virtual is always related to the actual, to what is to come. It 
is the indicator of the fact that every social relation can become different, 
can be rethought and reactualised in other ways. Deleuze (1994: 10), for 
instance, argues that the virtual is always in relation to the event; history is 
a theatre, a virtual realm, where unknown potentialities and actors can 
produce radically new events. The event, therefore, brings about ruptures 
and imposes “interruptions at the very heart of social determinism and 
historical causality” (Deleuze, 2004: 199). It calls for the disruption of bare 
repetition of the existing order, of history. The recognition of unknown 
potentialities also entails the recognition of the virtual aspect of the event. 
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In this sense the virtual side of revolution is always to come not because it 
does act for future promises but because it is a break with the existing 
order, signifying the opening up of the actual to the virtual. 
 
The event, in other words, cannot be thought of independently of the 
actual. The event can be a virtual problem but its varieties are also 
actualised in concrete historical situations. The event, therefore, cannot be 
separated from neoliberal and militarised post-politics. Since the dominant 
form of governance in contemporary society is neoliberal, the politics of 
event is set against neoliberalism. It has a virtual dimension but its 
possibilities are also actualised in contemporary neoliberal times. 
Differently put, the event is the virtual because it refers to unknown 
possibilities and subjectivities, while at the same time the actual because it 
also expresses itself in concrete situations. What matters, therefore, is an 
interactive surface between the virtual and the actual. Critique as divine 
violence is what corresponds to the two (actual and virtual) series, enabling 
an interaction between them. 
 
7.3 Cheerful Separation 
 
As I argued above, in contemporary society concepts related to social 
change such as individual liberty, economic freedom, nomad, rhizome, 
hybridisation, desire, and displacement no longer signify resistance to, or 
escape from power; their critical potential seems to be assimilated, 
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domesticated and thus accommodated by neoliberal capitalism. Thus, 
‘increasing social change’ does not mean ‘freedom’, but bare repetition, 
which corresponds to the immanent, axiomatic logic of neoliberal 
capitalism. Indeed, neoliberal capitalism does not oppose but asks for 
constant critique; it does not necessarily mean extinguishing critique, but it 
means pseudo-critique that does not radically challenge the very 
foundations of the existing order. In the society of neoliberal control, for 
instance, one never finishes learning. Rather “continuous assessment” 
becomes an imperative (Deleuze, 1995: 179). Permanent critique and thus 
permanent assessment have turned into dispositifs for neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics in which everything is constantly criticised and 
assessed, but nothing really changes radically. 
 
In this sense, what is accommodated by neoliberal capitalism is not so 
much emancipatory critique, but rather the revisionist critique which 
reduces dissensus to an apparatus that generates consensus. In other 
words, neoliberal capitalism signifies the revision of dissensus that is at the 
heart of radical critique; its counterrevolutionary aspects revolve around 
recuperating dissensual ideas and thoughts. Despite revisions, however, 
critique cannot be fully assimilated. Decaffeinated critique – this is what 
neoliberal capitalism means in the context of critique. However, critique is 
marked by antagonism rather than consensus and agreement. If dissensus 
is constitutive of critique, any consideration of the relationship between 
critique and politics has to come to terms with the question of change. 
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What is then needed is a new form of critique that takes emancipation as 
its main point of departure. This, however, entails siding with infinity, the 
event. In so far as critique takes the emancipatory side, it must separate 
itself from the consensual neoliberal governmentality. Radical critique is 
the ‘enemy’ of the bonds the existing order offers; it continues to live 
within these bonds (the laws, morality etc.) in order to destroy them. To 
paraphrase Deleuze (1983: 106), a critique “that saddens no one, that 
annoys no one”, is not a critique. In this sense critique is against liberal 
dialogue. 
 
Indeed, critique should provoke thought rather than dictate consensus. 
Critique is another name for disagreement, a disagreement on consensus. 
Consensus takes as foundational the inevitability of neoliberalism as an 
economic system, and free market capitalism as an unquestionable, 
naturalised background. All we can do is, therefore, accept the dominant 
ideology of capitalism as it is, and limit our hopes and ourselves by not 
imagining ‘the end of capitalism.’ Ultimately, what capitalist consensus 
amounts to is the elimination of revolutionary events and the 
naturalisation of neoliberalism. This is why radical critique always starts 
with questioning the consensus in a given social space. Contrary to 
neoliberal dialogue and consensus in which “all values have already been 
created” (Nietzsche, 1961: 55), the point of critique is to question the value 
of existing values with the aim of creating new values. If consensus allows 
one to ‘criticise’ in a given political constellation, radical critique targets the 
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given framework of sensibility. If consensus is the impossibility of a true 
event regarding the ‘given’ situations, radical critique is the ability to 
radically challenge that givenness and to fight for a new and better one. 
Consensus plays a given game, whereas critique does change the game 
itself. Consensus “justifies” the givenness, while radical critique interrupts 
the existing order of things, which is none other than “the police 
distribution of the sensible” (Rancière, 2010: 212). 
 
If neoliberal capitalism is shaped by a life of fundamental meaninglessness 
governed by an infinite extension of the market ideology, critique makes 
sense if it is critical of its own historical present, the given order of the 
sensible, and it can do so relating itself to another time. Critique can have 
meaning if it can refer to the infinite by keeping a distance from the infinite 
extension of capital and enacting fidelity to the event. Hence the 
fundamental task of critique is to think the exception, “to be in the 
exception in the sense of the event” (Badiou, 2009c: 13). That is, critique 
“becomes worthy of the event” (Deleuze: 1990: 148, 151), reversing the 
conditions that determine us and relates itself to emancipation. Critique, in 
other words, can have meaning if it can take side with the revolutionary 
event, which is not reducible to modern history as a linear process but 
refers, above all, to the possibility of disrupting the entire model of 
linearity. 
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As is well known, orthodox historical materialism conceived of historical 
time as a mere mechanical, evolutionist process. Revolution was therefore 
seen as the end-point of progress and of historical determinism. In this 
way, the historical time of revolution was reduced to a ‘homogeneous, 
empty time’, providing the temporal space for scientifically predictable 
revolutionary events. But one of the most prominent thinkers of 
revolutionary time, Benjamin, however, rejects any vulgar determinist, 
evolutionist notion in progress, stating that the “homogeneous, empty 
time”, or modernity, is an “eternal return of the same”, which speeds 
towards disaster. The present, or modernity, is the time of “hell”, the very 
“hell” one should escape: “hell is not something which lies ahead of 
us but this life here” (Benjamin et al, 1985: 50). 
 
The revolutionary moment, by contrast, is made up of interruptions of 
progress, breaks and transformations. And only redemption (revolution) 
can cut off – arrest - the flow of ‘empty and homogenous’ time. Benjamin 
calls this time “now-time”, or messianic time - a fulfilled time comprised of 
continuous flow of events: “history is the subject of a structure whose site 
is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by, the presence of the 
now” (Benjamin, 1969: 261). Messianic time is different from absolute 
chronometric time; it is the ‘emergency break’ of the empty, chronological 
time. Thus only messianic time is true revolutionary time, a time that we 
ourselves are in contrast to a vulgar empty and homogeneous time in 
which we are only reduced to mere spectators, and fearful of the future. 
323 
 
Messianic time is the time of political intervention, of disruption: the 
disruption of the entire model of linearity. Thus messianic time, kairos, is a 
“seized” chronos, an undetermined period of time: 
 
“In which man, by his initiative, grasps favourable opportunity and chooses 
his own freedom in the moment. Just as the full, discontinuous, finite and 
complete time of pleasure must be set against the empty, continuous and 
infinite time of vulgar historicism, so the chronological time of pseudo-
history must be opposed by the cairological time of authentic history.” 
(Agamben, 1993: 104-5) 
 
Messianic time, then, is the appropriate time to act or to make political 
interventions, which consists solely in both the perceiving and the seizing 
of the moment (Dillon, 2008b). If official history tends to be the history of 
the victors, ‘the tradition of the oppressed’ also carries in it signs and 
symptoms of another dimension, an interaction between past and present 
events, by which history is affiliated with universal redemption. And only 
redemption can contain the “true picture of the past”, for that involves 
taking each event in consideration, that is “the entire history of mankind” 
(Benjamin, 1969: 255). In this sense revolution “is a tiger’s leap into the 
past”, which enables human subjects to fulfil some historic task by linking 
the present to the whole of history, that is, the time of the virtual (ibid. 
261), Here one should shamelessly repeat the lesson of Marx’s The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: if history repeats itself, first as a 
tragedy, then as farce, it is not a reason for political impotence and 
enjoyment in (self-)destruction. Marx (1975: 179) asks: “Why does history 
take this course?” He answers: “So that humanity should part with its past 
324 
 
cheerfully.” To put it in yet another way: farce is there, history repeats 
itself, so that the subject can cheerfully destroy it. Critique as divine 
violence constitutes an opportunity for such a separation. 
 
7.4 The ‘Divine Violence’ of Critique 
 
There is, in this respect, an intimate relationship between radical critique 
and ‘violence.’ After all, all creativity, all freedom, necessitates violence - 
but which violence? Violence is an ambivalent concept. It is, in one guise, a 
promise of creative destruction. In another, it can turn to spite, which 
destroys in the pursuit of nothingness. In a world in which politics has been 
shown to be dependent upon a neoliberal and militarised global capitalism 
of structural inequalities, a politics centred upon the possibilities of the 
relation with ‘liberal democracy’ is insufficient. Indeed, one can argue that 
its subtle foreclosure of politics, and its refusal to accommodate radical 
socio-political conflict and antagonism through the moral castigation of all 
radicalism as ‘bad’, as ‘terrorism’, belongs to a specific politics, which does 
crucial violence to politics and justice. And, as argued before, so-called 
critical potential of contemporary society seems to be assimilated by 
capital’s processes of abstraction of future commodity value. Put 
differently, neither aesthetic nor social critiques are the ‘real enemies’ of 
neoliberal capitalism. For it is capable of generating moral support in what 
criticises it, appropriating and accommodating what opposes and 
challenges it (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 27). 
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Unlike neoliberal paradigm, radical critique refers to another temporality, 
the event. If radical critique is a forceful act of tearing “the past from its 
context, destroying it, in order to return it, transfigured, to its origin” 
(Agamben, 1999: 152), then, critique should move ‘beyond good and evil’, 
that is, to act. This leap, therefore, necessarily brings with it the negation of 
existing values and the creation of new ones. The task of radical critique is 
indeed to be violent, but also to avoid spiteful destruction. In other words, 
the question is how to distinguish creative violence from unproductive 
violence, which is spite. Hence the importance of Benjamin, who 
differentiates divine violence from mythic violence: 
 
“If mythic violence is law-making, divine violence is law-destroying; if the 
former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical 
violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power  expiates; if the 
former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is 
lethal without spilling blood. […] Mythical violence is bloody power over 
mere life for its own sake, divine violence is pure power over all life for the 
sake of the living.” (1999a: 297) 
 
The concept of divine violence continues to have a potent hold on 
revolutionary politics, while it has also been subject to serious questioning 
(Agamben, 1998; Derrida, 1992; Diken, 2009; Evans and Reid, 2013; Žižek, 
2007a). One context for this discussion is the ongoing debates concerning 
the notion of divine violence as ‘bloodless annihilation.’ As Agamben 
(1998: 64) notes, Benjamin’s divine violence has a “capacity to lend itself to 
the most dangerous equivocations” that prompts Derrida to approximate it 
– “with a peculiar misunderstanding – to the Nazi ‘Final Solution.’” It must 
be emphasised from the outset that Derrida approaches divine violence 
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with suspicion. He (1992: 62) tells us that Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” 
is “too Heideggerian, too messianic- or archeo-eschatological” (ibid. 62). 
For Derrida, Benjamin does not offer sufficient ground to distinguish his 
messianic literalness from the most horrible deeds that come from human 
agents. As a result, Benjamin’s divine violence risks falling into the “worst” 
(Nazism, the Holocaust) (ibid. 63). 
 
Derrida says, for example, that the crucial aspects of Benjamin’s essay 
leave open a temptation “to think the holocaust as an uninterpretable 
manifestation of divine violence insofar as divine violence would be at the 
same time annihilating, expiatory and bloodless.” “When one thinks of the 
gas chambers and the cremation ovens”, writes Derrida (ibid. 62), “this 
allusion to an extermination that would be expiatory because bloodless … 
one is terrified of this interpretation that makes the holocaust an expiation 
and an indecipherable signature of the just and violent anger of God.” How 
to read Derrida’s reaction and divine violence in the light of the Nazi 
extermination of the Jews? One could say that Derrida’s critique of 
Benjaminian divine violence is controversial to say the least. Derrida seems 
to be saying that, since divine violence will continue to be confused with 
actual violence, we should embrace the immanence of justice, which is 
marked as ‘justice-to-come.’ In other words, justice itself remains to-come 
in the future to continually remind ourselves that our just decisions are in 
fact not justice and that justice can never be fully realised, that justice is 
always to-come. 
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For Derrida, any sense of actual violence (and justice) always holds the 
potential for grave dangers, for it can lead to the type of violence that is, in 
fact, merely a spiteful destruction. In order to avoid such dangers that can 
repeat cruel sovereign acts, Derrida thus (partially) moves away from the 
Benjaminian interpretation of messianism. The question, therefore, is 
whether Derrida’s reading of divine violence does justice to Benjamin’s 
divine violence. Derrida’s warning about divine violence and Benjamin’s 
messianism suggest we need to proceed with more caution, and avoid 
recklessness in action. However, his understanding of divine violence is 
prone to problems. At this point, Walter Benjamin’s distinction between 
mythic violence and divine violence might be helpful. Benjamin (1999a: 
297) argues that divine violence is the antithesis of mythical violence “in all 
respects.” The key difference is that mythical violence is “bloody capture” 
of the mere life of human beings in a novel way, whereas divine violence 
intervenes into that capture and destroys our creaturely attachment to the 
rottenness of the law. We see here that mythical violence is at the origin of 
both law-making and law-preserving violence, the origin, that is, of nothing 
less than the sovereign law.  
 
In other words, mythical violence, or the violence of sovereignty in 
Schmitt’s sense, is linked to the ‘state of exception’ in which the law 
suspends itself in order to establish the conditions for constitutional 
normality. Divine violence, on the other hand, is revolutionary violence 
that expresses life in a “nonmediate” way. For Schmitt, the state of 
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exception is the political moment par excellence of an existing legal order. 
For Benjamin, conversely, a real state of exception must be established 
against the normalisation of the state of exception, calling for an end of 
time, an end which is performed by the existing legal order, by sovereignty. 
Benjamin’s true exception is nothing else than revolutionary violence, 
which emancipates bare life from the state of exception that lies at the 
basis of normality tied to the state.15 In this sense, a bare life that is 
entirely subjected to sovereign power can also be conceived as a form of 
redemption in which the subject becomes capable of breaking out of 
captivity of the sovereign law. Precisely in this sense, Schmitt’s state of 
exception is preservative and protective, designed to maintain or fortify 
the violence of state power, grounding it in sovereign decisionism. By 
contrast, Benjamin’s revolutionary violence seeks to overturn this captivity, 
the violence of state power. Schmitt is a fascist, Benjamin revolutionary. 
Revolution and sovereign violence are thus intimately connected. This is 
why Benjamin (1969: 255-59) takes as his point of departure the “state of 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
 Worth noting is that the concept of bare life is mentioned but not properly addressed in 
Derrida’s critique of Benjamin. 
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exception” that has not become, but always was “the rule” in history and 
of history: 
 
“We must arrive at a concept of history in accord with this insight. Then we 
shall see clearly that our task is to bring about the actual state of exception, 
and thereby we will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.”  
 
Along the same lines, Benjamin (1999a: 295) tells us that “lawmaking is 
power-making, assumption of power, and to that extent an immediate 
manifestation of violence.” Mythical violence in this respect takes a stand 
on God’s side; it becomes a human version of God. Put simply, mythical 
violence is sovereign violence which is God come to earth. Divine violence, 
by contrast, is anti-idolatrous (see Martel, 2011: 164). It does not 
acknowledge the truths, myths we ascribe to God’s sovereignty but serve 
to undermine them. Giving Korah as a Biblical example – a biblical scene in 
which an idolator rebelled against God’s sovereignty and then was 
swallowed by the earth along with his followers - Benjamin (1999a: 297) 
argues that: 
 
“It [divine violence] strikes…them without warning, without threat, and 
does not stop short of annihilation. But in annihilating it also expiates, and a 
deep connection between the lack of bloodshed and the expiatory 
character of this violence is unmistakable. For blood is the symbol of mere 
life. The dissolution of legal violence stems…from the guilt of more natural 
life, which consigns the living, innocent and unhappy, to a retribution that 
‘expiates’ the guilt of mere life—and doubtless also purifies the guilty, not 
of guilt, however, but of law.” 
 
330 
 
What we see here is nothing other than a form of revolutionary violence, 
for it removes idolatry, namely God, and the law and political authority it 
produces (Martel, 2011: 163). 
 
Benjamin’s analysis of divine violence is sharp and vivid. While ‘not drawing 
an exact parallel’ to his time, present-day readers will find striking 
analogies in contemporary society. We live in an age of neoliberal 
biopolitics in which entire human ways of life (e.g. stateless peoples, sans-
papiers, poor youth, women, homosexuals, immigrants, and urban others) 
are excluded from political and civil life in order to be included in the realm 
of neoliberal capitalism. The mythical violence of neoliberal capitalism 
today has become more apparent in the war against terrorism, along with 
the biopolitical violence of power regimes and the violence of the free-
market. In this way bare life of human beings, “life not worthy of being 
lived”, has become entirely subjected to neoliberal biopolitics, which is to 
be differentiated from the rest of society and eventually exterminated or 
left to die (Agamben, 2004: 37). Entire human ways of life are, in short, 
suspended in the ‘willed’ state of exception that lies at the heart of 
neoliberal capitalism. The question that concerns us, therefore, is the 
redemption of bare life from this mythical violence of state sovereignty, of 
capital. Put simply, a bare life that is captured by neoliberal biopolitics can 
nevertheless be a form of revolutionary event in which human beings are 
capable of escaping the captivity of capital. In this sense divine violence is 
the means for a biopolitical struggle between capital and revolution. Trying 
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to emancipate bare life from the captivity of neoliberal capitalism, divine 
violence is not an event that happens at some future point in linear time, 
but refers to the arrest and the disruption of the entire model of linear and 
homogeneous time - in our case this means neoliberal capitalism - in which 
the agent is transformed through a process of revolutionary becoming. 
Divine violence makes it possible for the agent to restructure the actual 
within the ‘perspective of the virtual’ without God’s transcendence. 
Refusing to reify law’s sovereignty, divine violence, in other words, enables 
us to reread the world without the certainties of the truths that we usually 
would otherwise ascribe to God, the capital and state power. 
 
Let us turn to Derrida and, once again, ask his question: What if the 
Holocaust was “an uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence?” At 
this point, I contend that Derrida does interpret Benjamin’s concept of 
divine violence literally rather than a signification. In so far as mythic 
violence seeks to side with the existing order, with sovereignty, it requires 
signs and traces that are realized in bodies and inscribed on the subjects. 
Simply put, mythical violence needs signs to produce its own existence; it is 
a means of state sovereignty. Divine violence, on the contrary, creates 
spaces where signs and myths are destroyed in favour of revolution. It is 
precisely in this sense that the Holocaust should not be thought of as an 
“uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence” (Derrida, 1992: 62). The 
Holocaust was the culmination of mythic violence because it was codified 
and externalized by a state that rapidly absorbed military, economic, 
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political, and social power to commit genocide. It was, in short, the 
exercise of a State’s coercive power, which showed how legal violence 
itself could become a tool for revenge, a troubling manifestation of spite 
itself. Divine violence, on the other hand, is not reducible to pure 
destruction of reality; it is essentially grounded in the problem of creative 
destruction, with the question of an ethical subject, of divine justice. And 
justice is destructive in the sense that it opposes “the constructive 
ambiguities of law” (see Benjamin, 2005: 456). Divine justice disrupts the 
entire model of linearity, the means-end relation as the natural 
representation of the mythic continuum of history. 
 
Divine justice removes myths and idols, including state sovereignty and 
‘liberal democracy’, not to create new ones and worship them. In short, it 
does not refer to any transcendent Law or God. “This cannot be conceded. 
For the question ‘May I kill?’ meets its irreducible answer in the 
commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’” (Benjamin, 1999a: 298). Benjamin is 
careful to identify that the commandment is to be understood neither as a 
positive prescription (or an empty principle) nor as an absolute sovereign 
authority, but “as a limit with which one must struggle”, whose written 
form turns out to be indispensable in resisting the lure of the imaginary 
and the blind submission to power it encourages (see McNulty, 2007: 36-
7). That is, the commandment should be viewed as “a guideline for the 
actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with in solitude 
and, in exceptional cases, to take on themselves the responsibility of 
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ignoring it” (Benjamin, 1999a: 298). Attempting to define radical act which 
is neither that of a suicidal spiteful violence, nor of absolutist sovereign 
violence, Žižek (2008b: 162) also says of divine violence as the unsupported 
act, “made in absolute solitude, with no cover from the big Other.” As an 
unsupported act, the risk of reading and assuming divine violence is fully 
the subject’s own (ibid. 485). 
 
Divine violence aims at changing the situation as a whole. Spiteful 
destruction, by contrast, involves identification with the given, which is 
entangled with the systemic violence of the existing social order. Unlike 
spite, Benjaminian divine violence is truly liberatory when the event can be 
‘interpreted’, as the intervention of a decision. In fact, Benjamin’s notion of 
time and history shares a curious resemblance to Deleuze’s conception of 
time and the event. This useful comparison allows us to understand how 
Benjamin, like Deleuze, sees time and history as a perpetual movement or 
becoming, oriented toward revolutionary change with regard to the virtual 
and the actual. Both thinkers try to escape a linear, determinist notion of 
time that points toward the untimeliness of revolution that cannot be 
reduced to the empty nature of chronological time. We need Deleuze 
because his concept of the virtual takes us to the heart of revolutionary 
events which occur in the form of two series: the actual and the virtual. 
The event has an actual existence but its virtual potentialities are 
irreducible to its actual state of affairs. Deleuze’s virtual is an indicator that 
every relation and every society can change because events have a virtual 
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dimension. In this sense, the event is a break with the existing order, 
opening up the path of the actual to the virtual. We need Benjamin 
because his critique of historicism, his dialectical perspective enables us to 
grasp revolutionary events. The time of revolution is, for Benjamin, 
Messianic time. In this sense, he distinguishes the time of the event from 
the empty time of history, the consequence of which is bare repetition, or 
history as a pile of non-events that produce no difference. And we need to 
consider Benjamin and Deleuze together because their understanding of 
revolutionary events is not subordinated to the linear understanding of 
time, either spatially or historically. It is ‘outside’ of the directional, 
determinist movement, pointing toward a spectral, virtual aspect. Echoing 
Benjamin’s dialectical image, Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 112) write: “it 
[the future] is the infinite Now, the Nun that Plato already distinguished 
from every present: the Intensive or Untimely, not an instant but a 
becoming.” Though Deleuze gives too much importance to the concept of 
becoming than Benjamin does, it is safe to say that Benjamin’s task to 
“brush history against the grain” (Benjamin, 1969: 392) refers to 
revolutionary change both in theory and practice that seems to be closely 
related to Deleuze’s becoming. 
 
Benjamin, like Deleuze, sees revolution as an ‘untimely’ intervention that 
disperses the historical continuum, allowing the agent to seize and to be 
seized by the moment. Two points are of crucial significance here. First, 
revolutionary or divine violence has an actual existence, while at the same 
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time it contains within itself possibilities for change, which links it to the 
domain of the virtual. Importantly, these possibilities, virtual potentialities 
are not abstracted from the real, but “are real without being actual” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 94). That is to say, the virtual indicates the 
infinite potentialities for new emergent actualisations. Second, since 
society also has an actual existence, what matters for divine violence is the 
surface between the actual and the virtual. This surface, in other words, 
refers to a double serialisation, which contains two kinds of events: 
virtualisation and actualisation, or ideal events and actual events. The two 
series, however, should not be thought of as “equal” events (Deleuze, 
1990: 37). Rather the virtual aspect of new emergent possibilities is always 
in relation to its actual aspect. Thus the virtual and the actual are 
intimately connected. 
 
To put it bluntly, there “must be at least two multiplicities, two types, from 
the outset” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 152). Like Benjamin who 
emphasises the interaction between past (the time of the virtual) and the 
present, the two types of multiplicities (actual and virtual) in Deleuze are 
not distributed on a single line but continuously enables interaction, a 
continuum of sorts between the virtual and the actual (ibid. 152). In both 
Deleuze and Benjamin, therefore, an actual “state of affairs” cannot be 
separated from the whole of the past, the time of the virtual (Benjamin, 
1969: 255; Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 156). The virtual, for both Benjamin 
and Deleuze, does not lack existence but only needs an actualisation 
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process. Put very simply, events, for them, are already in our world, 
practiced in the shadow of the existing order. There is no other place from 
which an event emerges. And this reciprocal movement means a subject 
which is always in a state of becoming. 
 
The actualisation process is in two forms. First, the agent actualises the 
event by seizing the moment, unknown potentialities. The event’s 
unknown potentialities occur always in the present in which the past and 
the future of the event are interpreted with respect to its embodiment 
(actualisation), that is, a present, at which the truth of the event is grasped 
by the actor, made present (Deleuze, 1990: 150, 152). Thus divine violence 
connects two opposing paths: the past and the future, what has been and 
what is to come (Nietzsche, 1961: 178); a contracted moment in which the 
virtual and the actual come together; a contracted moment “in which the 
present, the past and the future merge together.” This connection is of 
course the gateway to the present moment (Diken, 2012: 27, 35). Second, 
the interpretation requires a subjectivity, which, too, is transformed in the 
process of interpretation. As a result of acting, the actor becomes “worthy” 
of the event through a process of “counter-actualization” (Deleuze, 1990: 
148, 151). In other words, the physical actualisation of the event is 
accompanied by the actor through a process of counter-actualization. In 
actualisation the subject seizes the moment, the event as unknown 
potentialities, whereas in counteractualisation the event seizes the subject 
that is longer determined by historical conditions but determines the 
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conditions that determine her. With the two sides of the event – 
actualisation and counteractualisation - there emerges freedom and a ‘free 
subject’ who “grasps the event and does not allow it to be actualised as 
such without enacting, the actor, its counter-actualisation” (ibid. 152). To 
reiterate, divine violence addresses the ethical subject that is its principle; 
it refers to ethics as being worthy of what happens to us (ibid. 149). 
 
In this sense, divine violence is not necessarily a religious experience 
because it is always in the world. It does not wait for some magical 
intervention; it itself is an intervention into time, the moment, the present, 
in order to change the course of history in favour of revolution. Thus divine 
act prepares for the event even though its date of arrival remains 
unknown. Divine violence, then, is an untimely intervention into history 
with a view to bringing forth a new society. For this reason, Benjamin’s 
messianism has to be seen in conjunction with his Marxism, a revolutionary 
philosophy committed to the event. This aspect is what seems to be missed 
or overlooked in Derrida’s critique. In Benjamin’s revolutionary politics, 
divine violence is intimately connected to human action. Divine violence 
signifies “a Messianic cessation of happening” (Benjamin, 1969: 263); it is 
thus characterised by a cessation of myths and idols as well; human actors 
prepare the way for revolutionary action to fill the space of cessation. 
Divine violence and purposeful human action are two sides of the same 
coin. It is this connection that makes divine violence manifest itself in this 
world, in the here and now. 
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In this way human actors become able not only to alter their creaturely 
attachment to the existing order and God-sovereigns, but to rethink their 
approach to questions of law and justice as well. Divine violence is what 
stands against norms of the given, of sovereign spectacle. When the 
central narrative of the existing order and sovereign authority is disrupted, 
we find that we cannot passively wait for a justice that never arrives. The 
divine manifestations in this world are not fragments of futurity, of an 
impossibility we can await without expectation. Aiming to redeem the 
oppressed past, divine violence does not act for future promises; it is found 
in present-day-life (Benjamin, 1999a: 297). In this sense, every moment is 
of crucial importance because there is a “peculiar revolutionary chance” in 
every historical moment which is “grounded on the right to enter the 
formerly closed past” (Benjamin, 2003: 402). That is to say, an ‘intoxicating’ 
component that results from being ‘seized’ by the moment lives in every 
moment of revolutionary subject. However, an intoxicated subject is never 
good enough. For “...to place the accent exclusively on it would be to 
subordinate the methodical and disciplinary preparation for revolution 
entirely to a praxis oscillating between fitness exercises and celebration in 
advance” (Benjamin, 2005: 216). Intoxication and revolutionary strategy 
are thus inextricably linked. Critique as divine violence is as much about the 
intoxicated subject as it is about strategy. While one “seizes the moment”, 
one must also be “seized by the moment” (Diken, 2012: 35-6). In short, 
strategic timing of the event and fidelity to the event constitute a double 
necessity. This is why revolution cannot be thought of without the 
339 
 
perspective of ‘history’, that is, from the perspective of ‘objective’ facts 
and interests. “Whatever leads to revolution belongs to the meaningful 
time of real history” (Sloterdijk, 2010: 65). The course of this history is 
analogous to a combination of strategy and intoxication. If there is no 
“desire”, there can be no “seeing” (see Žižek, 2007b: 5). If there is no 
intoxication, there can be no revolutionary event. 
 
Consequently, true political intervention consists of the two dimensions of 
kairos, strategy and intoxication, in a materialist context. And, as shown 
above, here lurks danger. So long as the desire for revolution remains 
unsatisfied, it results in a feeling that “everything deserves to pass away” 
(Nietzsche, 1961: 162). Or, with Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 229), a line of 
flight can lose its creative potential and become a line of “destruction, 
abolition pure and simple, the passion for abolition.” This is precisely what 
happens in spiteful destruction. What is at issue here is the ambivalence of 
divine violence. While mythic violence “will be recognizable as such with 
certainty”, divine violence, “the expiatory power of [divine] violence is 
invisible to men” (Benjamin, 1999a: 278). Divine violence, then, is best 
characterised as an aporia, not an antinomy. As a strategic predicament, as 
an immanent exception, as a revolutionary act that makes political 
interventions, any experiment with divine violence involves a radical 
undecidability because it is ‘beyond measure’ in that it has a virtual 
dimension, an excess in relation to actual relations of power and 
domination (Dillon, 2008b: 11). Even though Derrida consistently argues 
340 
 
that the aporia must be lived through, he seems to neglect an important 
aspect of divine violence: that of the passage between actualisation and 
virtualisation. Divine violence is as much about actualisation as it is about 
virtualisation. It is as much about the disruption of the given which is 
actualised in concrete situations, as it is about a contingent decision that 
aims to transcend actualisation. In the lack of a contingent decision, of a 
strategic calculus, divine violence can always become a violent force of 
despair, of destruction. If divine violence is essentially aporetic, and the 
essence of the aporia is not passive but performative, there is neither 
passion nor freedom without the experience of aporia. In this sense one 
cannot escape aporias; they must be lived through. “What is excessive in 
the event must be accomplished, even though it may not be realized or 
actualized without ruin” (Deleuze, 1990: 168). 
 
If divine violence consists in a radical contingent decision which is a sign of 
the virtual, it necessarily involves the suspension of the given. In this sense, 
the actuality of divine violence cannot be infinitely deferred. The aporia 
must be lived out. After all, divine violence is valuable only in so far as its 
virtual aspect is not exhausted. And there is always a passage from the 
virtual to the actual. It is in this way that the whole time, the time of the 
virtual, becomes a transformative potential, which is no other than relating 
the actual to the virtual. Revolutionary chance is present in socially specific 
constellations, which are “‘historical objects’, politically charged monads, 
‘blasted’ out of history’s continuum and made ‘actual’ in the present” 
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(Buck-Morss, 1991: 221). Radical critique envisions creating spaces where 
the virtual historical transformation and the actual meet in revolution. In 
this way the ‘spirit’ of the past is animated and embodied in the present. 
The past recalled (the virtual) and the present perception actualised in 
concrete situations is transformation through repetition with no conclusion 
to historical time. Thus radical critique can emerge out of repetition, not 
against it; it is a repetition that creates “something that has never yet 
existed” (Marx, 1852/2002: 10). It is, in short, a productive repetition which 
produces something new, a resurrection of the past events. 
 
As such, radical critique remembers the past (the spectre) in order to avoid 
the mistakes of the past (the ghost) (Diken, 2012: 84). For the past is fully 
real, a virtual hole, not a closed sum of political events. What we have here 
is a critique which repeats not an aspect of the past but a recognition that 
puts the actual and the virtual, strategy and intoxication into interaction. 
Combining in the right measure both revolutionary intoxication and 
strategic predicament, what matters for critique as divine violence is the 
‘surface’, the mediation between the actual and the virtual, which is 
precisely what disappears in spiteful destruction. The true difficulty, and 
the task of radical critique, however, is to link together divine violence and 
its outcome, without falling back on spiteful destruction. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
 
Conclusion: The Militancy of 2011 and the Time of 
Revolution 
 
“There has never yet been human life, but always just economic life.” 
(Bloch, 2006: 18) 
 
 
Recall the moments in Times Square, where Occupy Wall Street activists 
were confronted by police. New York Police officers attacked with batons, 
pepper spray and horses in order to prevent the protesters from gathering 
in Times Square. Police officers’ rage was understandable, for in Times 
Square, we witnessed angry protesters who turned the world upside down. 
What Occupy Wall Street suggests is that people are no longer determined 
by capitalist excess, but determine the conditions that determine them. It 
shows the interaction between the virtual (a philosophical ideal, revolu-
tion) and the actual (angry protesters) that is at war with visible reality 
(neoliberal capitalism). Occupy Wall Street, therefore, represents 
a movement in which the stability and the certainty of neoliberalism 
became yesterday’s bad memory. Times Square, the capital of consumer-
ism and the capitalist spectacle, makes a powerful setting for Occupy Wall 
Street’s struggle: “shiny walls of towing glass, the citadels of corporate 
entertainment, dazzle among the giant screens” (Jones, 2011). 
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But, in Times Square, no one looked entertained. Rather the capitalist 
imperative to enjoy ceased to exist and was replaced by genuinely angry 
and determined human beings who did not protest just against austerity, 
corruption, or corporate greed, but against the system itself. They put 
neoliberal capitalism in the dock. As the protests have made clear, market 
fundamentalism and a universal fear of state power are insufficient 
answers to the question of how to sustain a global order. Everyone knows 
that Occupy Wall Street and its slogan “We are the 99 percent” against the 
profiteering 1% tells the truth, the truth of the system coming to an end. It 
politicises, visualises, and expresses the fact that ‘We are not all in this 
together. Let us awake to the destruction of the present!’ It reflects, in 
other words, a radical shift, a radical critique that focuses on the internal 
dynamics of the system, for the phrase focuses attention on massive 
inequality and injustice that characterise neoliberal capitalism. 
 
Occupy Wall Street and the alternative political possibilities it has revealed 
may yet prove to be a catalyst for radical structural change. That is not the 
point. Occupy Wall Street is a turning point in history, not only because it 
succeeded in putting neoliberal capitalism at the centre of debate, which 
so recently seemed the only game in town, but also because it has illus-
trated “how political engagement with reality can rekindle the imaginative 
possibilities” (Sparrow, 2012). Occupying a place day and night, surrounded 
by crowds shaking the ground with a joy of togetherness and friendship, is 
a change, already happening and shared. 
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Neoliberal capitalism has dominated the world over the last three decades. 
Margaret Thatcher claimed that “there was no alternative to capitalism.” 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall free-market capitalism ruled universally, the 
communist alternative turned out to be impossible, and Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) declared history’s end in which liberal democracy, or neoliberal cap-
italism seemed incontrovertible. Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, the pioneers of 
neoliberal post-politics, led the left to embrace ‘free-finance’ friendly Third 
Way politics. As a result, ours has become a world in which people can 
easily imagine the end of the world but not that of capitalism (see Žižek, 
2009: 78). 
 
What we see in Times Square is the end of that consensual neoliberal 
order, which is going out of joint. What we see collapse is neoliberal capit-
alism, which declares that ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ 
is only possible through the existence of an unfettered market economy. In 
a naïve expectation of a ‘just justice’, what we get instead is neoliberal and 
militarised post-politics, a network of cruel and militarised social regimes 
that has come to define politics in contemporary times. In short, it is neo-
liberal capitalism which has clearly emerged as the name of the problem. 
What we see rise instead is nothing other than radical critique that is insep-
arable from the concept of revolution. If neoliberal capitalism is the prob-
lem, revolution is the answer. After all, revolution is an idea that never 
disappears. 
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In this sense, 2011 was a turning point in history, a year of a revolutionary 
becoming. Together with the Occupy movement, the world witnessed six 
revolts, in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and Québec. Specifically, what 
made the Arab revolts unexpected was not only the collapse of western-
backed corrupt and cruel dictatorships, but the fact that they occurred at 
the hands of the people, notwithstanding Islamists, who demanded free-
dom and justice. The Arab people have been consistently portrayed as ‘sav-
ages’, ‘barbarians’ who are not ready for democracy. However, they have 
shown us what democracy is. What we could and should learn from the 
Occupy movement and the Arab uprisings is that we aren’t powerless, 
depotentialised; we have a choice. The event is not far away. Central, then, 
to the Occupy movement and the Arab uprisings is the idea of event, which 
enables an opening to the virtual within the actual. The uprisings have 
demonstrated that history is a theatre, a virtual potentiality where human 
actors can produce new events. In short, the event occurs between us, the 
people, who have been silent for a long time  –  “people, who are present 
in the world but absent from its meaning and decisions about its future” 
(Badiou, 2012: 56). Thus they have illustrated how the notion of people is 
an invitation to commitment to the event. One cannot but recognise the 
thread of radical critique, the link between its moment and its place. The 
Occupy movement and the Arab revolts signal the arrival of an era in which 
the politics of hope extinguishes the politics of fear. The people are no 
longer silent and fearful. It is the governments, their repressive technolo-
gies and the universal surveillance state that are afraid of the people now. 
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Put simply, nobody predicted these revolts. They truly were ‘events’ in the 
sense that they marked the beginning of a new era in which radical critique 
extinguishes revisionist or decaffeinated critique. OWS and the Arab 
revolts recentred radical critique on struggle against neoliberal capitalism. 
They showed that neoliberal capitalism doesn’t work.  
 
How should we read the sign of this process? Quoting the French historian 
Andre Monglond, Benjamin (1999b: 482; see also Žižek, 2012: 128) writes: 
“The past has left images of itself in literary texts, images comparable to 
those which are imprinted by light on a photosensitive plate. The future 
alone possesses developers active enough to scan such surfaces perfectly.” 
OWS and the Arab revolts are such signs from the future, referring to a 
dialectical image in the Benjaminian sense rather than making a vulgar 
historical claim that revolution has already fully actualised. Hence “we 
should turn around the usual historicist perspective of understanding an 
event out of its context and genesis” (Žižek, 2012: 128). Revolutionary 
events cannot be understood in this way: instead of analysing them from 
the usual historicist perspective, we should affirm the interaction between 
the actual and the virtual, an interaction which enables us to see OWS and 
the Arab revolts as signs from an utopian future “which lies dormant in the 
present as its hidden potential” (ibid. 128). Referring to a Proustian 
dimension, Deleuze (1989: 39) argues that “people and things occupy a 
place in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space.” 
The magical word in this respect is in place which is here, whose time is not 
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the chronological empty time but the now-time, the time of the 
emancipated future, the future of revolution. After all, revolution is an 
ongoing process. Thus we should strive for a delicate balance between the 
virtual and the actual without falling back upon either passivity or spiteful 
violence. As mentioned before, what matters is the interaction between 
signs from the future and “the radical openness of the future”, for it 
contains unpredictable and contingent potentialities. In short, 
revolutionary signs from the future should be seen as signs from a future 
full of potentiality, which will become actualised if we remain open to that 
future and read these sings as guides (Žižek, 2012: 128). 
 
In Occupy Wall Street and the Arab revolts, masses seized the moment and 
were seized by the moment. What we have here is a resurgence of political 
will  –  a kind of revolutionary intoxication which is inextricably connected 
to strategy. What’s more, the space of the event is not reducible to the 
empirical space. One should never underestimate the political power of 
place because it can become a space of critique, dissensus and collective 
resistance to build new, potential worlds. Zuccotti Park and Tahrir Square 
resistances have demonstrated that people can clearly use places to house 
political energy. While the free movement of capital exists as an invisible 
abstraction, occupying a place is exceedingly concrete, a visible presence at 
the spaces of hope. The politics of hope, it seems, finds “shelter nowhere 
but in the tents pitched on public squares” (Bauman, 2012: 14). Instead of 
the market, or competition, the protesters depend upon cooperation; 
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instead of reckless individuality, they rely upon collective solidarity. In 
short, Zuccotti Park and Tahrir Square are indications of how places are 
common grounds; they haunt the imaginations of people who can build 
a consciousness toward existence. The place is intimately connected to the 
event: 
 
“In the stride of an event, the People is made of those who know how to 
solve the problems brought about by the event. Thus, in the takeover of a 
square: food, sleeping arrangements, watchmen, banners, prayers, 
defensive actions, so that in the place where it all happens, the place that is 
the symbol, is kept for the safeguarded for the people, at any price. 
Problems that, at the level of the hundreds of thousands of risen people 
mobilized from everywhere, seemed insoluble, all the more that in this 
place the State has virtually disappeared.” (Badiou, 2011) 
 
After all, an event is valuable in so far as it transcends the empirical space, 
and links us to the virtual, the untimely. The topological space of the event 
is the space of creative destruction. The space of the event is, in short, one 
in which the new eternally returns. It is at this point that the importance of 
Occupy Wall Street and the Arab revolts should be situated, as they epi-
tomised the very antagonism between the empty, chronological time (of 
measurement) and the virtual (immeasurable) time, the ‘time for revolu-
tion.’ In their struggle, the mediation between the virtual and the actual 
was of crucial significance. Their resistance had an actual existence, while 
at the same time contained within themselves possibilities for change, 
which linked them to the domain of the virtual. Their struggle, in other 
words, involved a double serialisation, which contained two kinds of 
events: virtualisation and actualisation. 
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The actualisation process was in two forms. First, since the virtual (idea) 
and the actual (the protesters) were inextricably bound to the event, the 
demonstrating masses actualised the event by seizing the moment, 
unknown potentialities. Reading the signs in the given situation, they 
grasped the moment of opportunity by a strategic decision. Theirs was, in 
short, an untimely intervention in which the past and the future merged 
together; a contracted moment where the virtual and the actual came 
together, rectifying capitalism’s injustices and inequalities and imagining 
a different future. This was of course the gateway to the present moment, 
revealing a non-linear time in which unknown possibilities are not pregiven 
but created with revolutionary action. 
 
Second, by means of an interpretation (reading the symptoms, signs avail-
able in the existing situations), the occupiers were, too, transformed in the 
process of interpretation. As a result of acting, they became worthy of the 
event through a process of counteractualisation. Put differently, the phys-
ical actualisation of the event (Zuccotti Park, Tahrir Square) was accompan-
ied by the demonstrating masses through a process of counter-
actualisation. In actualisation they seized the moment, the virtual as 
domain of political possibilities, whereas in counteractualisation the 
moment, the event seized them. Consequently, they were able to determ-
ine the historical conditions that determined them for a long time. With 
the two sides of the event - actualisation and counteractualisation - there 
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emerged freedom and ‘free protesters’ who grasped the political event as 
a revolutionary becoming. 
 
In their upheaval and disruption, time was experienced intensively: in their 
tent cities some kind of elemental process took place where the living fab-
ric of life was transformed into the experimental commune. Their struggle 
was exactly to transcend the empty, chronological time, transforming the 
places into a virtual centre in which new potentialities emerged. There was 
incessant political debate. Both Zuccotti Park and Tahrir Square created an 
immense impetus for the intentional acting of a revolutionary subjectivity 
(‘the struggling, oppressed classes’). Everything was shared, from space, 
thoughts to beds and food. Developing a culture of dissent and confronta-
tion, the protesters shared ideas/thoughts, avidly discussing them, mobil-
ising a life around an idea. As a result, Zuccotti Park and Tahrir Square 
became a microcosm of debate, a profusion of ideas, a site of encounters, 
which enabled the occupiers to organise a life around an idea in the service 
of a moment of awakening. In a sense, this historical awakening was an 
escapist logic, but it was not an escapism which seeks to hide from the 
world. Rather it was an escapism from hell, the very hell of neoliberal capit-
alism, which followed through into escape from the present. 
 
Concomitantly, the protesters not only struggled against neoliberal capital-
ism, but also against the ‘dirty tricks’ used by the governments. Mobilising 
the repressive state apparatus of the police and armed forces, the govern-
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ments did everything to savage the occupiers, smear their opponents, and 
manipulate, channel, and repress the participants’ tremendous energy, 
thus illustrating what Alain Badiou (2012: 18-9) calls “zero tolerance” for 
the occupiers and other participants and “infinite tolerance for the crimes 
of bankers and government embezzlers which affect the lives of millions.” 
Despite all these difficulties, the demonstrating masses’ appeal must be 
understood at the level of strategy and revolutionary intoxication, which 
are keys to a transformed relationship with the world, a revolutionary 
becoming. 
 
What we’ve learned from the Occupy movement and the Arab revolts is 
that neoliberal capitalism is not the only alternative, conceivable economic 
system - in short the realisation that there is an alternative. Before 2011, 
one couldn't even imagine an alternative to neoliberal capitalism. But the 
revolts showed that we can now at least imagine new political possibilities 
In short, they finally managed to break the 30-year stranglehold of 
neoliberalism that has been placed on our thoughts and imagination, 
a counterrevolutionary thought which has been writing the history of 
human relations as market relations for over 30 years. 
 
There remains one issue to be clarified however. The militancy of 2011, it 
seems, didn’t itself have the force necessary to topple the existing social 
order. As I argued before, today even great successes can be contained and 
neutralised by neoliberal capitalism. Thus, it is not enough to reject neolib-
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eral capitalism; one should also begin to think seriously about what kind of 
system we desire instead of capitalism. Since neoliberal capitalism has 
appeared as the name of the problem, it seems the time had come to think 
about new political possibilities: the very nature of neoliberal capitalism, 
fear, money, debt and inequality; to ask what ‘capitalism’ is actually for. 
What social system can replace capitalism, what idea can replace it? These 
are the questions that we all need to ask; questions that should prompt us 
to think about new political possibilities and search for new emergent 
forms of organisations such as communism. 
 
The crisis of neoliberalism caused us to think politics might be possible. 
That realisation should deepen and enrich us. Thus we should begin to ima-
gine and experiment with what is possible, since the virtual bears no rela-
tionship with the existing order. After all, freedom is valuable in so far as it 
can mean experimenting with the link between what exists and what hap-
pens. If the protests are to become more than ‘hapless carnivals’, if they 
are to become a catalyst to change the world, eventually we will 
undoubtedly have to confront a new form of organisation. Given that we 
have only just emerged from the neoliberal counterrevolution, it is safe to 
say that it will take time. So the key will be to sustain the story of Occupy 
and the Arab revolts through a new political organisation that is as 
intoxicated as it is open to new emergent possibilities. So we need to do so 
patiently, respectfully and always in relation to strategy and hard work, the 
very features that made revolution what it is. 
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Of course nothing in the long run is only going to be changed by just 
occupying space. And we still do not know where OWS and the Arab 
revolts will lead, for we are dealing here not with a determinate historical 
event which cannot be explained by economic and political causality, but 
the event as a process that is still going on. But they will only have an effect 
on the established order if they match with a new subjectivity that com-
bines both revolutionary intoxication and strategic predicament. Only on 
this basis can it be possible to translate the new subjectivity into action 
that offers ‘resistance.’ For OWS and the Arab revolts to succeed in the 
long term, the creative and divine dimension of radical critique needs to be 
put to work, rather than translated into power’s language. Only in this way 
can revolutionary change be effected without falling back upon either 
passivity or unproductive violence. 
 
In this respect both sides of kairos - strategy and intoxication, seeing and 
desire, knowledge and faith - are crucial. Strategy without intoxication is 
useless as intoxication without strategy, that is to say, spiteful destruction 
which creates nothing new. Revolving around the permanent crisis of its 
strategic aporia, radical critique establishes a link between the actual (a 
strategic calculus) and the virtual (revolutionary intoxication), a link which 
makes it possible for the new subjectivity to positively cause a rupture, to 
destroy its creaturely attachment to neoliberal capitalism. In short, both 
sides of kairos are vital for radical critique. What matters is to keep them in 
relation. And finally, the aporia of critique must be overcome in praxis, 
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which is not reduced to empty, chronological time. The time of critique as 
divine violence has no ‘proper time.’ The time of divine violence as critique 
is never chronological time. And if radical critique still persists, refuses to 
disappear in the new spirit of neoliberal capitalism, this is because radical 
critique as divine violence inhabits a present in which “time stands still and 
has come to a stop” (Benjamin, 1969: 254). 
 
The Occupy movement may have been evicted, the spirit of the Arab 
revolts may have been ‘stolen.’ But these burgeoning movements have 
demonstrated that ‘no one can evict an idea whose time has come.’ That 
idea, I suggest, is communism. 
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